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The development of the solar industry in China has attracted a great deal of 
attention in recent years with the exponential growth in its solar photovoltaic (PV) 
manufacturing and installation. Conventional wisdom holds China as a manufacturing 
giant but a weak innovation player. This study examines the solar PV innovation and 
manufacturing system in China. 
Using solar cell lab efficiency, the quality and quantity of solar PV patents, and 
publications as three innovation indicators, this study finds that in general, China is 
closing the innovation gap between itself and the world’s leading innovators. Unlike what 
conventional wisdom assumes, this study shows that the Chinese PV R&D community 
has been actively engaging in basic science research and has produced noticeable 
outcomes in certain technology areas, although depending on the choice of innovation 
indicator, the progress is uneven across the PV technology spectrum.  
Three reasons are behind the increasingly active solar innovation in China. 
Firstly, the Chinese government set a strategic vision for the solar PV industry, which is 
to achieve both technological advancement and industrialization along the entire solar PV 
value chain. The vision is then implemented by a suite of science, technology and 
innovation (STI) programs administered by the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST) of China. Secondly, the growing public finance support from the central and 
local governments coupled with corporate R&D investment from major Chinese solar 
panel manufacturers fuel the innovation in both academia and the industry. Lastly, solar 
PV R&D in China benefited from an increasingly global innovation network that 
involves both public and private innovation players from domestic and international 
institutes. Governments’ deliberate effort to recruit overseas well-established scientists 
and the solar companies’ rising attention to innovation both play an important role in 
forming the network.   
 xxii 
In contrast to its increasingly global innovation network, solar PV manufacturing 
in China thrives on a fully developed domestic supply chain. The supply chain grew out 
of non-solar-specific suppliers, who co-located and co-developed with the booming solar 
PV manufacturing industry. The market advantage derived from agglomeration 
economies combined with government policies that encouraged economies of scale 
development eventually gave rise to a fully developed, self-sufficient domestic solar PV 
supply chain that features a few highly concentrated industrial clusters, such as the one in 
the Yangtze River Delta area.  
This study discovers that a fully developed domestic supply chain could offer 
multiple benefits to domestic industries. It provides them with cheaper alternative tooling 
and material options that directly reduce their production costs. It lowers the transaction 
cost associated with communication between suppliers and producers and enables 
collaborative local learning. In addition, the agglomeration economies created by the 
domestic supply chain lock the cost and logistic advantage within the country and gives it 
unique infrastructure, business, and knowledge advantages that are difficult to duplicate 
elsewhere.  
Despite the importance of a domestic supply chain, the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses conducted by this study finds that it is impossible to point to one 
factor as the root of competitiveness. Rather, this study identifies 15 factors that cover 
five realms of potential sources of competitiveness: agglomeration economies, firm 
strategy, culture, resource, and policy.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese solar PV industry still faces a few stubborn 
weaknesses. MOST’s utilization of the STI programs was inefficient and ineffective due 
to its lack of policy consistency and continuity, its own less-than-perfect technology 
forecast, and inaccurate market feasibility assessment. Local institutions, including local 
governments and universities, have not developed the tenacity to building innovation 
strength, and the weak innovation capacity jeopardizes the competitiveness of the 
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manufacturing sector and the development of the supply chain, making it difficult for 
them to gain strength in areas that require advanced knowledge and manufacturing skills. 
Besides, the industry-wise pursuit for quick commercial success via the low road 
development strategy caused a range of problems, from low product quality to poor 
product performance. As consumes become more and more sensitive to efficiency and 
reliability of their solar PV systems, the low-cost strategy is likely to cause problems for 
the Chinese PV industry in the future. Last but not least, an overshoot of the economies 
of scale strategy fueled by easy access to capital and local governments’ short-term-
interest-driven economic development decisions led to rapid but irrational expansions of 
manufacturing capacity. 
A few policy lessons can be learned from the study of the solar PV industry in 
China. First, setting a national vision and then following it up with concrete strategies can 
energize an industry. Second, a country’s manufacturing capacity is as strong as its 
innovation strength. Therefore, countries should use innovation as a crosscutting lever to 
integrate R&D conducted in labs with manufacturing innovation and supply chain 
innovation. Innovation policy, industry policy, and market-adoption policy should be 
designed in synergy.  In addition, policies should also be crafted to match to the right 
geographical scale. In particular, policies that promote the development and diffusion of 
codified knowledge should aim for a global reach whereas local industrial clusters and 










In the wake of rising energy demand, a changing climate and deteriorating 
environmental quality, many countries have made developing renewable energy 
resources one of their top priorities. Among all types of renewable energy, the 
development of the solar energy industry has attracted a great deal of attention in recent 
years with its exponential growth in global solar photovoltaic (PV) installed capacity. 
China stands out in this ongoing solar revolution. Chinese solar PV installed capacity has 
doubled every year since the passage of Renewable Energy Law in 2006, reaching 7 GW 
total installed capacity in 2012 (Montgomery, 2013). In 2013, China installed close to 12 
GW of PV capacity (BNEF 2014a), surpassing Germany and the United States for the 
first time to become the world’s largest PV installer.  The figure was slightly lower in 
2014, which was 10.6 GW, but it pushes the total installed solar capacity of the country 
to 30 GW (National Energy Administration, 2015). It is reported that in the first nine 
months in 2015, China added another 9.9 GW solar capacity to its fleet (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2015c). The National Energy Administration, China’s energy regulative body, 
announced in October 2015 that China had set an installed capacity goal of 150 GW solar 
for 2020 (Xinhua News Agency, 2015b).  
Behind the country’s fast deployment of solar PV is China’s world’s largest PV 
manufacturing industry, which has grown from almost non-existent in early 2000s to 
account for 70% of the global solar PV production in 2014 (GTM Research, 2013). 
Today, China has at least 65GW of solar module production capacity (PV-Tech, 2014). 
Seven out of the ten World’s largest PV manufacturers in 2014 are Chinese (PV-Tech, 
2014). 
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China’s ability to quickly develop a new energy industry has caught the world’s 
attention, but it also puts its entire PV sector under scrutiny. First, its pursuit of a “low 
road” (cost driven) strategy instead of a “high road” strategy (high productivity) has 
trapped the industry in the lower value-added segment of the global market. Although 
solar PV modules made in China were sold worldwide, not many of them have state-of-
the-art electric conversion efficiency, a key indicator that measures the performance of 
solar PV. In fact, China is a latecomer to PV technology innovation. The U.S. National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) tracks the world record lab efficiency of 23 types 
of PV technologies between 1975 and 2014 and none of them was set by Chinese entities. 
Even in the commercial production realm, Chinese companies are often known as 
producers of low- to medium-efficiency but affordable solar PV. In today’s market where 
the cost of solar panels has declined so significantly that room for further cost reduction 
is limited. The manufacturing industry and the research community in China are in fact 
eagerly yearning for innovation because they have exhausted almost all the potentials of 
the low road strategy. Second, the way that Chinese PV manufacturers achieve its global 
market dominance is challenged by American and European solar PV manufacturers. 
They alleged that the reasons Chinese PV manufacturers were able to achieve cost 
competiveness were because they received “illegal” subsidies from the government and 
they sold their products at prices below their production costs. The claim led to bitter 
trade fights between China and E.U. and the U.S. over China’s solar panel exports. 
The securities challenge the entire legitimacy of the solar PV sector in China, 
from research to manufacturing. Essentially, the critics construct an alternative view that 
there is no real solar PV technological innovation in China; and the reason that the 
Chinese solar PV industry is competitive is because of government subsidized low-cost 
production.  
Challenges from the critics in fact pointed to some quintessential questions that 
any emerging energy technology, or any new socially and environmentally friendly 
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technology in general for that matter, has to answer, which are how to develop the 
innovation capacity around a new technology? And how to effectively and efficiently 
scale up the manufacturing in order to facilitate its market creation and to advance its 
adoption in the market? This study intends to contribute to the search for answers to these 
questions by using the solar PV industry in China as an example. 
1.2. Research Objectives  
This objective of the dissertation is threefold. First, it intends to explain the 
development of the solar PV industry in China using the Technological Innovation 
Systems (TIS) framework and explain the mechanisms that lead to the successes and 
failures in the industry. This study defines the “development” of the solar PV industry as 
containing three dimensions: the advancement of solar PV research; the creation and 
sustaining of PV manufacturing competitiveness; and the scaling up of the solar PV 
supply chain. By analyzing the structure and functions of the industry and the 
mechanisms through which drivers and barriers are created that either facilitate or block 
the development of the industry, this dissertation proposes to answer the following 
questions:  
Where does China stand in terms of solar PV innovation relative to the world’s 
leading innovators? And what policies and market dynamics enabled or impeded the 
advancement of solar PV innovation? 
What are the sources of market competitiveness among Chinese PV 
manufacturers? And how can they be translated to other socially and environmentally 
friendly technology-related manufacturing industries?  
What market and polices forces led to the development a regionally clustered 
solar PV supply chain in China despite the strong force of globalization? And how did it 
contribute to solar PV innovation and manufacturing?   
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What lessons can policymakers draw from China's experience to design better 
policies to facilitate the development of future new socially and environmentally friendly 
technology-oriented industry?  
At the center of the quest to answer these questions lies the effort to understand 
the interactions between public policy and markets. Comparing to conventional energy 
industries like the petroleum and coal, the solar energy industry is still at its initial stage 
of development; policies can have significant impacts on the growth trajectory of the 
industry through providing incentives, setting standards, or rewarding certain behaviors 
(Lewis & Wiser, 2007; Mitchell, 2010). Therefore, this dissertation will examine the 
development path of the Chinese PV industry from the policy perspective by applying the 
TIS framework to examine the functions and impact of various policies (known as 
institutions in TIS terms)1, and explain the dynamics between the policy tools, market 
forces, and market behavior of industry players in order to identify the drivers and 
barriers and illustrate the processes through which they induce or block the development 
of the industry.  
This work will draw insight from the national technological innovation systems 
(Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, & Rickne, 2008; B Å Lundvall, 2010; Richard 
R. Nelson, 1993), economic geography (S Christopherson & Clark, 2009; Clark, 2013; 
Dicken, 2011; Gordon & McCann, 2000), industrial policy (K. S. Gallagher, 2014; 
Lewis, 2013; Nahm & Steinfeld, 2014a), political economy (Mitchell, 2010; Zhao, 
Zhang, Hubbard, & Yao, 2013a), and energy policy (M A Brown & Sovacool, 2011; 
Sovacool & Brown, 2015) literature. By examining the innovation system and the 
manufacturing system first independently and then synergistically using first-hand 
empirical evidence, this work hopes to explore the links across different policy areas in 
                                                 
1 Terms and phrases special to the TIS framework will be put in bold and italic font throughout the 
dissertation. 
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order to shed practical light on policymaking that aims to effectively and efficiently 
development a new socially and environmentally friendly technology-based industry.  
In addition, this dissertation means to develop methods that can quantitatively test 
the causal factors of market competitiveness among leading Chinese solar PV 
manufacturing firms. Much of the ongoing trade dispute between the U.S. and China 
stems from the different understanding of the source of cost-competitiveness at the firm 
level (Goodrich, Powell, James, Woodhouse, & Buonassisi, 2013a; U.S. DOC, 2012a, 
2012b). Building on literature about technology innovation (Breznitz and Murphree 
2011; de la Tour, Glachant, and Ménière 2011; Lewis 2013; Mohr 1969; Nelson 1993a), 
competitive advantage in manufacturing (Fujita & Thisse, 2013; P. Krugman, 1991a; 
Nahm & Steinfeld, 2014a; Teece, 1980; Weiss & Bonvillian, 2009) and industrial policy 
(Clark, 2013; Milstein Commission on new Manufacturing, 2014; Rodrik, 2004), this 
work aims explore the production cost of tier-1 solar PV manufacturing firms using firm-
level data in order to understand low cost production among Chinese firms in relationship 
to potential causal factors like subsidies, economies of scale, and innovation. Fuzzy set-
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) approach will be used to as the main 
quantitative tool to accomplish this task. This analysis will offer empirical evidence to 
inform the debate about the true sources of market competitiveness in the solar 
manufacturing area. More importantly, it will advance the academic discourse on 
building and maintaining economic competitive advantages of a firm, and shed light on 
policy design that aims to facilitate the building and scaling up of a new socially and 
environmentally friendly technology-based industry.  
1.3. Structure of the Dissertation  
The remaining chapters of this study are organized as follow. Chapter 2 will 
introduce the TIS framework, the quantitative and qualitative research methodology and 
data. Chapter 3 dives into the innovation subsystem to examine whether it has been 
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effective in producing innovation progress and what mechanisms lead to the progress or 
the lack thereof. Chapter 4 provides analysis of the development of the manufacturing 
subsystem and its sources of competitiveness using both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Discovered that the supply chain development is the most prominent feature of 
the manufacturing subsystem, Chapter 5 has an in-depth look at the supply chain, its 
history, characteristic, and most importantly the role it plays to link the innovation 
subsystem with the manufacturing subsystem. Finally, Chapter 6 will bring the findings 
together and explore the inherent connections between innovation, manufacturing, supply 
chain development, and deployment. Although PV deployment will not be discussed in 




METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK  
2.1. Introduction 
A mixed-method approach will be used to qualitatively understand the processes 
through which policies and markets interact and influence the development of the PV 
industry as well as quantitatively assess the competitive advantages that PV 
manufacturing firms developed in response to different policy and market environment.  
The qualitative analysis will be guided by the Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) 
framework. The structural components of the solar PV TIS, such as the actors, their 
networks and the institutions that govern them will be analyzed. TIS also emphasizes 
qualitatively assessing the processes through which driving- and blocking-mechanisms 
are formed and used to either advance or impede the development of the solar PV TIS. 
More than 120 semi-structured interviews with solar PV professionals, researchers, 
analysts and policymakers have been conducted. Content obtained from these interviews 
will be used as data for qualitative analysis under the TIS framework. In addition, the 
causal factors that lead to lower solar PV production cost among Chinese solar PV 
manufacturers will also be quantitatively examined.  
Much of the research, analysis, and writing that undergirds this dissertation was 
done as part of the China Project at Stanford University’s Steyer-Taylor Center for 
Energy Policy and Finance. That project, as of the submission of this dissertation, was in 
the process of finalizing a comprehensive report that will be published widely. The 
Stanford report chronicles and analyzes changes in China’s dominant role in the global 
solar industry; examines in particular developments in China’s innovative capacity in 
solar and in its solar supply chain and the drivers and implications of those innovation 
and supply-chain advances; assesses what the changes in the Chinese solar industry say 
about the comparative advantages of China and of other countries, including the United 
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States, in the globalizing solar industry; and, in light of that analysis, recommends 
policies that different countries might pursue to play to their comparative advantages in a 
way that minimizes the cost of scaling up solar power for the world. Much of the work 
that appears in this dissertation, which the Stanford Project has by courtesy allowed to be 
presented in this dissertation, was done in concert with multiple members of the project’s 
Stanford research team and will appear in the Stanford project’s report. In particular, the 
data and analysis prompting the conclusion that China is in certain areas narrowing the 
solar-innovation gap with the West, the data and analysis deconstructing China’s solar-
manufacturing supply chain, and interviews with dozens of solar executives, 
policymakers, and academics in China are key parts of the Stanford project’s work. As 
explained above in the Acknowledgement section, the author of this dissertation took the 
lead while at Stanford in organizing the innovation research and in analyzing the supply-
chain related research. 
2.2. Qualitative Analysis: Framework and Its Application 
2.2.1. Technological Innovation Systems as an Analytical Framework  
This dissertation will use Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) as the main 
theoretical framework to conduct qualitative analysis. TIS examines a dynamic network 
of agents interacting in a specific economic/industrial area under a particular institutional 
infrastructure to pursue the development, diffusion, and utilization of one technology 
(Bergek et.al., 2008).  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the analytical flow of the TIS framework. It begins with 
identifying the technological innovation system in focus and the actors, networks, and 
institutions involved in the system. One highlight of the TIS framework is that it pays 
special attention to the processes that affect the overall wellbeing of the system (Hekkert 
et.al., 2007; Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000). It does so by first identifying key functions 
of the system, i.e. the contributions of one component or a set of components to the 
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advancement of the system. Seven functions are at the heart of the TIS framework: 
knowledge development, resource mobilization, market formation, influence on the 
direction of search, legitimation, entrepreneurial experimentation, and development of 
positive externalities.  The next step is to assess how the processes of fulfilling these 
functions work in a TIS. When examining the processes, the TIS framework evaluates 
how well these processes work to advance the functions of the system and identify the 
mechanisms that either drive (induce) or block the development of the functions, which 
in turn impact the overall wellbeing of the TIS.  The driving (inducement) and blocking 
mechanisms are the key products of a TIS analysis because they explain the success and 
failure of a technological innovation system in creating and developing its functions. 
They also explain how each function individually and/or collectively serve to improve or 
hinder the wellbeing of the overall system. Policy recommendations can be offered based 
on TIS analysis to promote the identified good practices and tackle the barriers created by 
blocking mechanisms.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Analytical Flow of Technological Innovation Systems Framework 
Source: Bergek et al. 2008 
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2.2.2. Key concepts in the framework 
Technological Innovation System: a dynamic network of agents interacting in a 
specific economic/industrial area under a particular institutional infrastructure and 
involved in the development, diffusion, and utilization of technology.  
Structural components of a TIS: a group of components serving a common 
purpose, which is to uphold the goals of a TIS. 
Actors: players who are involved in the development, diffusion, and utilization of 
a certain technology. 
Networks: an intermediate form of organization between actors. Their essential 
function is to facilitate information and knowledge exchange. 
Institutions: formal institutions refer to rules, laws, regulations, and policies. 
Informal institutions include culture and social norms. 
Functions: the contribution of a component or a set of components to the overall 
wellbeing of an innovation system. They are the processes that directly influence the 
development, deployment of a new technology and consequently affect the performance 
of the innovation system. The TIS framework focuses on understanding the process of 
technology innovation through assessing seven functions of an innovation system.  
Knowledge development and diffusion: the expansion of a TIS’s knowledge base 
by adding new knowledge and new sources of knowledge. It also concerns with the 
evolution of the knowledge base over time via learning and knowledge diffusion.  
Influence on the direction of search: activities that shape actors’ needs, 
requirements and expectations with respect to their involvement in developing and 
advancing the emerging technology. It is a combined strength of incentives, pressures, or 
even coercion (Bergek et al., 2008).  
Entrepreneurial experimentation: the risk-taking behaviors with regard to the 
uncertainties of new technologies and markets that eventually reduce the uncertainties for 
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latecomers. It opens up the door for new technologies to make inroads into the 
mainstream market.   
Market formation: the multi-phased process to create, nurture, and solidify the 
market presence of technologies at concern.   
Legitimation: the act to gain the social acceptance, align with the incumbent 
institutions, or establish new rules of the game. It is the prerequisite for a new industry to 
become a mature industry. Ways through which legitimation can be created include: 
institution alignment; manipulation of rules of the game; conformance with the existing 
rules; and creation of new rules of the game.   
Resource mobilization: the ability of an actor or a technology to draw on 
resources such as financial assets, human capital, social support, regulatory endorsement 
and etc. to one’s own benefit.  
Development of positive externalities: a positive feedback loop that allows one 
function to help the fulfillment of other functions. For example, the market creation 
function fulfilled by the PV manufacturing subsystem facilitates the legitimation of the 
subsystem.  
Mechanisms: “the causal inter-relations within the system itself as it moves under 
the influence of outside pushes and pulls and the momentum of its own internal 
processes.” (Myrdal, 1957). TIS aims to understand two types of mechanisms: the driving 
mechanism and the blocking mechanism. A driving mechanism provides inducing force 
to a TIS to facilitate the fulfilling of certain function(s) and improve the overall wellbeing 
of the TIS. A blocking mechanism is a negative force that impedes a TIS’ efforts to 
develop its function(s) and hurt the overall wellbeing of the TIS.  
2.2.3. Apply TIS to the Solar PV Industry in China 
The scope of the system includes three distinct but interrelated subsystems: the 
PV technology innovation subsystem, the PV manufacturing subsystem, and the PV 
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deployment subsystem (Figure 2.2). The reason to divide the solar PV TIS into three 
subsystems is partly because different skills and products are involved in different 
subsystems. More importantly, from the policy and political economy perspective, each 
subsystem is governed by a distinct set of institutions: the PV innovation subsystem is 
heavily influenced by the national innovation system in China and the specific science 
and technology policies that it promulgates.  
  
Figure 2.2 The Scope of Solar PV Technological Innovation Systems 
 
 
In a broader sense, the PV technology innovation subsystem is essentially part of 
the large network that connects the government policies with education system, 
enterprises, and a suite of enabling infrastructures such as the financial market and the 
labor market and so on (B Å Lundvall, 2010; Richard R Nelson, 1993). In a narrower 
sense, the subsystem is under the direct influence of the country’s and companies’ R&D 
budget and its non-financial capacity to innovate such as its research talents and its 
attention to manufacturing processes. From a public policy perspective, policies that are 
most relevant to this subsystem is administered by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) in China (de la Tour et al., 2011; Lewis, 2013; Sun, 2013). MOST 
is in charge of setting agendas for PV technology innovation. Besides agenda setting, 
these agencies also carry out another important function –allocating R&D funding among 
various players. Chapter 3: The Solar PV Innovation Technological Innovation 
Subsystem in China examines the development of the subsystem in details. 
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Unlike the innovation subsystem, the manufacturing subsystem is in essence an 
industrial sector. In the Chinese context, it is regulated by industrial policies promulgated 
by NDRC, China’s top economic decision-making agency, and Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MOIIT) (Andrews-Speed, 2012; Breznitz & Murphree, 2011). 
Policies used to facilitate the development of the PV manufacturing industry include a 
combination of tax incentives and subsidies on labor, capital and material inputs. Market 
plays an important role in shaping the development path of the PV manufacturing firms 
in China. In addition, trade policy plays an increasingly important role in shaping the 
manufacturing landscape as globalization continues to change the way goods are 
produced. The recent trade conflicts that China had with the U.S. and the E.U. are 
examples of the impacts of trade policies. Chapter 4: The Solar PV Manufacturing 
Technological Innovation Subsystem in China is dedicated to study the PV 
manufacturing subsystem.  
Supply chain stands out as a unique and consequential feature of the solar PV 
manufacturing subsystem in China. Its sheer size, degree of sophistication, and 
continuous evolvement make it a one-of-a-kind factor that differentiates the PV industry 
in China from the rest of the world. Yet, there has not been a single study that dives into 
the history and nuances of the solar PV supply chain in China. Moreover, the how the 
supply chain has enable the development and the maturation of the PV industry has not 
been thoroughly investigated. Chapter 5: Supply Chain of the Solar PV Manufacturing 
Industry fills this blank by detailing the history and current state of solar PV supply chain 
in China, and the mechanisms through which it facilitates the growth the overall PV 
manufacturing industry.   
Although the PV deployment subsystem is considered as part of the national 
energy infrastructure system, this dissertation does not include the PV deployment 
subsystem in the scope. Part of the reason is that the deployment system has very little 
connection with the innovation subsystem, albeit it is intertwined with the manufacturing 
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subsystem. The latter relationship will be explored in Chapter 4: The Solar PV 
Manufacturing Technological Innovation Subsystem in China.  
2.3. Qualitative Analysis: Data and Research Design 
Under the TIS framework, this dissertation will use qualitative semi-structured 
interview data and documents on government directives, policies, ordinance, and political 
debates to examine the functions and mechanism developed in the three subsystems, and 
how they contribute to the wellbeing of the solar PV industry.  
2.3.1. Qualitative Data  
Interview data were collected during five research field trips to China between 
December 2013 to June 2015. Given the similar research structure between the Stanford 
China project and this dissertation, this dissertation has the fortune to draw from rich 
interview data collected by the Stanford China Project. In the last three research trips, the 
author of this dissertation traveled and worked with at least one, and sometimes two, 
other members of the Stanford project’s research team. During the trips, the author 
attended two academic conferences and two trade shows, and, usually as a member of the 
Stanford research team, participated in 124 semi-structured interviews, and took 28 site 
visits to 16 silicon, solar cell, solar module, and manufacturing tooling production plants 
and nine site visits to PV research labs, two visits to industrial parks, and three site visits 
to distributed solar PV deployment sites. In addition, the researcher worked with other 
members of the Stanford project to organize three workshops on the topic of the Stanford 
project and to present the Stanford project’s research preliminary findings for feedback. 
Two of those workshops were held at a Stanford University facility in Beijing, China, and 
one was held at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. Table 2.1 summarizes the 
data-collection activities in China.   
The selection of the interviewees and site visits means to cover the three 
subsystems of the solar PV industry by including as many major stakeholders from each 
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subsystem as possible. The final distributions of interviews and site visits reflect this 
design. The manufacturing subsystem has the largest number of interviewees: 46 people 
gave 49 interviews, and majority of the interviewees are senior managers and executive 
officers at leading China PV manufacturers, such as Trina, Yingli, Canadian Solar and 
more. The solar PV innovation subsystem has the second largest number of interviews 
(not counting the Policy-making/Consulting/ Industry Association category, which is a 
cross-cutting category that touches on all three subsystems). 27 interviews were 
conducted with 22 science and technology experts. They come from two sectors: 
academic institutes, and R&D divisions of large Chinese solar corporates. The PV 
deployment subsystem has the least number of interviewees; 15 people working in the 
PV project development sector were interviewed. Interviews conducted with 
policymakers at the central and local levels also provided good amount of insight into the 
deployment sector. These interviewees are categorized under the Policy-
making/Consulting/ Industry Association category; along with solar-focused consultants 
from global leading firms such as Bloomberg New Energy Finance, IHS, and etc., and 
professional from solar and renewable energy associations in China, they offered a 
balance to the number of opinions collected across the three subsystems.  Table 2.1 in 
Appendix A includes high-level information about interviewees.  
Table 2.1 Summary of Data Collection Activities in China 
 
Sector Number of 
Interviews 
Number of People 
Interviewed 
Solar PV Innovation 27 22 
Solar PV Manufacturing  49 46 
Solar PV Deployment  17 15 
Policy-making/Consulting/ Industry Association 31 26 
Total number of semi-structured interviews 124 108 
Site Visits 
Type of Site Number of Visits 
Solar PV Cell/Module Manufacturing facility 13 
Solar PV Materials and Tooling Manufacturing 
facility 
3 
Solar PV Research Laboratory 9 
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Table 2.1 Continued  
Type of Site Number of Visits 
Solar Deployment Site  3 
Industrial Park  2 
Total number of site visits 28 
City Visits 
Total number of Chinese city visits 10 cities over 5 trips to China 
Tianjin, Beijing, Shanghai, Suzhou, 
Baoding, Changzhou, Hangzhou, 
Jiaxing, Nanjing, Changsha 
 Trade Shows and Academic Conferences 
Trade Shows and Academic Conferences attended  4  
Workshops  
Workshop helped organized and presented at 2 in Beijing, China 
1 in Washington D.C., U.S.  
 
In addition to interviews, the author, usually as part of the Stanford research team, 
also participated in 28 site visits in 10 Chinese cities, including 13 different solar cell and 
module manufacturing facilities, and three factories of solar PV materials and tooling 
suppliers (one poly-silicon supplier, one glass supplier, and one tooling supplier), nine 
academic and corporate research labs, three distributed solar PV project sites, and two 
clean energy and advanced manufacturing-oriented industrial parks. These site visits are 
valuable because they offer inside looks to the state of the three subsystems in China. 
From the combination of the site visits and semi-structured interviews, the author was 
able to have a first-hand understanding about the organization and operation of Chinese 
manufacturing firms, the types of machinery they use, the level of automation, and their 
corporate culture; the research condition of Chinese labs, the types of equipment and 
research approach they use in their experiments; as well as the process of building a 
rooftop solar PV projects. Table A.2 in Appendix A provides more information about 
these site visits.   
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2.3.2. Qualitative Research Design  
In general, the design principle of the semi-structured interviews adheres to the 
TIS framework in a sense that it tries to identify both the structural components of the PV 
TIS, i.e. the players, networks, and institutions. The questions intend to tease out the 
functions fulfilled by each structural component, and more importantly the drivers and 
barriers that either spurred or prohibited the development of the industry or a particular 
firm. 
In addition to first hand interview data, written records on governments and firms 
decision-making process are also valuable qualitative data. They reveal the motives of 
governments and firms’ actions as well as the incentives that drive them and the obstacles 
that prevent to make certain decisions and the compromises they make in between. 
Sometimes, when used independently, semi-structured interviews and official written 
documents could represent certain rhetoric that reflects the preferred image that particular 
players want to be seen as to the outside world. Therefore, it is important to use both 
types of qualitative data in combination in order to tease out the real motives and actual 
inner working of a decision-making body such as a government agency or a firm.  
2.4. Quantitative Analysis: Data and Research Design  
To assess the state of solar innovation system, this study tracks three types of 
innovation performance indicators: public and private R&D, solar cell-efficiency record 
in China, and solar PV-related patents data in Chin and in the U.S.  
In order to understand the source of cost-competitiveness, this study will unpack 
the cost of producing solar PV in leading Chinese firms using fussy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA). Fs/QCA is a comparative approach that is fit to analyze 
the causal configurations of a set of variables that consistently appears or does not appear 
in order to produce certain outcome. It is based on the idea that causal relations are 
frequently better understood in terms of set-theoretic relations rather than correlations 
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(Ragin, 2000, 2008, Fiss, 2007; Ragin, 1987, 2000, 2008; Ragin & Fiss, 2008). It uses 
Boolean algebra to create algorithm to reduce numerous causal possibilities to a set of 
configurations that lead to outcome (Fiss, 2011). Fs/QCA does not rely on large sample 
size to draw statically inference, which is suitable for this study.   
2.4.1. Quantitative Data and Research Design Related to Solar PV Innovation  
This study collected quantitative data related to three innovation performance 
indicators: R&D spending, solar cell efficiency and solar PV patents.  
Data collection related to public R&D spending was met with great difficulties, 
due to the poor information collection and management system in China and its lack of 
transparency. Section 3.4.1.2 in Chapter 3 will have a longer discussion on this point. 
Despite of the challenge, this study explored almost all the means possible to collect the 
R&D investment data since the 10th FYP. Methods for data collection include searching 
public databases, tracing government documents, and interviewing people who involved 
in R&D funding decision-making. Results can be found in Chapter 3 Sector 4.1.  
To measure the progress made in the innovation system, this study take the five 
solar cell technologies from three-generations of solar PV, track the record cell efficiency 
in Chinese and compares it to the evolution of the world record cell efficiency. The 
effectiveness of the innovation system in China is measured using the change of the gap 
between the two. In all five technologies, record efficiencies were lower in China at the 
beginning. If over time, the gap between China and the world’s leading level narrows, it 
suggests that the China’s solar innovation strength has grown and vice versa. Data on 
solar cell record efficiency in China was collected from a thorough literature and 
technical document review as we as interviews of technology experts. Data on the world 
solar cell record efficiency was collected based on data from the U.S. National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL, 2014). Chapter 3 Sector 4.1 will discuss the 
findings.  
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Solar PV patent data are from two sources: China’s State Intellectual Property 
Office (SIPO) and U.S. Patents and Trademarks Office (PTO). With assistance from a 
China-based patent analytical firm Evalueserve2, which donated its time and insight as 
part of the Stanford project, patent-search strategies were developed for all 16 types of 
solar PV technologies that are currently active in either the commercial or research area. 
The search strategies were then applied to the SIPO database to extract patents related to 
the PV technology scientific research, excluding those associated with PV manufacturing 
and deployment, just to tease out the real impact of hardcore scientific innovation in the 
solar PV arena. A similar approach was then applied to U.S. PTO database. Patent 
quantity, measured in number of patents granted to Chinese entities over time in both the 
Chinese and U.S. market, and patent quality, measured in patent lapse rate were used as 
two indicators to measure the effectiveness of the solar PV innovation system in China. 
Findings will be discussed in Chapter 3 Sector 4.2. 
2.4.2. Quantitative Data and Research Design Related to Solar PV Manufacturing 
Data used in this study to unpack the manufacturing competitiveness come from 
Bloomberg Industries (BI)’s solar industry database, known as BI SOLAR (Bloomberg 
Finance L.P., 2014a). BI SOLAR contains information related to the entire value chain of 
the global solar energy industry, from silicon manufacturing, to PV cell and module 
production, and eventually the installation of and electricity generation from solar panels. 
BI SOLAR divides industry players into different peer groups, each consisting of 
players that meet a certain set of standards. The Global Large Solar Energy Valuation 
Peers (LSEP), also known as Tier 1, includes 15 global leading solar energy firms, 
among which 13 are solar PV module producers, 1 is wafer producer (SunEdison), and 
another one 1 silicon producer (GCL-Poly). For the purpose of this study, the sample is 
                                                 
2 The author was one of two co-managers of research Stanford University’s China Project at the time when 
Evalueserve (http://www.evalueserve.com) volunteered its patent-data-analysis services to the Stanford 
research project.  
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limited to PV module producers only. Among the 13 PV module producers, 11 of them 
report information on production cost, manufacturing capacity and production, which are 
three crucial variables to this study. 9 of them are Chinese firms. Table 2.2 summarizes 
the key statistics of the 9 PV module manufacturing firms that comprise the sample of 
this study. Together, they accounted for at least 40.3% of the global PV module 
production in 2014. This study uses firm-level quarterly data because they provide good 
granularity on Chinese firms’ financial and manufacturing information. More information 
about the data and sample set will be introduced in Chapter 4 Section 4.2.2. Quantitative 
Research Design and Data.  

















Trina Solar China 7.60% 2006 NYSE Entrepreneur 
Yingli Green 
Energy China 6.90% 2007 NYSE Entrepreneur 
Canadian Solar China 5.80% 2006 NASDAQ Entrepreneur 
Hanwha 




JinkoSolar  China 5.00% 2010 NYSE Entrepreneur 
JA Solar China 5.00% 2006 NASDAQ SOE Spinoff /Join venture 
ReneSola China 4.10% 2006 NYSE Entrepreneur 
LDK Solar China 0.60% 2007 NYSE Join venture/ Entrepreneur 
Suntech Power China 5.8%* 2006 NYSE Entrepreneur 
Total*  40.3%    
Source: Bloomberg BISOLAR database.  
* Suntech’s market share is calculated based on 2011 data, the year before Suntech defaulted on its 
investor’s bonds. Total market share does not include Suntech.  
 
This dissertation aims to examine the causal relationship between the dependent 
variable production cost and the list of explanatory variables. A causal model illustrating 
the relationship among the factors is shown in Figure 2.3. It is hypothesized that subsidies 
measured in cost to access capital and equity, production capacity expansion, and 
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increasing level of vertical integration all lead to lower solar PV production cost. 
Investment into R&D and higher production input cost, represented by electricity cost, 
would lead to higher PV production cost.  
The causal impact of these factors in combination with each other and the data 
and method used to tease it out will be explored in details in Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 in 
Chapter 4.  
 




THE SOLAR PV INNOVATION SYSTEM IN CHINA  
3.1. Introduction  
Solar PV technologies have come a long way since the early 2000s in terms of 
performance enhancement and cost reduction. The U.S. National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL) tracks the world record lab efficiencies of 24 types of PV technology 
between 1975 and 2015 (Figure 3.1). Over the 40-year time period, multiple types of new 
solar cell were invented and the electric conversation efficiencies of all of them rose 
significantly.  
 
Figure 3.1 World Record Research-Solar Cell Efficiencies between 1975-2015  
Source: The U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
http://www.nrel.gov/ncpv/images/efficiency_chart.jpg  
 
In the meantime, the costs of solar panels have decreased dramatically. Figure 3.2 
shows the cost trajectory of two types of commercially dominant solar PV panels, 
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crystalline silicon (c-Si) panel and Cadmium telluride (CdTe) panel, over 33 years. Both 
technologies see their costs drop by more than a magnitude.  
 
Figure 3.2. Global Average Solar Module Selling Price between 1979 and 2012  




Scientific and technological innovation and manufacturing process innovation are 
the driving forces behind the performance and cost improvement. China’s ability to 
manufacture solar panels at a large scale has contributed to the dramatic cost reduction 
(Goodrich et al., 2013a; Nahm & Steinfeld, 2014a). However, when it comes to 
innovation, China is a latecomer. It has a large historical knowledge gap compared to 
western innovation powerhouses like Germany, United States, and Japan. In fact, prior to 
2014, none of the world solar cell efficiencies shown in Figure 1 was set by Chinese 
entities, until Trina Solar (known as Trina hereafter), – the world’s largest solar panel 
producer, and a company based in China – broke the record for the multicrystalline solar 
cell. Despite the breakthrough, China is still seen as a weak innovator, especially in the 
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hardcore science and technology areas. Acknowledging its weakness, China has devoted 
great effort to increase its solar PV innovation capability since the turn of the 21st 
century. This chapter intends to examine the innovation effort China made in three 
generations of solar PV cells, its effectiveness in producing innovation outcomes, and the 
mechanisms that lead to innovation progress or the lack thereof.  The fundamental 
research questions this chapter seeks to answer is: Research Question 1a: Where does 
China stand in terms of solar PV innovation relative to the world’s leading 
innovators? And,  
Research Question 1b: what policies and market dynamics enabled or 
impeded the advancement of solar PV innovation? 
Before diving into a detailed analysis, some easy-to-understand technical 
background about the solar PV technologies studied in this dissertation is helpful in terms 
of understanding the history of the technology and providing context.  
Today, there are three generations of solar PV technologies. The first-generation 
of solar cells are silicon-based technologies. It includes mono-crystalline silicon (mono-
Si) solar cell, poly-crystalline silicon (poly-Si) solar cells, amorphous silicon (a-Si) as 
well as a few high efficiency modifications of them such as Interdigitized Back Contact 
(IBC) cells, Passive Emitter Rear Contact (PERC) cells, Heterstructure with Intrinsic 
Thin Layer (HIT) cells, and etc. Compare to later generations, the first generation cells 
are based on silicon, a very common material on earth, and have relatively high 
conversation efficiency.  
The second-generation technologies mainly include Copper Indium Gallium 
Selenide (CIGS), Cadmium telluride (CdTe), and etc. They are often called thin film 
solar cells because they are made by depositing one or more thin film-like layer of 
photovoltaic materials on a substrate. The second-generation technologies have lower 
efficiency than the first generation, but they are also cheaper to produce, which makes 
them legitimate competitors to their earlier peers.  
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Finally, the third-generation technologies refer to new and emerging solar cells 
such as organic PV (OPV), perovskite, dye-sensitized solar cell (DSSC), quantum dot 
solar cell, and Copper zinc tin sulfide (CZTS) cell. They are relatively new technologies 
but hold promising potential to reach high efficiency.   
The remaining part of this chapter will first review the literature on innovation 
and generate a hypothesis pertain to the research questions. After providing an overview 
of the solar PV innovation actors, this chapter will proceed to answer the two research 
questions propose above by first assessing the progress made in the solar innovation 
system in China, and then dissect the strength and weakness of the system through 
examining its structure, actors’ networks, and the mechanisms via which elements within 
the system interact with one another to produce innovation outcomes or the lack thereof. 
Guided by the TIS framework, the analysis does not only focus on understanding the 
structure of the system, the functions it fulfill, but also the process to fulfill the functions 
by identifying driving and blocking mechanisms. Based on the findings, this chapter will 
close with some policy implications and recommendations.  
3.2. Literature and Hypothesis  
Scholars have long acknowledged that innovation is a nuanced concept. It does 
not only constitute the invention of brand new things, but also includes the improvements 
made to the “process”. Richard Nelson defines innovation as “the processes by which 
firms master and put into practice product designs and manufacturing processes that are 
new to them” (Richard R. Nelson, 1993). Hardcore scientific and technological 
innovation is the act of inventing new technologies or new product that are either 
functionally or design-wise different from previous products. Often being misunderstood 
as the only form of innovation, scientific and technological innovation is a knowledge-
intensive, capital-intensive operation and it is frequently associated with long planning 
period, sizable investment, and high risk (B Å Lundvall, 2010; Mitchell, 2010). For 
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countries and firms alike, their ability to carry out scientific and technological innovation 
depends on hard criteria such as the knowledge and research skills of their people 
(Audretsch & Feldman, 1996) and soft environment like the society and company culture 
towards innovation and the policy environment (Huang et al., 2012; Mitchell, 2010; M. 
E. Porter, 1990a).  
Unlike product innovation, process innovation has a murkier but also more 
encompassing definition. It refers to improvements of internal production processes, and 
discovery of new tools, devices and knowledge as well as customer based re-engineering. 
This can lead to higher product quality, higher labor productivity, less inputs 
requirement, lower production cost, and any combination of these outcomes (W. M. 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Cohen, W. M., & Levin, 2007; C Freeman, 1987a). Process 
innovation is experience-based and is strongly related to the concept of “learning” 
(Arrow, 1962; Bengt Åke Lundvall, 2007; R R Nelson & Winter, 2009). There is a 
tendency in literature and in day-to-day thinking to overlook process innovation, or 
considered it not as important as “hardcore” product innovation. As Lundvall pointed out, 
this bias needs to be overcome because product and process innovation are interrelated, 
and latter is crucial to the former (Lundvall, 2007). Scholars also found that process 
innovation can be a significant source of firm competitiveness, which gives process 
innovation additional significance (Li, Liu, & Ren, 2006; Nahm & Steinfeld, 2014; Yam 
et. al., 2004).  
Besides understanding the nuances about innovation, it is also crucial to realize 
that innovation is a network activity. At the macro level, the National Innovation Systems 
(NIS) framework championed by scholars like Nelson, Lundvall, and Winter has taken a 
system view by treating innovation activities as an interactive process through which 
multiple agents like universities, research organizations, firms, and government agencies 
engage in exchanges with each other under certain institutional settings (Bengt Åke 
Lundvall, 2007; Richard R Nelson, 1993). From a micro perspective, firms do not exist in 
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isolation. Rather, they form innovation networks with research institutions like 
universities, research labs under the influence of or in partnership with regulatory bodies 
(Susan Christopherson & Clark, 2007). These innovation networks are key to the success 
of building innovative capacity and allow countries and firms to harness the return on 
innovation investment (Dooley, 2008; Energy Innovation, 2011; Huang et al., 2012; 
Bengt Åke Lundvall, 2007; Richard R Nelson, 1993; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; 
Steinfeld, 2004; Teece, 1986).  
The theoretical arguments for the network view of innovation are twofold. First, 
different parties offer unique resources that, when pooled together, are compliment to 
each other.  For examples, universities have strong research capacity and personnel 
advantage but lack at real time knowledge about the market demands (Motohashi, 2005; 
Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, & Link, 2003).  Meanwhile, firms have more information 
about market demands and better knowledge about process innovation that can be 
beneficial when combined with university resources (Ace & Audretsch, 2014; Motohashi, 
2005; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Siegel et al., 2003). However, firms can be restricted 
by their pursuit of near-term interest, but governments have higher tolerant of risk and are 
in a position to make relatively long term investment (Dooley, 2008; K. Gallagher, 2013; 
Huang et al., 2012; Organization for Ecomonic Development and Coorperation, 1997). 
Together, firms, universities, and governments complement each other and allow greater 
efficiency in resource allocation and utilization (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000; 
Motohashi, 2005).  
Another reason why network is important to innovation is that it facilitates the 
diffusion of innovation. Technologies and knowledge flow not only within organizations 
but also across organizations. A network that connects academic researchers, innovators, 
entrepreneurs, firms, and government provide either formal or informal channels for 
information, technologies and knowledge to diffuse among interested parties. It lowers 
the transaction cost of diffusion (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Williamson, 1999) and 
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increase the likelihood of harvesting rents associated with innovation (Teece, 1986). 
Knowledge diffusion can also help break the spell of path-dependency (W. M. Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990) and allow organizations to gain access to knowledge that would 
otherwise unable to develop indigenously.  
Given the theories and literature, this work proposes the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1. Innovation networks facilitate knowledge production and 
diffusion, which lead to solar PV innovation progress in China.  
As pointed out earlier, innovation is a multi-layered concept. As far as this 
chapter concerns, innovation is defined as hardcore scientific and technological research 
endeavor that lead to either new inventions or significant improvement to existing solar 
PV technologies. Chapter 4 will explore process innovation in greater detail.  
3.3. Solar PV Innovation Actors in China 
Innovation actors are one of the three key structural components of an innovation 
system in the lens of TIS, along with networks and institutions. It is important to 
understand whom the players are because they are the agents who conduct the actual 
R&D work; they form the networks and shape the institutions. They are like bones to an 
innovation system.  
There are three types of key innovation actors in China’s solar innovation 
subsystem: government agencies, research groups at university and research institutes, 
and R&D departments at private enterprises.  
3.3.1. Government agencies  
• Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 
As China’s science and technology policy-making body administered by the State 
Council, MOST is the main architect of the solar innovation TIS subsystem. It is 
principally in charge of setting national visions for science and technology development, 
designing substantive policies and strategies to promote the visions, and building 
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innovation ecosystems and allocating financial resources to achieve the advancements 
desired by the visions. MOST does not work alone; it coordinates it financing and 
administrative efforts with other government agencies, introduced below.  
• Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
MOF provides public finance to MOST to be used for its various innovation 
programs. MOF also administers R&D related tax breaks and other forms of financial 
incentives. For example, MOF exempts research equipment purchased by research 
institutes and universities from import tariffs, value added taxes and sales tax.  
• Ministry of Education (MOE) 
MOE oversees universities, an important force of innovation in China. Although 
MOE is mostly in charge of university education, it shares the administrative 
responsibility of the university-based SKLs and SETRCs with MOST. Besides, MOE 
used to have its own SKL list, which is independent to MOST’s SKL list. The MOE 
awarded SKLs receive R&D findings from MOE and will be evaluated by MOE on a 
five-year basis. However, since August 2015, as part of the overall national innovation 
system reform, MOE will no longer award its own SKLs in order to streamline the 
innovation spending and reduce redundancy.  
• Ministry of Industry of Information Technology (MOIIT) 
MOIIT is the nation’s industrial policy-making body. Since MOITT’s main 
constituency is the industries and companies, it works in concert with MOST to promote 
company-based R&D, technology commercialization, and incentive innovation in SMEs. 
This joint effort is particularly salient to solar technology innovation given the fact that a 
number of companies in the solar industry such as Trina, Yingli Solar (known as Yingli 
hereafter), and GCL-Poly are active in conducting R&D. MOIIT aims to facilitate the 
solar PV companies to better integrate their R&D efforts with production and bring new 
products to the market. In addition, MOIIT also influences solar PV innovation through 
issuing industry standards. The Solar PV Manufacturing Industry Standards rolled out in 
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2013 by MOIIT requires a minimum 3% of company’s revenue and no less than ¥10 
million ($1.6 million) every year on R&D.  
• National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
NDRC is in charge drafting the national Five Year Plans (FYPs) and other 
economic policies.  As an integral part of the national economy, science and technology 
development is frequently mentioned in FYPs, especially since the 1980s. NDRC sets 
grand goals for S&T development in the FYPs. The goals will later be further articulated 
by MOST via its own sub-FYPs.  
In addition to drafting the nation’s economic policies, NDRC also oversees the 
National Energy Administration (NEA), which is the central government’s energy policy-
making body. It is in charge of deploying solar energy and supports research related to 
solar PV system and grid connection.  
This multi-agency approach led by MOST is mirrored, to a large degree, at the 
provincial and local level. Each Chinese province has its own Bureau of Science and 
Technology (BOST), and it works with the provincial counterparts of the other central 
government agencies to promote innovation activities in their jurisdiction. Similar 
structure trickles down even one more level to local governments.  
3.3.2. Research Groups at Universities and Research Institutes  
The role played by research groups at universities and research institutes in 
China’s solar innovation system cannot be overstated. Historically, government affiliated 
research institutes were the first generation solar PV research entities. Nowadays, 
research groups at universities and research institutes conduct some of the most basic 
science and engineering research (knowledge development and diffusion). Table 3.1 
summarizes major research groups from both the public and private sector in nine 
research areas across three generations of technologies.  
 31 
It shows that academics completely dominate the third-generation technology 
research field. Compared to previous generations of technologies, third-generation 
technologies like perovskite and organic solar cell are still at the early stage of 
technology development and not considered as market-ready yet. Therefore, private 
sector actors are still waiting to see if there is a realistic chance of commercializing these 
technologies. In contrast, academics at universities and research institutes are well suited 
to lead the charge of scientific investigation in these areas because of their basic-research 
oriented focus. It is worth noticing research in this space is mainly lead by young 
researchers with overseas education background. The third-generation solar cell research 
in China benefited from harnessing the power of globalization. The rigorous research 
training these young academics received abroad, their acute intuition about the latest 
research trends, and their English communication skills make them agents of change to 
solar innovation in China. They directly contribute to the narrowing of the innovation 
gaps between China and the world class in the third-generation of solar technologies.  
More details about the research conducted in these research entities can be found in 
Section 3.7.2 and in Appendix B.  
Table 3.1 Major Solar Cell Research Groups in China 
 







Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(CAS) Institute of Electric 
Engineering  
SKL at Trina 
Shanghai Jiaotong University  SKL at Yingli  
Zhongshan University  Canadian Solar 
18th Research Institute of 
CETC 
JA Solar 
811th Research Institute of 
CETC 






48th Research Institute of 
CETC 
GCL-Poly  
45th Research Institute of 
CETC 
SETRC at LDK  
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Table 3.1 Continued   
Major Public Research Groups Major Company-based Research Group 
42th Research Institute of 
CETC 
Shenzhen S.C.  
CAS Fujian Institute of 
Research on the Structure of 
Matter  
Seven Star  
 Fullshare Energy  
HIT 
CAS Shanghai Institute of 
Microsystem and Information 
Technology  
SKL at Trina 
CAS Institute of Electric 
Engineering 
 




Nankai University   
CAS Institute of Electric 
Engineering 
 





Nankai University  Global research 
centers of Hanergy 
CAS Shenzhen Institutes of 
Advanced Technology 
 
CAS Shanghai Institute of 
Ceramics  
 
CAS Shanghai Institute of 
Microsystem and Information 
Technology  
 
China Science and Technology 
University  
 
Tsinghua University   
Peking University   
CdTe 
Sichuang University  Advanced Solar Power 
(Long Yan)  
CAS Electric Engineering 
Institute 
 
CAS Shanghai Institute of 
Technical Physics  
 




18th Research Institute  of 
CETC 
 
811th Research Institute of 
CETC 
 
CAS Suzhou Institute of Nano-
tech and Nano-bionics 
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Table 3.1 Continued 






CAS Institute of Chemistry   
South China University of 
Technology  
 
Peking University   
Perovskite 
Huazhong University of 
Science and Technology  
 
Peking University   
CAS Institute of Physics   
Tsinghua University   
CAS Changchun Institute of 
Applied Physics  
 




In contrast, research groups working on the first-generation solar cell technologies 
are more likely to adopt a practical approach to their work in two ways: they either team 
up with solar PV manufacturers to develop technologies of high commercializability, or 
they work with them to solve tooling and material obstacles faced by the manufacturers.  
The practical mindset makes them often place high priority on the industry-
applicability of their R&D products. Their no longer only concern how to overcome the 
scientific and technical barriers, but also to keep a close eye on product 
commercialization. They do so by designing simpler cell structures and using cheaper 
materials to control the production cost. Although cell efficiency may also be lowered as 
a result of these approaches, it does not discourage the researchers. During interviews, 
many of them showed the belief that the person who gets the last laugh is the one whose 
technology is sold on the market rather than the one who sets the highest efficiency 
records3.   
Research groups working on the second-generation solar cell technologies are in 
the middle ground between basic and applied research. There are a large number of CIGS 
                                                 
3 Interviewee #39, #45, #59, #73 
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research groups, and some of them, such as the labs at Nankai University, are among the 
first movers in solar cell research. However, the commercialization space in China is 
dominated by silicon-based technologies, domestic Chinese CIGS technologies have not 
been able to garner enough cloud to achieve mass production yet. An attempt by Nankai 
University to start a joint-venture company with private sector partners to produce its 
own technology ran into big financial and operational issues. The company ended up 
going bankrupt without even producing a single cell. The case with Nankai University 
illustrates the difficulties in commercializing CIGS in China. As a result, most research 
groups choose to stay focused on researching the fundamentals related to CIGS, and the 
efficiency of the technology increased dramatically in the past one and a half decades. 
Section 3.4.1 will discuss the efficiency performance of various types of solar PV 
technology including CIGS.  
There are not a lot of groups in China conducting CdTe research. The slim chance 
of CdTe commercialization is a major deterrence factor.  According to interviews with 
Chinese researchers and company officials, China’s domestic solar industry has not been 
excited about CdTe because of two concerns. First, Cadmium’s environmental impact on 
water may invite tighter environmental regulations and impose higher compliance costs. 
Second, Tellurium is a rare element and mass-utilization may cause a sharp decline of its 
availability and drive up the cost. Since researchers in China often have an eye towards 
technology commercialization, they are, discouraged by the difficult path for CdTe 
commercialization, resulting a mundane research interest and a slower efficiency 
improvement4.  
3.3.3. Corporations  
Corporate R&D is playing an increasingly important role in China’s solar 
innovation system for two reasons. First, the central government has a strong desire to 
                                                 
4 Interviewee #47, #52, #93 
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mobilize private sector players to step up their innovation efforts because they do not 
only have the financial resources to do so but also the first-hand information about the 
market for technologies and its demand for innovation. One major criticism about the 
solar innovation system as MOST manages is that there is a big disconnection between 
the types of research academics does and the types of research the solar industry needs. It 
is not rare to find cases that research projects handpicked by MOST ended up being 
regarded as too theoretical or tangential by the solar companies and do not a stand a 
chance of generating economic returns. For example a-Si and DSSC are among the 
technologies that receive long-standing MOST investment, but their commercialization is 
far from sight. In order to increase the efficacy of its R&D investment and facilitate 
information sharing among academic researchers and the industry, MOST started to 
encourage joint R&D between academia and the industry since the 11th FYP cycle. In the 
12th FYP, MOST escalated the status of corporations to the “main agent” of China’s 
national innovation system, and stated that market, not the government, should play a 
bigger role in R&D resource allocation. All these official rhetoric meant to send a policy 
signal to private sector players and make them more active in R&D.  
Besides the inviting signal from the central government, private sector players in 
China have innate drives to invest in innovation to enhance their market competitiveness. 
This is particularly true for Chinese solar PV manufacturers after the trade disputes with 
the U.S. and E.U (see Chapter 5 Section 5.2.3 for more information about the trade 
dispute). After a period of rapid cost reduction between 2009 and 2013, the cost of solar 
PV hit a plateau and consumers shifted from looking for cheap solar panels to pursing 
better quality and more reliable panels. On top of this changing trend in the consumer 
market, the import quota and price floor imposed by the E.U., and tariffs charged by and 
U.S. also resulted in shrinking cost competitiveness for Chinese PV producers. In 
response, large Chinese PV manufacturers turned to innovation for their next source of 
competitiveness.  
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In 2013, two State Key Labs opened their doors at two Chinese companies: Trina 
and Yingli, respectively. All publicly traded Chinese PV manufacturers have their own 
in-house R&D divisions, and they regularly devote human and financial resources to their 
R&D activities. Table 3.9 in the innovation investment section lists Tier 1 Chinese PV 
companies and their annual investment in R&D. PV companies are the major contributors 
to the first generation solar technology R&D in China. They eclipse academic groups in 
both R&D investment and R&D output, measured in cell efficiency improvement.  
Exhibit 1 and 2 in Appendix B showcase the R&D activities at Trina and Yingli’s 
SKLs. Exhibit 3 in the Appendix provides an overview of Canadian Solar’s innovation 
effort, which represents a middle of the road corporate innovation model in China, unlike 
the “glamorous SKL model”. Exhibit 4 offers a view into the innovation related to PERC 
cell at Sunergy, the first mover in PERC solar cell research and commercialization in 
China. Innovation effort at Advanced Solar Power (ASP, known as Long Yan in 
Chinese), the leading innovator and producer of CdTe solar PV in China, is summarized 
in Exhibit 5. 
One thing to notice is that, besides establishing their own R&D department, 
silicon PV producers in China often build their research network by collaborating with 
academic researchers. For example, Trina works with Dr. Zhengxin Liu from CAS 
Shanghai Institute of Microsystem and Information Technology on HIT research; Chaori 
Solar works with Dr. Wenjing Wang from CAS Institute of Electrical Engineering also 
on HIT. The nature of company-academic research in China is more science-oriented 
than most of the R&D conducted in-house at Chinese companies. (Section 3.7.2 details 
the research networks).  
Hanergy, China’s largest thin-film solar cell producer, represents a very different 
network model. Instead of building its indigenous innovation capacity, the company has 
garnered R&D strength through a list of high profile global merge and acquisition. It 
acquired five overseas innovative thin film solar PV companies and became the owner of 
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their R&D profiles (Exhibit 6 in Appendix B details the companies Hangery purchased 
and their technology profiles). Its global R&D center in Beijing is the central 
management entity that oversees its global research network. No actual research is 
conducted in its Beijing center.  In Hanergy’s model, the goal was not so much to build 
an indigenous innovation capacity, but to build a global research network through 
acquiring overseas promising thin film technologies that struggle with commercialization 
and marry them with China’s strong manufacturing capacity. 
3.4. Evaluate Solar PV Innovation Progress in China  
A technology system’s innovative capacity can be measured using both the output 
of the system and the input into the system (Ace and Audretsch 2014; Freel 2000 Arnold 
2004; Georghiou and Roessner 2000; Griliches 1979; Salter and Martin 2001). This study 
first uses world and Chinese record solar cell efficiencies, quantity and quality of sola PV 
related patents, and scientific publications to measure the outputs of the solar PV 
innovation system in China. Later, R&D investments from the public and private sector 
are analyzed. Rather than treating the investment as merely an input into the system, it is 
found that the investment is actually a driving force in producing better system output.  
3.4.1. PV Lab Efficiency – Measure the Innovation Output 
Solar cell efficiency is the most important indicator of the innovative capacity of a 
solar innovation system. Using five types of solar cell from three generations of 
technology, this study measures the progression of record cell efficiency in Chinese and 
compares it to the evolution of the world records. Improvements in record Chinese solar 
cell efficiencies serve as a proxy for solar PV innovation progress produced by the 
system. Furthermore, the change in the gap between Chinese record efficiencies and the 
world record efficiencies indicates the relative strength of China’s solar PV innovation 
capacity in relationship to the world’s leading innovators’. For example, in all five 
technologies, record efficiencies were lower in China at the beginning. If over time, the 
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gap between the China and the world’s leading level narrows, it then suggests that 
China’s solar innovation strength has grown relatively and vice versa. The results show 
three different trends, which are discussed below. 
3.4.1.1.     Gaps are Narrowing in HIT and CIGS 
Heterstructure Intrinsic Thin-layer, a.k.a. HIT, is a high efficiency first-generation 
solar PV technology. It takes advantages of both the high efficiency of crystalline silicon 
and the thin layer of thin film. Copper Indium Gallium Selenide (CIGS) is the most 
popular second-generation solar PV technology known for its light weigh and low cost.  
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 tracks the world record HIT and CIGS cell efficiencies and 
those in China over the decades. For both technologies, the efficiency boundaries keep 
moving forward, internationally and within in China. Furthermore, there was a large 
historical efficiency gap between China and the world’s leading innovators for both HIT 
and CIGS. However, the gaps become narrower over time, with China closing in to the 
world-class level. The continuously improving efficiency records in China suggest that 
the Chinese solar PV innovation system has been producing progress in the HIT and 
CIGS technology space. What is more, the narrower efficiency gaps indicate that the 
Chinese’ ability to produce high efficiency HIT and CIGS cell is catching up to that of 
the world’s leading innovators. Both pieces of evidence show that China is growing its 
innovation capacity related to these two technologies and is improving its relative 
innovation strength compared to the world-class. 
 A further look at the innovation actors who produced the Chinese records and 
their research collaborations suggest that innovation networks are at the heart of the cell 
efficiency improvement. Later in Section 3.7.2, a detailed network analysis will be 
carried out to dissect the relationship between the innovation networks and the outcomes 
that the system produces. But just to foreshadow the findings, the improvement in HIT 
cell efficiency in China is a result of both industry-academia collaborative R&D efforts 
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supported by MOST and by harnessing the power of the increasingly globalized 
innovation network, while the Chinese CIGS innovation network leverages the 
knowledge and methodological advantage of oversea-educated Chinese scientists.  
 
Figure 3.3 World and Chinese Record HIT Research-Cell Efficiencies* 
 
* See Exhibit 7 in Appendix B for detailed information on each data point.  
Data collection and analysis conducted as part of the Stanford China Project by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a 
member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  




Figure 3.4 World and Chinese Record CIGS Research-Cell Efficiencies* 
 
* See Exhibit 8. In Appendix B for detailed information on each data point.  
Data collection and analysis conducted as part of the Stanford China Project by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a 
member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  
Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington DC.    
3.4.1.2.     Miniscule Gaps in Perovskite and Organic PV 
For technologies like perovskite and organic PV, China had a small gap to begin 
with because they are relatively new technologies and China does not have a historical 
knowledge gap that it needs to overcome. Although China entered perovskite research 
relatively late, the record efficiency leapfrogged when multiple research groups enter the 
area and created competition among themselves (Section 3.7.2.5). As a result, Chinese 
record efficiency was updated 9 times by 8 different research groups in 16 months and 
eventually stood at 15.4% in April 2014. Similarly, two competing Chinese groups keep 
updating OPV record efficiency in China. The density of the data point in Figure 3.5 and 
3.6 show the active perovskite and organic solar PV research space in China, as well as 
globally. Once again, innovation networks are key to the rapid improvement of cell 
efficiencies. Scholars with ties to leading overseas research institutes drove the progress 
in these two technologies, as Section 3.7.2.4 will explain in detail. Besides, large amount 
of grants coming form NSFC’s to these two research area certainly enhance the research 
capacity in these two technology areas (Section 3.6.3.1).  
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Figure 3.5 World and Chinese Record Perovskite Research-Cell Efficiencies* 
* See Exhibit 9. In Appendix B for detailed information on each data point.  
Data collection and analysis conducted as part of the Stanford China Project by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a 
member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  
Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington DC.    
  
 
Figure 3.6 World and Chinese Record Organic PV Research-Cell Efficiencies* 
* See Exhibit 10 in Appendix B for detailed information on each data point.  
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Data collection and analysis conducted as part of the Stanford China Project by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a 
member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  
Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington DC.    
3.4.1.3.     Large Gap Remains in CdTe 
The research space of CdTe is not as active as that of the previous four 
technologies. Due to concerns for cadmium’s environmental impact on water quality and 
tellurium’s lack of natural availability, CdTe research in China has not been able to create 
a large enough academic cloud to produce innovation progress.  Only a small number of 
research groups work on CdTe (Table 3.1). As a result, the gap between China and the 
world remains significant in this area, as shown in Figure 3.7.  
 
Figure 3.7 World and Chinese Record CdTe Research-Cell Efficiencies* 
* See Exhibit 11 in Appendix B for detailed information on each data point.  
Data collection and analysis conducted as part of the Stanford China Project by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a 
member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  
Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington DC.    
 
Using the solar cell efficiency of five types of technology as an indicator, this 
study arrives at two findings. First, the solar PV innovation system in China has made 
progress in improving its capacity, as suggested by the continuously rising solar cell 
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efficiencies in all technology categories. Second, the gaps between China and the world’s 
leading innovation have narrow for most technologies but not CdTe. This indicates that 
although the improvement in innovation strength is uneven across technologies, in 
general, China is catching up to the world-class level.  
3.4.2. PV Patents – Measure the Innovation Output  
Solar innovation is a multi-faucet concept and its measurement is not limited to 
laboratory cell efficiency. Patent is another good candidate to measure innovation 
because it provides a relatively objective measure of new knowledge. A successful 
invention patent must demonstrate something novel, something that is not previously 
known or mastered. A patent ideally should show the state-of-the-art techniques in its 
field and is agreed by experts to be nascent and innovative (Albert, Avery, Narin, & 
McAllister, 1991; Alcacer & Gittelman, 2006; Basberg, 1987).  
There are three types of patents in China: invention patent, utility model patent, 
and design patent. Among the three, invention patents are considered to have higher 
innovative quality because applicants need to meet a set of stringent standards in terms of 
novelty and creativity in order to be granted an invention patent. This study analyzed 
solar-PV related invention patents granted by China’s State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO) between 2000 and 2014.  
3.4.2.1. Patent Quantity as An Indicator of Innovation   
Analysis of China SIPO’s data shows that Chinese players are filing and obtaining 
more and more solar PV-related patents. Both the total number of patents and the growth 
rate are greater for Chinese players than those for foreign entities. As seen from Figure 
3.8, the number of patents granted to Chinese entities was very small in the first half of 
the 2000s. Chinese entities obtained less number of patents in its domestic market than all 
foreign entities combined. However, 2007 was as a watershed year. The number of 
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patents granted to Chinese entities rose rapidly since then and quickly surpassed the 
foreign entities’ patent numbers. Figure 3.8 tracks the number of patents granted by their 
application year5.  
This steep upward trending line does not mean Chinese players are more 
innovative than their foreign counterparts. Instead, it is a piece of evidence showing that 
Chinese innovation players have devoted significant effort in the past decade to produce 
patent-worthy knowledge and products.  
 
Figure 3.8. Patents Granted in China* 
 
                                                 
5 The time horizon ends on 2011 because of the following reason. This study focuses on patents granted 
rather than patent applications and it usually takes 2 to 3 years for a patent to pass the evaluation process. 
Therefore, majority of the patents granted in 2014 were filed in 2011 or earlier, which correspond to the 













Chinese Entities Foreign Entities
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Figure 3.9. Patents Granted in the US to Chinese Entities* 
 
*Data source: Figure 3.8: State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of P.R.C. http://www.pss-
system.gov.cn/sipopublicsearch/ensearch/searchEnHomeIndexAC.do  
Figure 3.9: United States Patent and Trademark Office (US PTO) http://www.uspto.gov/patent  
Data collection for Figure 1 facilitated by Evalueserve http://www.evalueserve.com/  
Data collection and analysis done as part of Stanford University China Project. 
Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington, DC.    
  
Granted, there is a home field advantage when looking at patents granted to 
Chinese entities in China. To correct that basis, this study also analyzed solar PV patents 
grated in in the U.S. Figure 3.9 shows the number of solar PV patents Chinese entities 
obtained in the U.S., charted by their application year. Two observations can be made. 
First, the number of patents granted to Chinese by the U.S. PTO is significantly smaller 
than it is by the China PTO, as shown in Figure 3.9. In total, only 65 patents have been 
obtained by Chinese inventors over the past 15 years, compared to over 1400 patents 
obtained by American inventors (not charted due to the high volume).  Despite the 
smaller number, the trend shown by the US PTO data is similar to the patent data in 
China: the number of patents obtained was small before 2007 and it spiked since then. 
2011 appears to be an abnormal year with a dip in number of patent granted. However, 














this could be due to the time lag between patent application and issuance and therefore, it 
should be seen as only a temporary drop.    
To understand the reason behind the big spike in number of patents obtained by 
Chinese entities, one must take a close look at innovation policies in China. Two major 
policies played a significantly role in shaping the patent regime and players’ patenting 
behavior in China. In 2008, the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of China issued 
an Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (SIPO, 2008). Its overall goal is 
to “improving China’s capacity to create, utilize, protect and administer intellectual 
property, making China an innovative country”. Among the four goals laid out by the 
Outline, the number one goal is to increase the percentage and absolute quantity of the 
self-relied intellectual property and make China rank among the advanced countries of 
the world in terms of the annual number of invention patents granted to the domestic 
applicants and also raise the number of overseas patent applications filed by Chinese 
applicants. The outline also declared that policies related to finance, investment, 
government procurement, industrial development, and etc. would be used to facilitate the 
creation and utilization of patents. New energy technologies including solar are listed as 
one of the key areas for patent creation and utilization. In 2010, National Patent 
Development Strategy for 2011-2020 was promulgated to improve the country’s 
innovation strength and further enhance China’s ability to utilizing patent system and 
resources (SIPO, 2010). Incidentally, a few science, technology and innovation (STI) 
programs under MOST, such as the 973 and 863 program, encourage or even require the 
projects they support to produce certain number of patents.  
The timing of the issuance of the Outline and the National Strategy also correlates 
with the uptake and strong growth of the Chinese patent numbers in China and in the U.S. 
One could argue that the dramatic increase in the number of patents granted to Chinese in 
China is because the Outline explicitly encouraged the creation of patents, in which it 
sent a signal to both the innovation players for them to work harder to create patent-
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worthy material and to the intellectual property administrators for them to approve more 
patents. However, a similar uptake in patent numbers can also be observed in the number 
of patents granted to Chinese entities in the U.S. (Figure 3.9). It is fair to assume that 
American patent administers are not under any pressure to increase the number of 
Chinese-owned patents, which is to say that the increase in Chinese patents in the U.S. is 
mostly due to a higher level of innovation among Chinese inventors. Using the 
combination of Figure 3.8 and 3.9, one can conclude that although Chinese policies had 
created a favorable environment for Chinese players to obtain patents in its domestic 
market, the larger number of Chinese patents is not merely a result of loosing approving 
process. Instead, it, in part, demonstrates the country’s improvement in solar PV 
innovation capacity.  
Government policies certainly led to a large increase in patent filing in China and 
made it the world’s number one in the number of patent applications by the end of 2012 
(United Nations, 2012). For example, if a company owns a large number of patents and 
has a high-level of R&D spending and a well-educated R&D team, it could obtain 
recognition of the High and New Technology Enterprise and obtain tax credits given to 
companies. Policies like this, along with national IP strategies, to certain extent 
incentivized innovation players to file for patents, which in turn led to greater number of 
patents. However, critics see the increase in patent numbers as a bubble because it is in 
part driven by policies. Aware of the criticism, Chinese government is changing the 
system to improve the quality of patent filings without reducing the numbers. For 
example, SIPO has issued a policy to evaluate the novelty of utility models in order to 
avoid granting patent rights to copy cat patents. Many local governments such as 
Shanghai, and Suzhou have started to organize technology committees to evaluate the 
quality of patents in a more comprehensive way, in order to avoid granting preferential 
tax status simply based on the number of patents. 
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3.4.2.1.1.     A technology-by-technology look at patents 
A detailed technology-by-technology analysis shows that Chinese players and 
foreign players focus on the similar areas of research. For instance, five out of the top 
seven PV technologies by number of patents granted to Chinese and foreign entities are 
the same; organic solar PV, mono-silicon, DSSC, poly-silicon, and CIGS are among the 
common interests between Chinese and non-Chinese players.  
 
 
Figure 3.10 Top 7 Technologies for Chinese and Foreign Players in terms of 
Number of Patents Granted 
 
*Data source: Figure 3.10: State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C. http://www.pss-
system.gov.cn/sipopublicsearch/ensearch/searchEnHomeIndexAC.do  
Data collection and analysis done as part of Stanford University China Project and facilitated by 
Evalueserve http://www.evalueserve.com/  
 
Using the progress made by Chinese entities, PV technologies can be divided into 
three categories.  
Category 1: Chinese entities have caught up with and even surpass western 
players in mono-si, poly-si, a-Si, HIT, CIGS, CdTe, PERC, pervoskite, GaAs, Metal 
Wrap Through (MWT), Multi-junction.  Similar to the historical efficiency gap in HIT, 
CIGS, and CdTe technology, there had been a gap in number of patent held in the above 
mentioned technologies between China and its western peers in technologies in this 
category. However, overtime Chinese players did not only closed the gap, they surpass 
western players in number of patents obtained.  
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Technologies in category 1 can be further divided into two groups: a group that 
represents first- and second-generation conventional PV technologies including mono-Si, 
poly-Si, a-Si, HIT, CIGS, CdTe, PERC; and a group that represents new and emerging 
technologies like pervoskite, GaAs, Metal Wrap Through (MWT), Multi-junction. The 
reasons for the rapid patent number growth for these two groups are different. For first- 
and second-generation technologies, because they are the predominant commercial 
technologies on the market, they benefit from corporate R&D investment more than any 
other innovation sources. Chinese companies accounts for majority of the patents in this 
group, indicating that they are the driver in technology innovation of the conventional PV 
technologies and their high-efficient derivatives like HIT and PERC. For the new and 
emerging technology group, Chinese academics carry the weight of innovation and are 
responsible for majority of the patents granted. It makes sense because these technologies 
are still at their early R&D stage; they are not market-ready yet, which makes them 
perfect candidate for academic research.  
Category 2: In technology areas such as organic, DSSC, Quantum Dot, CZTS, 
Chinese players were leaders from the very beginning, filing and obtaining more patents 
than their foreign counterparts since as early as 2001. Parallel to what was observed in 
the cell efficiency analysis, this patent analysis shows that China’s organic solar cell 
research moves almost head-to-head with world’s leading countries from the very 
beginning. Research personnel exchange between China and the U.S. early on in the 
invention and initial development stage of the technology had allowed China to stay on 
top of the latest development of the technology and in so doing avoided getting a late 
start. In general, China does better with newer technologies, as suggested by organic PV, 
as well as DSSC, Quantum Dot, CZTS, of which Chinese academic filed for more patents 
than foreign entities from the very beginning.  
Category 3: Chinese players are still slightly behind their foreign counterparts in 
IBC. IBC is the flagship high-efficient product of Sun Power in the U.S. Deterred by both 
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of the high knowledge barrier to product IBC and the concern for direct competition with 
Sun Power, Chinese companies have made the strategic decision to not pursue the IBC 
line of research and product development. As a result, IBC research is not active in China 
and has produced few patents.  
More details on patents can be found in Appendix B Table B.2.  
3.4.2.1.2.     Patent behavior by different actors  
In general, universities and research institutes are leaders in obtaining patents in 
the new and emerging technology areas (Table 3.2). These technologies are still at early 
research stage and therefore, have not received much R&D interest from the private 
sector.  Nevertheless, they are perfect candidates for academic research because of the 
need to understand the underlining science and engineering related to these technologies. 
In contrast, companies hold the majority of the patents for a suite of technologies that 
have already been commercialized or with near term commercialization potentials, such 
as mono-si, poly-si, a-Si, HIT, CIGS, PERC, and IBC. 
Our results suggest that there is a division of labor between public sector R&D 
and private sector R&D (true for both patents and efficiency), which suggests the PV 
innovation system in China is rational and relatively efficient. It is rational because 
researchers from universities and research institutes and their counterparts at private 
companies’ R&D division do what they are each incentivized to do. Depending on the 
market-readiness, the academics are more likely to work on early-stage technologies 
because scientific inquiry is their job, whereas private sector companies, driven by the 
market and profit motives, conduct research related to commercial and commercializable 
technologies. By focus on largely different areas of the PV technology spectrum, public 
and private sector innovation players in China also maximize the efficiency of the overall 
PV innovation system.  
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Table 3.2 Solar PV Technologies by Leading Patent Holder Types 
Leading 
Sector Solar PV Technology 
Academia  organic, pervoskite, DSSC, quantum dot, CdTe, GaAs, CZTS, multi-
junction 
Company mono-si, poly-si, a-Si, HIT, CIGS, PERC, MWT, IBC 
 
With that being said, there are a few caveats with looking at just the number. 
Patents, as a means to protect a technology holders’ intellectual property, is more 
complex than its sheer numbers suggests. There are many reasons why an entity wants to 
file for patents or vice versa.  
As a leading Chinese intellectual property lawyer6 said in an interview “Patent is 
a numbers game.” Both academic and corporate entities want to use patents to protect 
their intellectual property, to build a large R&D profile to impress investors (in the case 
of publicly-traded companies) or government grant managers if they want to participate 
in government-run innovation programs, and to generate economic returns on their 
investment in R&D.  
In the case of some MOST-run innovation programs participants, they are 
incentivized by the Programs to produce patents. Since the mid-2000s, the STI programs 
run by MOST started to include criteria related to patent production in the grant 
agreement, requiring the sponsored projects to produce certain number of patents in order 
to pass the project evaluation. A special patent-related fund is usually included in the 
general grant funding in order to provide the financial resource needed in the patent 
application process. The same is true for many R&D programs sponsored by MOST’s 
local counterparts. For instance, in Shanghai, under the Rules on Patent Sponsorship 
stipulated on July 1, 2012, any applicants with a Shanghai address is eligible under the 
patent sponsorship program where 80% of the application fee, 100% of substantive 
review fee and 80% of the second and third year annual fee will be waived. 
                                                 
6 Interviewee #111 
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Nevertheless, there are also reasons why entities want to be prudent about 
obtaining patents. The CTO of a large Chinese PV manufacturer breaks down the 
corporate perspective on patenting during an interview.7 According to him patenting is a 
strategic decision, which means not all inventions are suitable for patents. Whether to 
patent a technology or not depends on the company’s strategic position on this 
technology relative to its competitors. If a company decides to patent a technology, the 
moment the patent is granted that technology becomes public information, and the 
company’s economic rights over it depends on patent law enforcement. If the company 
has little confidence in a country’s patent enforcement regime, it could end up deciding 
not to file for patents. If a technology is deemed as truly crucial to a company’s 
competitiveness, then it will be treated as proprietary information and patenting is off the 
table. Sometimes, companies would even pre-empt its competitors from patenting a 
technology by putting the knowledge related to that technology into the public domain 
(e.g. publish paper). Finally, from an economic perspective, companies need to decide 
whether it makes sense to obtain a patent, the cost of which does not only entail the initial 
application fee but also the renewable fee that occurs annually. The fact of the PV 
manufacturing industry is that the profit margin is low and there may not be enough 
financial resources to spend on filing and maintaining a large number of patents.  
3.4.2.2. Patent Quality as An Indicator of Innovation  
One needs to be cautious when making inference about innovation using one 
single indicator. Both laboratory cell efficiency and patent numbers measure certain 
aspect of innovation. For the latter, it provides a sense about how active the innovation 
players are as seen through their patent behavior. But the numbers along say nothing 
about the quality of the patents. If both the quantity and quality of the patents can be 
measured in objective ways, then concrete conclusions can be drawn regarding how 
                                                 
7  Interviewee #53 
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innovative the Chinese patent system is.  However, patent quality is very difficult to 
assess. Players from different sectors prefer different measures. The most obvious 
approach to evaluate the value of a patent is to look at the licensing data (Geuna & Nesta, 
2006; Meurer & Bessen, 2005). If a patent is licensed by other entities, it is valuable.  
However, the opposite is not true, which is to say if a patent does not get licensed, it does 
not mean it is not valuable. A patent could be simply too ahead of its time to be utilized, 
or it could be in a niche area where does not see a lot of commercialization activities. As 
a result, licensing data is only a partial indication of patent quality.  
Academics and legal professionals also often use forward and backward citations 
as an indicator. If a patent is cited by a large number of other patents in their claims, it 
indicates that the original patent is valuable because it paved the way for later research 
(Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004). However, citation analysis favors basic science-
oriented patents over applied science and engineering-oriented patents. Legal 
professionals judge patents based on how well crafted their legal claims are. An interview 
with a leading patent lawyer based in both China and the U.S. revealed that a good patent 
should have a broad claim that allows it to cover as much ground as possible but in the 
meantime also be specific about its uniqueness so that it can pass the patent evaluation.8 
A fourth way to evaluate patent quality is to use lapse rate. Patent lapse rate measures the 
percentage of patents that did not get renewed. A patent lapses when its holder, for 
various reasons, fails to pay the annual maintenance fee. Patent holders usually do not 
allow their high quality valuable patents lapse. However, when they do let their patents 
lapse, it indicates a drop of patent holders’ confidence in the value of their patents, which 
infers lower patent quality. Therefore, the lapse rate can be used to indicate the overall 
quality of a collection of patents.  Although financial resource constrain may also affect 
an entity’s decision to maintain its patents, however, for truly valuable patents, the patent 
holders are more likely than not to maintain them.  
                                                 
8 Interviewee #112 
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Researchers have applied this lapse rate as a measure patent quality and found it 
to be effective in evaluating the quality of a collection of patents (Griliches, 1990; Hall & 
Harhoff, 2012; Schankerman & Pakes, 1985). This study uses lapse rate to evaluate 
patent quality, for two reasons. First, patent lapses rate can be calculated using the same 
data from China SIPO, whereas forward and backward citation data and licensing data 
are not available. Second, all patent quality evaluation methods have their pros and cons, 
yet the simplicity and straightforwardness offered by the lapse rate approach outweigh its 
drawbacks.  
Table 3.3 compares the overall lapse rate by technology among solar PV-related 
patents in China (both patents held by Chinese and non-Chinese players) to the lapse 
rates of Chinese patents. Among all 16 types PV technologies, Chinese patents 
demonstrate statistically higher lapse rate than the foreign patents in six technologies: 
organic, pervoskite, CIGS, DSSC, CdTe, and quantum dot, and the differences in lapse 
rate range from 4.2 percentage points to 7.8 percentage points. For CTZS, and MWT 
technology, all patents filed by Chinese and foreign entities still remain in force.  For 8 
technologies – HIT, GaAs, PERC, a-Si, Poly-si, Mono-Si, multi-junction, and IBC – 
Chinese patents have statically lower lapse rate, although the differences between the two 
groups are much smaller, ranging from 1.3% to 6.0%, except for IBC.  
Two one-way paired t-tests are carried out to test if the differences between the 
Chinese and foreign lapse rates are statistically significant. The results show that both 
differences are significant. This means that depending the technology at focus, Chinese 
patents’ quality is uneven across technologies. They have higher quality in certain 



















holder Type in 
China 
Solar PV Technologies with Higher Chinese Patent Lapse Rate  
Organic 7.4% 15.2% 7.8% Company Academia 
DSSC 10.3% 18.1% 7.8% Academia Academia 
Quantum 
Dot 12.2% 19.8% 7.6% Academia Academia 
CIGS 6.5% 13.8% 7.3% Academia Company 
Perovskite 15.4% 20.0% 4.6% Company Academia 
CdTe 10.6% 14.8% 4.2% Company Academia 
One-way 
paired t-test  
P= 0.0001. Chinese lapse rate is significantly higher than the overall 
lapse rate 0.05 statistical level 
Solar PV Technologies with the same Overall and Chinese Patent Lapse Rate 
CTZS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Academia Academia 
MWT 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Company Company 
Solar PV Technologies with Lower Chinese Patent Lapse Rate 
GaAs 9.1% 7.8% -1.3% Company Academia 
PERC 7.7% 6.0% -1.7% Company Company 
HIT 18.9% 16.0% -2.9% Company Company 
Mono-Si 14.4% 10.0% -4.4% Company Company 
A-Si 16.7% 11.6% -5.1% Company Company 
Multi-
junction  13.2% 8.0% -5.2% Company Academia 
Poly-Si 17.0% 11.0% -6.0% Company Company 
IBC  12.0% 0.0% -12.0% Company Company 
One-way 
paired t-test 
P= 0.0024. Chinese lapse rate is significantly lower than foreign lapse 
rate the 0.05 significance level 
 
*Data on patent lapse counts by technology collected by Evalueserve http://www.evalueserve.com/ as part 
of Stanford University China Project. 
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It is interesting to notice that academics are the majority holder of five out of the 
six types of technology that China has higher lapse rate, with perovskite being the only 
one exception, whereas the profile of the foreign group shows that academics are only the 
majority patent holder in 3 technologies –DSSC, quantum dot, and CIGS. In contrast, 
among the 8 technologies with lower Chinese lapse rate, only two have the academics as 
majority patent holders – GaAs and multi-junction. The fact that academia-led 
technology areas tend to have higher patent lapse rates in China suggests that Chinese 
academics file for more patents than they can or are willing to realistically maintain, and 
there is a greater variation in quality among their patents. In fact, the patent filing 
decisions among Chines academics are influenced by policies. As mentioned earlier, 
MOST-run innovation programs such as the 973 and 863 Program require certain number 
of patents produced as a result of the government-sponsored innovation project, and a 
portion of the grant funding is dedicated to cover patent application-related expenses. 
With the requirement and financial support, Chinese academics are eager to file for 
patents, which explains the large number of patents obtained by them. According to 
Chinese solar PV scientists who were involved in multiple 973 and 863 projects, even 
though there had been a number of high quality patents produced through the projects 
that they were involved in, some patents they filed were not superb and if it were not for 
the purpose of meeting the requirement they might not filed those patents9. Plus, 
academics in China often are agnostic about patents, when they occur no cost to 
themselves in filing for patents, they usually will as well do it.  
However, there is one catch with the MOST patent-related funding: it covers 
patent application fee, but does not always cover the renewal fee. Depending on the 
cases, sometimes, part of the renewal fees in the first two years are covered by MOST 
grants, while some other times, patent applicants are responsible for the renewal fees. So 
even if it is free from the academics’ perspective to file for patents, once their patents are 
                                                 
9 Interviewee #52, #93 
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granted, they will need to deal either partially or completely pay for the renewal fees. For 
those who filed the patents just to meet the MOST requirements or to take advantage of 
the patent application subsidy rather than genuinely wanted to protect their patent-worthy 
intellectual property, they are unlikely to keep up with the renewal, which explains the 
high lapse rate.  
3.4.3. Publications – Measure the Innovation Output 
This study conducts a meta-analysis on solar PV related publication.  A 
bibliometric analysis conducted by Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for 
Development (CASTED) shows that by august 2014, Chinese journals have published 
16,914 solar PV-related articles; 7,587 master and the doctoral theses were devoted to 
solar PV research; 3,681 academic conference papers discussed solar PV technologies 
(CASTED, 2014). The growth rates in all three categories are high in China. However, 
despite the fast growth, the absolute number of Chinese publications is small compared to 
82,217 English language journal publications and 22,983 international conference papers. 
Du et. al  looked at solar energy (including but not limited to solar PV) literatures 
between 1992 and 2011 and concluded that China is second to the U.S. in terms of total 
number of publications, accounting for 9.79% of the world total solar energy related 
publications (Du, Wei, Brown, Wang, & Shi, 2012). China has the fastest publication 
growth rate, especially in the post-2007 period, a trend similar to what was discovered 
about patents. CAS and Shanghai Jiaotong university are the third and forth most 
productive institutes in the world.  
The publication patterns show that China is coming from behind and catching up 
to the world’s leading countries in terms of scientific discovery in the solar technology 
realm. The fast publication growth rate is an indicator that China is making a big effort to 
improve its ability to conduct scientific innovation and judging from the publication 
numbers, the effort is paying off.  
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3.4.4. Summary of Findings – Output in the Chinese Solar PV Innovation System 
Up until this point, this study uses Chinese and the world record solar cell 
efficiencies, quantity and quality of solar PV patents, and the quantity and quality of solar 
PV publications as indicators of outputs of the Chinese solar PV innovation system to 
answer research question 1a. It is noticed that the answer to the question is nuanced. 
China is clearly making efforts to improve its innovation capacity, although depending on 
the choice of indicator and the technology at focus the progress is uneven.  
Using cell efficiencies of five types of solar PV technologies across all three 
generations as an indicator, it is found that China is becoming more and more active in 
solar cell innovation, suggested by the rising record solar cell efficiencies. For four out of 
the five technologies, the efficiency gap between China and the world’s leading 
innovators are narrowing, indicating that China is growing its innovation strength at a 
relatively fast speed. However, CdTe represents technologies where effort to produce 
innovation progress has been stagnant.  
In terms of solar PV related patents, the number of patents granted to Chinese 
entities in China is increasing dramatically, the trend of the same indicator is mirrored in 
the U.S., although the absolute volume of patents is much smaller in the latter case. 
Judging from patent quantity in China, Chinese entities have surpassed their foreign 
competitors in all sixteen PV technologies except IBC. The large number of Chinese 
patents and the fast growth rate indicate that solar-PV innovation players in China have 
increased their effort to create patent-worthy knowledge and products while becoming 
more aware of the means to protect their intellectual property and enhance their 
competitiveness.  
Nevertheless, the analysis of patent quality using lapse rate as an indicator shows 
that the quality of Chinese patents is uneven across technologies. In six technologies, 
Chinese patents have statistically significantly higher lapse rates, meaning lower patent 
quality, than their foreign counterparts. However, in eight other types of technologies, 
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Chinese patents have statistically higher patent quality than foreign patents obtained in 
China. In addition, Chinese academics own more solar PV patents than Chinese 
companies, but they are also more likely to let their patents go lapse. Analysis done by 
this study found that academics’ patent application decisions are made often based on 
their obligations to meet requirements of government issued-grants rather than an 
objective evaluation of the quality of their work.  
The rising but yet still small number of U.S. patents obtained by Chinese entities 
shows that although the Chinese are becoming more and more active in seeking to 
produce high quality patents, their absolute innovation strength is still relatively weak. 
Last but not least, the trend in publication is similar to that in solar cell efficiency 
for HIT and CIGS. China is overcoming a historical gap in knowledge production and is 
catching up to the world’s leading countries in terms of scientific discovery in the solar 
technology realm. The fast publication growth rate suggests that China strives to improve 
its ability to conduct scientific innovation, and judging from the publication numbers, the 
effort is paying off. 
Given the noticeable yet uneven innovation progress, this study further asks the 
question what factors enabled or impeded the advancement of solar PV innovation in 
China? It turns out three factors really mattered: policy, money and people. The next 
three sections are going to explore these factors in detail using the TIS framework.   
3.5. National Institutions and Their Impact on Solar PV Innovation 
Under the TIS framework, there are formal institution and information 
institutions. Formal institutions refer to rules, laws, regulations, and policies. Informal 
institutions include culture and social norms (Bergek et al., 2008). In the context of this 
study, formal institutions in China’s solar innovation TIS subsystem include its national 
vision for solar innovation, FYPs and sub-FYPs that specify innovation topics, goals, and 
tasks, and a suite of STI programs that carry out the implementation and execution of the 
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innovation tasks. Together, the formal institutions build a structure of the solar innovation 
ecosystem and provide an environment where innovation actors interact with each other 
and shape and change the innovation subsystem.  
The most important informal institution is China’s pragmatic culture, which 
profoundly influences the structure of the system, the makeup of the actors, and their 
interactions. This section will unpack the institutions, both formal and informal, to 
understand how they affect the overall wellbeing of the PV innovation subsystem.  
3.5.1. An Evolving National Vision for Solar Innovation Through FYPs 
China started to place high priority on developing the solar energy sector since the 
late 1990s, after realizing its potential in solving the energy and environmental problems. 
Its long history with central planning makes it that China approaches this development 
quite methodically. It uses national Five Year Plans (FYPs), the most important social 
and economic planning tool in the country, to launch grand strategic visions to lend 
legitimacy to solar energy and influence the direction of search of the scientific 
community. It will then use sector specific sub-FYPs to further set goals and 
development benchmarks. Interestingly but unsurprisingly, innovation was not the initial 
focus of China’s push for solar; it was the industrialization of the solar panel 
manufacturing industry that got the attention first. Nevertheless, solar innovation receives 
increasing regulatory and financial support over time, but the duo-focus of technology 
R&D and product industrialization permeates the solar innovation policymaking in China 
as discussed below. 
3.5.1.1. The 10th Five Year Plan Period (2001-2005) 
China started to form a national strategy for the solar energy starting from its 10th 
FYP in 2001. In the 10th FYP period, for the first time, China issued a plan specifically 
for the new and renewable energy industries titled the 10th FYP for the New and 
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Renewable Energy Industry Development. In this Plan, the then State Economic and 
Trade Commission, the predecessor of NDRC, laid out a path of market-oriented 
development. The overarching principle in this plan is to industrialize the new and 
renewable energy industries, including the solar industry, through economies of scale. 
For solar PV in particular, the emphasis was placed on scaling up PV cell and panel 
production as well as developing a robust PV supply chain. Well-defined panel 
manufacturing and supply chain development goals were proposed in the Plan. It called 
for a 15 MW annual solar cell manufacturing capacity and a fully-developed PV module 
supply chain by the end of the planning period. The plan also proposed a 53 MW of 
cumulative solar PV deployment goal by the end of 2005. As much as the Plan stressed 
the industrialization of the new and renewable energy industries, it also called for more 
research innovation in the respective technology areas. It encouraged the private sector to 
take the lead in innovation, to form collaborations with universities to develop new 
technologies and then transfer them to commercial production. The plan also proposed to 
improve China’s capacity in solar cell and panel production equipment manufacturing. 
Technology innovation was mentioned as a measure to improve the competitiveness of 
the industry but was followed with no substantial details. 
Overall, the 10th FYP emphasized industrialization and scaling up the PV 
manufacturing industry, which goal, as history later shows, was well over-achieved. The 
market responded to the policy signal with a lot of enthusiasm. A large number of solar 
PV manufacturing firms emerged in China during this five-year period, many of which 
later became global solar PV manufacturing leaders such as Suntech, Yingli, Trina. The 
annual solar module manufacturing capacity was over 500 MW in 2005, 33 times more 
than the FYP’s proposed goal. In essence, the 10th FYP started the solar manufacturing 
market (market creation).  
 3.5.1.2. The 11th Five Year Plan Period (2006-2010) 
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In The 11th FYP for Energy Development, the theme of industrialization through 
economies of scale continued to be the principle of developing the renewable energy 
industry.  More solar PV related details were laid out in the 11th FYP for Renewable 
Energy Development. The Plan acknowledged the fast growth of the PV manufacturing 
industry in the last FYP period as well as the lackluster performance of solar PV 
innovation, and proposed to devote more effort to solving technical issues such as the 
production of high purity poly-silicon and grid connection of large solar PV farms 
through R&D. Compared to the 10th FYP, the 11th FYP for Renewable Energy 
Development put forward specific PV deployment goals: 300 MW of cumulative 
installed solar capacity and 540 GWh of annual electricity generation by the end of 2010 
(market creation).  
Besides the FYP for renewable energy, the 11th FYP for High Tech Industry 
Development also shed light on PV technology innovation. This is the first time that solar 
PV was discussed not as an energy matter, but as a technology research and development 
issue along with other popular emerging technology areas like IT, biotech, aerospace, and 
etc. This Plan called for more research in the following solar PV related areas: poly-
silicon material production, high-efficiency solar PV and its application in large-scale 
electricity generation, and building integrated solar PV (BIPV). One similarity between 
the Renewable Energy Development Plan and the High Tech Industry Development Plan 
is that they are both stress the importance of economies of scale to the solar PV industry. 
This emphasis of building a large manufacturing capacity is consistent with the previous 
FYP. As the CTO of a world’s leading Chinese solar PV manufacturer said  
“Solar in China is an industry first, a science subject second.” 10  
Even though more attention had been given to solar innovation in the 11th FYP 
cycle, the end goal of innovation was to better serve the manufacturing industry and 
strengthen its competitiveness. For example, due to the lack of domestic suppliers, China 
                                                 
10 Interviewee #53 
 63 
relied heavily on imports for a few key materials and equipment required in solar cell and 
module manufacturing, such as high purity silicon, EVA, silver paste, fully-automated 
screen printing machine, etc. Starting from the 11th FYP, MOST designated these areas as 
“bottleneck issues” to building a globally competitive Chinese PV industry. It started to 
fund research projects to acquire knowledge on these fronts. The ultimate goal was to 
build a fully developed domestic supply chain. MOST’s effort created positive 
externalities that spread from the solar innovation TIS subsystem to the manufacturing 
subsystem. China’s reliance on imports in materials and equipment declined significantly 
during these 5 years. Domestically produced poly-silicon met 50% of the totally demand 
in China in 2010, up from only 10% in 2005. The trend is best highlighted by companies 
like GCL-Poly, which grows from a little known company to today’s world’s largest 
producer of PV grade silicon and supply over 90% of Chinese PV industry’s demand in 
2014. During the same time period, 70% of the tooling demand were met by Chinese 
equipment providers, a significantly leap from the 2005 situation where almost all 
Chinese manufacturers used imported tooling (NDRC, 2011). MOST’s targeted efforts on 
solving innovation bottlenecks have allowed the entire solar PV supply chain in China to 
make progress in overcoming technical barriers.  
The 11th FYP period marks the golden age of China’s solar PV industry. The 
manufacturing capacity grew from 500 MW in 2005 to just under 8.7 GW in 2010; more 
than a third of the global solar panel demand during this five years was met by Chinese 
producers; seven Chinese solar panel manufacturers became publicly traded companies in 
the U.S.; Dr. Zhengrong Shi, the founder and then chairman and CEO of Suntech was 
made the wealthiest person in China in 2006 and was featured on the cover of Fortune 
magazine in 2008. These facts highlight how vibrant the manufacturing sector was during 
the 11th FYP period.  
While the manufacturing sector made a big splash globally, solar innovation in 
China stayed low profile. Neither groundbreaking inventions nor breakthrough 
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advancement to existing technologies were made, although steady improvements were 
achieved in many of the “bottleneck” research areas.  
 3.5.1.3. The 12th Five Year Plan Period (2011-2015) 
China’s planning for solar PV continued to become more nuanced in the 12th FYP 
period. In additional to being an integral part of the energy development plan, the 12th 
FYP, for the first time, had not one but two specific plans dedicated to solar PV: The 
Special Plan for Solar Electricity Generation Technology Development (NDRC, 2010a) 
and The Special Plan for Solar PV Industry Development (NDRC, 2010b). The former 
plan aimed to bring more affordable solar electricity to China’s energy mix and the latter 
plan intents to strengthen China’s advantage in the solar PV manufacturing field. It is 
worth noticing that both plans acknowledge the role that innovation can play in achieving 
their respective goals, and the give similar prescriptions for how to approach solar 
innovation.  
Between the two plans, China aimed to ramp up innovation activities along the 
entire solar PV value chain, including research in the following four areas:  
• Materials that are crucial to high-performance PV cell such as high purity silicon, 
EVA, etc;  
• High-performance cell and module 
• System integration of solar;  
• Tooling needed to in cell and module production.  
Table 3.4 shows the innovation topics and specific goals outlined by the two 
Special Plans. Cell and module as well as system were given a large amount of attention 
in the plans; each has eight different innovation topics assigned to them. Two topics were 




Table 3.4 Innovation Topics and Goals Proposed in the 12th FYP Special Plan for 
Solar Electricity Generation Technology Development 
 




emission ways to mass 
produce poly-silicon  
Improve the “modified Siemens 
process” for mass, low-cost, clean 
production of silicon;  
  Achieve mass production using the 
silane method; 
Explore new low-cost production 
method.  
Auxiliary materials used in 
solar PV panel production 
Master the techniques to produce the 
following materials: silver paste; 
aluminum paste, TPT back sheet 
material, EVA; and TOC glass 





improvement and/or pilot 
line production for seven 
types of solar cell 
technologies and 




Grid integration of utility-
scale solar PV 
Master power station designs and grid 
integration techniques for 100MW 
level solar-plan grid integration 
Microgrid with solar Master techniques for micro-grid 
stability and quality control system.   
High voltage inverter for 
microgrid  
Master the design and production of 
self-controlled synchronous voltage-
source inverter and its application in 
microgrid operation 
10MW level CPV  
Large scale solar power grid 
integration with other 
renewable sources 
Master system design and operation 
techniques required in grid integration 
of large scale multi-renewable energy 
sources 
Silicon-based building-
integrated solar PV 
Build a BIPV panel production 
industry and its tooling supply chain 
Distributed CPV  Master 100kW level distributed 
concentrated solar power technologies 
and the power electronic technologies 
required to operate the system 
Solar thermal storage  Improve thermal storage materials; 
master thermal energy transmission 
and distribution technologies 
Tooling Required in the above areas Table 3.5 
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Technology coverage is also broad and comprehensive in the two Special Plans. 
They identified specific research areas for all three generations of PV technologies and 
attached assessable goals to each area. As seen in Table 3.5, for each solar PV 
technology, there are two sets of goals related to them: the innovation goals and the 
commercialization goals. The innovation goals include cell-efficiency targets but often 
times also entails requirement for tooling R&D. To China, the ability to produce tooling 
needed in solar cell and module manufacturing is crucial if it wants to maintain its status 
as the manufacturing mogul in the solar industry. Given its significance, China had called 
for developing an all-encompassing domestic solar PV supply chain with robust tooling 
manufacturing capacity since the 11th FYP. Although its domestic tooling manufacturing 
capacity had come a long way, moving from completely relying on foreign equipment to 
70% self-efficient, China is aspired to become complete self-sufficient by the end of the 
12th FYP cycle, and hence the push for tooling research in the two Special Plans.  
The call for tooling R&D also connects the innovation goals with the 
commercialization goals. The latter appeared hand-in-hand with the former in the Plans. 
This is yet another evidence showing the practical innovation culture in China where 
innovation does not exist in isolation but rather serves a purpose for the industrialization 
in the country. The commercialization goals outlined in the Plans aim to transfer the 
innovation outcomes to factory floor by requiring pilot production lines or mass 
production lines to be built by the end of the planning cycle (Table 3.5). This influenced 
the scientific community’s direction of search. Instead of creating prototype solar cells, 
MOST-sponsored program are often required to produce pilot production line that can 
manufacture the prototype cells. In addition, production cost targets were also specified 
for CdTe, a-Si, and tandem solar cell technologies. Overall, the integration of the two sets 
of goals illustrates that solar PV innovation as laid out in the 12th FYP went beyond just 
creating high performance solar cells; it also included mastering the science and 
 67 
technological knowledge involved in the entire production cycle and discovering new 
approaches to lower the production cost.  
Table 3.5 Solar Technology Innovation and Commercialization Goals 
 in the 12th FYP 
 
Technology Innovation Goals Commercialization Goals 
Mono-crystalline silicon 
(mono-Si) 
19% and above average 
commercial efficiency 
Domestic supply of key 
tooling equipment; 
100 MW production 
capacity of high-efficient 
silicon solar PV 
Poly-crystalline silicon  
(poly-Si) 
20% and above average 
commercial efficiency 
CIGS 
Master key CIGS tooling 
design and manufacturing 
techniques; electrochemical 
deposition method 
5MW roll-to-roll flexible 
substrate CIGS production 
line; MW level flexible 
substrate CIGSS pilot 
production line  
Cadmium Telluride 
(CdTe) 
10% and above average 
commercial efficiency; 
100% self-designed and 
self-produced tooling for 
30MW production line 
30 MW CdTe production 
line; CdTe turnkey 
solutions;  
5 RMB/W ($0.8/W) 
production cost or lower 
Amorphous silicon (a-Si) 
10% and above average 
commercial efficiency; 
100% self-designed and 
self-produced tooling for 40 
MW production line 
1 MW roll-to-roll flexible 
subtracted a-Si pilot 
production line; 
40 MW production line; 
turnkey solutions; 
5 RMB/W ($0.8/W) 
production cost or lower 
Dye-sensitized Solar Cell 
(DSSC) 
8% and above average 
commercial efficiency; 
master materials and tooling 
required in mass production 
5MW level production line 
Heterstructure Intrinsic 
Thin-layer (HIT) 18.5% pilot line efficiency 
2MW capacity pilot 
production line 
A-Si/μc-Si tandem solar 
cell 
8% and above average 
commercial efficiency; 
a-Si materials; Tooling for 
mass production 
50MW production line; 
5 RMB/W ($0.8/W) 
production cost or lower 
GaInP/GaInAs/Ge multi-
junction 
Master multi-junction cell 
design and production 
techniques 
5MW pilot production line 
Concentrated solar PV 
(CPV) 
35% commercial efficiency; 
master CPV power plant 
control system and inverter 
design 




Compared to previous FYPs, the two plans issued in the 12th FYP period are more 
nuanced and articulated in terms of specifying research areas and setting measurable 
research goals. Table 3.6 summarizes the evolution of solar innovation planning over the 
past 3 FYPs. The trend is clear that the solar energy receives more policy attention 
overtime. It started as a manufacturing industry before and during the 10th FYP, but has 
since evolved to integrate more components of science and technology innovation. 
Although the emphasis on product commercialization and the industrialization of the 
entire supply chain has been consistent and remained strong, the rising importance of 
innovation is also clear.  
Table 3.6 Solar Innovation Planning in the 10th, 11th, and 12th FYP 
 Specific Plan for Solar 
PV 
Emphasis on PV 
Innovation 









 FYP for the New 
and Renewable Energy 
Industry Development. 
Briefly.  Heavily.  
Emphasize 





Yes and No. 
No: No PV specific sub 
plans. 
Yes: 2 sub-FYPs have 
specific sections 
dedicated to solar PV: 
11
th
 FYP for High Tech 
Industry Development; 
11th FYP for 
Renewable Energy 
Development 
Good amount.  
The 11
th
 FYP for High 
Tech Industry 
Development. 
Identify research areas:  
poly-si production, high-
efficiency solar cells and 








economies of scale 
and full supply 






Two PV-specific plans:  




Special Plan for Solar 
PV Industry 
Development 
Heavily, with well 
identified research needs 
and assessable goals.  
The 12
th
 FYP Special 
Plan for Solar Electricity 
Generation Technology 
Development.  
Heavily, with aims 





Special Plan for 
Solar PV Industry 
Development.   
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Despites its evolution, China’s PV innovation strategy does not explicitly place 
high priority on advancing the scientific frontier and producing cutting-edge 
technologies. As illustrated above, focuses have been placed on two types of actives: the 
activities that allow China to tackle the bottleneck issues, which often entails achieving 
the mastery of certain techniques rather than making the best of their kinds; and the 
activities that would improve China’s competitive advantage along the entire solar PV 
manufacturing value chain. This practical-approach is proven to be a double-bladed 
sword. On the one hand, it does allow China to achieve an unmatchable manufacturing 
scale. However, on the other hand, the industry-oriented innovation approach has 
impeded Chinese researchers from conducting long-term, in-depth, future-oriented 
research that are unlikely to see immediate market payback. The tradeoff to the self-
sufficiency-driven industrialization-oriented research is the lack of originality in China’s 
own research agenda and the absence of scientific and technological breakthroughs. 
Chinese solar community is becoming more and more aware of the drawbacks. Plenty of 
criticism about its approach to innovation had been heard by MOST, which to certain 
extent sow the seeds of the upcoming MOST reform.  
3.5.2. Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Programs  
MOST administers some of the most impactful science, technology and 
innovation programs in China, with the exception of NSFC, which is an independent 
entity.  Individually, each program occupies a niche in the technology development cycle 
with a certain level of overlap with its adjacent programs by design. Collectively, they 
cover the entire technology research, development, demonstration and deployment 
(RDD&D) spectrum. From the most basic research to produce commercialization, there 
are the NSFC Grant Program (independent to MOST), the National Basic Research 
Program (also known as the 973 Program), the National High Tech R&D Program (also 
known as the 863 Program), the State Key Laboratory system (SKL), the National 
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Science and Technology Infrastructure Program (the Infrastructure Program), and the 
China Torch Program. According to the specific technology development stage that each 
program is designed to target, financial resources are allocated through the programs to 
fund specific R&D projects carried out by innovation players in universities, research 
institutes and private companies. The size of the financial support and the preferred types 
of innovation players vary from program to program.  
The remaining part of this section provides a close look at these programs and 
how they relate to solar PV innovation in China.  
3.5.2.1. NSFC  
Similar to the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States, the 
National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), supports early stage, basic and 
novel research conducted in universities and research institutes. Public available record 
on NSFC can be traced back to 2000. CdTe and poly-crystalline silicon are the first two 
solar technologies receiving NSFC funding. No particular reasons as to why these two 
technologies were first selected. NSFC’s investment in the early 2000s was small and 
was not consistently provided to any type of PV technology. For CdTe, it did not see the 
second NSFC grant until 2010; and there is a four year gap between the first and the 
second NSFC grant to crystalline silicon solar PV. Appendix F details NSFC’s 
investment across the technology spectrum.   
Starting from 2007, NSFC broadened its technology choice and began to 
consistently invest in a portfolio of solar PV technologies, including mono-Si, poly-Si, 
and a-Si solar PV, amorphous silicon PV, various types of thin film PV technology such 
as Cadmium Telluride (CdTe), Copper indium gallium selenide (CIGS), and etc., as well 
as emerging technologies like pervoskite, organic, dye-sensitized solar PV.   
Grants awarded by NSF are typically around $75,000 to $100,000. Because of the 
early-stage nature of NSFC research that NSFC supports, individual researchers can 
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apply on their own without having to form partnership with fellow researchers or 
companies.  
3.5.2.2. The 973 and the 863 Program 
The National Basic Research Program, also known as the 973 Program, and the 
National High Tech R&D Program, i.e. the 863 Program, are two flagship innovation 
programs under MOST.   
Established in March 1997 (hence, 973) under MOST Office of Basic Research, 
the 973 Program aims to support large-scale basic research projects. Compared to the 
exploratory nature of NSFC, the 973 Program requires projects to have proven concepts 
and they must show that their results will have significant impact on China’s society and 
national economy. In other word, NSFC projects can be out of pure scientific curiosity, 
but 973 projects must have a social mission. The Program is also forward looking, aiming 
to lay the ground for the so-called “technologies of tomorrow”.  
Since its inception in March 1986, the 863 Program focuses on R&D areas that 
are further along down the technology maturity curve. It mainly supports high-tech 
projects that have demonstrated great potential for commercialization but still need to 
address a few key science and technological issues. Private sector players play an 
increasingly important role in the 863 Program because they have a better sense about the 
market potentials of technologies and where innovations are needed in order to bring the 
technologies to market. Starting from the 11th FYP, MOST officially encourages 
companies and other private sector players to participate in the 863 Program. Research 
proposals that are jointly developed by private companies and academics receive 
priorities in the grant application process. This change mobilized private sector actors to 
more actively take part in the innovation.  
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3.5.2.3. State Key Lab System and State Engineering and Technology Research 
Center System 
The State Key Lab (SKL) system and the State Engineering and Technology 
Research Center (SETRC) system are made of laboratories and research centers from 
universities, research institutes and companies, which have demonstrated strong research 
capacity in certain science or engineering areas that are deemed as important to Chinese 
society and national economy. Once acknowledged as a SKL or a SETRC, labs and 
research centers will receive long term funding from MOST. One SKL or SETRC term is 
usually 5 years, but labs and centers with good performance are usually renewed for a 
second, or even a third term. This is designed to ensure some level of constant public 
finance support to major research groups and enable them to build long-term research 
strength. The SKL and SETRC system also give more freedom to research groups to 
select their own topics of investigation and partners to collaborate with. The financial 
support coming from the SKL and SETRC System is mainly used for the overall building 
and operation of a lab or a research center like purchasing lab equipment, hiring 
researchers, and paying for operation costs, etc. No string is attached to any particular 
research projects. The idea is to release researchers from the worry for money so that they 
can dedicate their energy to their research.  
There are two solar-related SKLs: the State Key Laboratory of Photovoltaic 
Materials and Technology at Yingli and the State Key Laboratory of PV Science and 
Technology at Trina. Exhibit 1 and 2 in Appendix B give an overview of these two SKLs.  
Three solar-related SETRCs involve both academics and private sector players. 
LDK Solar is home to the State Photovoltaic Engineering and Technology Research 
Center. The 48th Research Institute of China Electronic Technology Group Corporation 
houses the State PV Tooling Engineering and Technology Research Center. Finally, the 
State Photo-electronic Crystalline Material Engineering and Technology Research Center 
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is located in the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Material Structure Research Institute in 
Fujian.  
Besides the central government level labs and research centers, provincial and 
local level innovation programs support an even larger number of projects in China albeit 
the quality of the projects may be lower than the top tier national projects. According to 
the research of China Renewable Energy Industry Association (CREIA), there are 2 
provincial level key labs in Liaoning and Henan province and 6 provincial level ERTCs 
located in Jiansu province, Hubei province, and Beijing (Table 3.10) (CREIA, 2014).  
3.5.2.4. National Science and Technology Infrastructure Program  
The Infrastructure Program is a demand-oriented program in the sense that it 
gauges its R&D support according to the need of the economy and key national 
infrastructure projects, as well as industries’ demands for new tooling. Technologies 
covered by the Program are usually relatively mature and have shown potentials to have 
significant social impacts. The Program’s goal is to connect the technologies with the 
markets that they can serve, which include both the consumer market and the pubic 
sector.  For example, China Silicon Corporation has received support from the 
Infrastructure Program for 5 different projects related to technology and tooling used in 
mass production of high purity silicon.    
Starting from the 11th YFP (2006-2010) the Program encourages private 
enterprises to play the leading role in formulating projects that have a clear focus on 
products development and their commercialization. Unlike the 863 Program, which 
despite the application-oriented focus, relies primarily on public finance to fund R&D 
projects, the Infrastructure Program sees its investment into industrialization and 
commercialization projects as an invitation to private enterprises for them to devote more 
of their own resources into R&D, typically no less than 50% of the total project budget. It 
has been doing so through a suite of new financing mechanisms such as subsidized-
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interest R&D loans, revolving loan fund, and allowing private venture capital to invest in 
technology R&D.  
3.5.2.5. China Torch Program. 
The Torch Program is the most market-oriented program of all. It champions the 
commercialization, industrialization, and internationalization of R&D products by 
supporting building high tech industrial parks, developing technology service industries, 
providing R&D financing to innovative SMEs, and facilitating international 
collaboration. The goal of the Program is to facilitate, rather than direct, the market-
oriented R&D activities. As a result, much of its effort has been focusing on building an 
environment for innovation and commercialization and solving the auxiliary needs such 
as information exchange, personnel training and etc. 
The recipients of the Torch Programs are almost all private sector players: high 
and new tech companies, especially SMEs, industrial parks with a high tech focus, and 
technology service companies.  
3.5.2.6. Thousand-Talent Program 
The Thousand-Talent Program is a research expert recruitment program started in 
2008 by more than 20 central government agencies. Its mission is to mobilize human 
resource by recruiting top-notch research experts from all over the world. The 
establishment of this Program reflects the idea that people are just as important to China’s 
national innovation system as financial resources. Yet, for a long time, China has been 
leveraging the latter while overlooking the importance of the former. With the Thousand-
Talent Program, the emphasis on attracting and retaining research talents have been made 
it clear. By the end of May 2014, the Program has recruited 4180 research experts from 
overseas and majority of them are foreign-trained native Chinese researchers. 11  
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The Thousand-Talent Program evolves over time. Before 2012, the Program 
recruitees were placed mostly in R&D positions at Chinese universities and research 
institutes. Since 2012, the Program increased its effort to attract experts who are the 
intellectual property owners of technologies and are looking for opportunities to start 
their own business. In both pure research and business-oriented recruit cases, the 
recuritees are provided with an incentive package that includes a job post at a leading 
Chinese research institute or company, personal financial reward (usually at one to five 
million RMB per year level), a research budget, and administrative supports for research 
and business development. People who are recruited by the national Thousand-Talent 
Program usually also receive local incentives, which include subsidized or free housing, 
matching research budge, and etc. In the solar energy field, the founder of Suntech, Dr. 
Zhengrong Shi; the chairman and CEO of Canadian Solar Dr. Xiaohua Qu; China’s 
leading researcher in HIT solar cell, Dr. Zhengxin Liu are all recruited by the Program.  
The evolution of the program is also manifested in the age cohort.  The program 
used to focusing on attracting well-established senior scholars, but soon they found out 
that these senior scholars were more likely to take part-time positions and spilt their time 
between China and their overseas bases than permanently relocate back to China because 
of their concern for the work and education opportunities for their spouses and children. 
In order to attract scholars that are more committed to building their career in China, the 
Program shifted its focus to young and mid-age overseas scholars who are at the early 
stage of their career and are more open to the idea of moving their entire families back to 
China. This change in recruiting target resulted in more full-time positions being taken by 
overseas returnees. 
The Thousand-Talent Program has been proven to be important to China’s 
growing innovation strength for the following reasons.  
First, they are trained overseas with rigorous theoretical and methodological 
skills. When they return to China to teach Chinese students, they introduce the same 
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rigorous training to China. By diffusing knowledge and methodologies, they help 
improve the quality of China’s higher education in science and engineering fields.  
Second, the recuritees are all well-vetted top tier researchers who are at the 
forefront of their respective R&D field. They stay up to date with the latest research and 
have an acute sense about where the research is going. Therefore, they are likely to 
discover the “next big thing”, rather than only playing the catch up game.  
Third, trained overseas expanded Chinese science community’s network to a 
global level. They take their overseas networks with them to China, and sever as bridges 
that link Chinese research community more closely with overseas communities, allowing 
the former to be further integrated into the global research network. Knowledge 
development and diffusions happen more easily and frequently when scientists talk to 
each other.    
Lastly, overseas returnees are fluent in English as well as research collaboration 
international. They help to close the communication gap between the native Chinese 
research community and the broader international research community. Academic 
communication is crucial to Chinese innovation.  
The Thousand-Talent Program is not the only global R&D expert recruiting effort 
in China. The Yangtze Scholar Program under the Ministry of Education, and the 
Hundred-Talent Program at CAS are other examples of central-government level 
programs. All Chinese provinces and many local governments also established their own 
research talent recruitment programs.  
Driving mechanism 3.1: Effort to recruit overseas top tier Chinese 
researchers back to China has significantly narrow the knowledge, scientific 
methodology, and communication gaps between China and the world innovation 
leaders, broadened the network and improved the innovation strength of Chinese 
solar PV research community.  
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3.5.3. Informal Institution: the practical attitude towards innovation  
China holds a pragmatic (practical) view towards innovation. Unlike the West 
which approaches solar PV innovation as a constant effort to invent new technologies and 
to set new efficiency records for existing technologies, China treats innovation as 
everything that brings improvement to the performance and production of a PV 
technology. This philosophical difference in understanding innovation between China 
and West manifests in the following three ways.  
First and foremost, according to the Chinese, innovation does not equal to 
invention. Although the pursuit of original ideas and new technologies are encouraged in 
China, research and development that focuses on improving the efficiency and 
performance of existing technologies has also been an integral part of the Chinese 
innovation system. This is especially germane given the fact that China has a large 
historical knowledge gap to overcome in order to stand side by side with its western 
peers. For instance, China had to rebuild its education and R&D infrastructure in the late 
1970s and early 1980s after 10 years of stalling, if not regressing, in education and 
research due to the Cultural Revolution. Solar cell technologies came a long way 
worldwide while China was in a standstill.  
Given the historical gap, China’s solar technology innovation campaign started in 
the late 1990s has been focusing on catching up to the West. Chinese researchers spend 
much of their efforts in mastering technologies developed by western scientists. The first 
generation of post-cultural revolution solar cell scientists in China started the field almost 
from scratch since there was little knowledge to draw from. Their main goal was o undo 
the damage inflected by Cultural Revolution and to catch up to the leaders in the filed as 
much as possible. Therefore, any small improvement on solar cell efficiency was seen as 
a hard-fought progress, even if they came a few decades later than the initial progress 
made by western scientists. The fact that solar technology innovation in China has been a 
catch-up game for a long time means that Chinese researchers do not necessarily see their 
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mission as to create the highest-efficiency cell or invent a new cell structure. Rather, they 
are driven to close the gap between China and the West. During one interview with a 
current leading Chinese solar cell scientist, the oversea-trained scientist stated the goal of 
his research group as “not necessarily to develop new world efficiency records, but to 
ensure China has the ability to mass produce HIT and CIGS (two technologies that were 
invented in the West).”12 This mindset partly explains why none of the world record cell 
efficiencies was set by China until very recently. Nevertheless, Chinese researchers have 
managed to improve solar cell efficiencies steadily over time albeit the lack of ambition 
to be the leader of solar cell research.  
The second informal institutional belief that affects China’s approach to solar 
innovation is its treatment of innovation as an academic-industry continuum, which 
encompasses not only scientific research conducted by scientists in labs but also process 
innovation developed by engineers and even production line workers. As seen earlier, 
solar energy in China was developed as an industry first, a research subject second. 
Because the PV manufacturing industry has a head start, it has stronger influence on the 
researcher community compared to its western peers. To keep up with PV technology 
advancements, large Chinese solar PV manufacturing firms invest in their own R&D 
departments as well as in collaborations with domestic and foreign universities and 
research institutes. For examples: Trina and Yingli each has a State Key Lab jointly 
established with MOST (see Appendix B, Exhibit 1 and 2). In addition, Trina 
collaborates with CAS, Yingli and Canadian Solar collaborates with ECN in Netherland, 
and Suntech collaborated with Fraunhofer in Germany. The list goes on. Through both 
in-house and joint research, Chinese PV manufacturers lead R&D in a pragmatic 
direction because they are not only interested in the physics of solar cell technologies, but 
also practical matters such as manufacturability and production cost. As a result, their 
academic R&D partners’ are influenced by such pragmatic demand in a way that they 
                                                 
12 Interviewee #59 
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extend their research agenda beyond just answering intellectually interesting questions 
but also consider the practicality and the commercializability of their R&D product. This 
sentiment is reflected in many interviews we conducted with Chinese solar PV scientists, 
who often stressed the importance of transferability between their lab R&D products and 
mass production.13  
Last but not least, the consideration for cost is so deeply rooted in Chinese solar 
PV industry that it permanents the entire solar PV value chain, including the innovation 
system. Scientific and technological merits of solar cells are only one side of the coin; 
innovations that lead to production cost reduction are just as germane as the science and 
technology underpinnings. Besides manufacturers’ drive for process innovation, Chinese 
scientists and engineers have learned to be cost-sensitive at their work. Because 
innovation is seen as an academia-industry continuum in China, the manufacturing 
industry's desire to control cost is very visible to the solar innovation system in China. In 
one conversation with a renowned Chinese PV scientist, we made an observation that 
there had not been a single cell efficiency record set by Chinese entities (until November 
2014). In response, he pointed out that all the record-efficiency cells are either 
technologically too complex or economically too expensive to produce, whereas the cell 
his research team had been working on was designed with mass-production and low-cost 
in mind from the very beginning, so even if he does not have a world record under his 
belt, he was hopeful that he will see his product being applied in the real world. 14  
China’s pragmatic approach towards innovation has its big downside. To certain 
extent, the low-cost easy-to-make nature of process innovation overshadows the 
importance of scientific innovation because the former is easier to do and it directly helps 
with cost reduction whereas the latter not only has a longer payback period it sometimes 
even goes against the short term cost-containment goal. Too much emphasis on low-cost 
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14 Interviewee #45 
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would render the innovation shortsighted. It provides reverse incentive for researchers to 
not engage in long-term scientific investigation but only chase short-term marginal 
improvement.  
Although the catch-up strategy seems to work for China in the past, but the 
danger of such strategy is that it makes the scientific community comfortable with 
following the world leaders’ footsteps rather than attempting to be the leaders 
themselves. This strategy may bring the Chinese PV industry practical economic benefits 
in the short term, but in a scenario where disruptive technology emerges, Chinese PV 
industry will soon find itself losing its market dominance.   
Blocking mechanism 3.1: The pragmatic culture in China caused the solar 
PV innovation subsystem to focus on short-term commercial success at the cost of 
long-term scientific innovation. It also resulted in a “catch-up” mindset, providing a 
reverse incentive for the subsystem to achieve breakthroughs.    
3.6. Innovation Investments and Their Impact on Solar PV Innovation  
3.6.1. An Overview of China’s Innovation Spending  
Research and development spending in China totaled at $190 billion (1.18 trillion 
RMB) in 2013, equal to 2.08% of the annual GDP, representing a slight improvement 
from the 1.98% in 2012. Over three quarters of the total national spending was used in 
corporation-led R&D activities, which is consistent with the latest policy guidance to let 
private sector players become the main agent of innovation. Research institutes and 
universities accounted for another 15% and 7.2% of the R&D spending. Public finance 
was the largest source of R&D investment; it totaled at about $100 billion (¥ 618.5 
billion), representing over 52% of the total national R&D spending, among which 44% 
came from central government’s budget and the remaining was from provincial and local 
government budge. Public R&D finance at all government levels added up to 4.41% of 
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the total government budget of 2013 (Ministry of Science and Technology of China, 
2014).  
Solar innovation is part of the China’s overall national innovation system. The 
system has a multi-layered innovation funding mechanism that provides both public 
finance and private investment to solar innovation players. However, tracing the exact 
amount of solar innovation investment has been proven to be a daunting task given the 
limited data availability and low transparency. In fact, difficulties with data availability 
are a recurring theme in this research, and the frustration with data is shared by many 
researchers, who work on China-related issues.  
3.6.2. Data Issues: You cannot manage what you cannot measure.   
This study is aspired to track and analyze the public and private R&D investment 
into the three generations of solar PV technologies in China. The idea is that the 
allocation of financial resources reveals the government’s and the companies’ innovation 
strategy. By tracing the solar PV R&D investment over time and across the technology 
spectrum, one can understand the revealed technology preference of the public and 
private entities in China. The investment pattern can be put side by side to the official 
innovation rhetoric to assess the implementation of the policies. It can also be evaluated 
against the innovation outcome in order to understand the effectiveness and the efficiency 
of the innovation programs.  Results of these policy study exercises can in term inform 
decisionmakers about the success or failure of the past programs and allow them to 
improve the quality of their policy design.  
However, good quality R&D investment data is extremely hard to get in China. 
Ideally, time series data on public and private R&D expenditures across three generations 
of PV technology would allow this study to carry out the above-mentioned policy 
evaluation tasks. However, there is no public database that includes information that is 
nearly as comprehensive as desired, except for the NSFC. For programs like the 973 and 
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863 Program, the best public available data is the sporadically released grant approval 
announcements, but the lack of continuity makes it impossible to tease out the investment 
pattern over a long period of time. No public data regarding the Infrastructure Program 
and the China Torch Program can be found.  
Poor information transparency and lack of data granularity represent a huge 
challenge to this study because in order to measure the innovation progress in China and 
understand the role played by the STI programs in enabling the progress, both historical 
and current data at the sub-technology level are needed. To make things even worse, data 
issue in China runs deeper than non-transparency and low data quality.  There is real fear 
among the research community in China that there has not been a good data collection 
infrastructure and management system in place to ensure the granular data needed for 
program evaluation are properly collected. As one researcher said during an interview 
“It’s more likely than you think that even MOST itself does not know how money has 
been spent.” 15 This may be a particularly pessimistic view, but it is not very far from 
truth for the pre-2000 era when data collection and management infrastructure practically 
did not exist. The historical data gap is impossible to remove, which means policy lessons 
from those year could never be learned.  
The under developed data collection and management system cannot support the 
need for policy evaluation and resource management. In particular, this study does not 
only face obstacles related to data availability but also data quality. The available data are 
often aggregated at the technology family level, like renewable energy, without being 
broken into specific technologies such as solar, not to mention sub-technologies such as 
HIT, CIGS, etc. In addition, data found in government reports and announcements 
usually cannot be fact-checked because the data behind them are not publicly available.  
Blocking mechanism 3.2: Ineffective data collection system and poor data 
transparency make it extremely difficult to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency 
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of the innovation system. It prohibits policymakers from making informed 
decisions.  
Problems with data availability in China stem from the country’s lack of 
transparency and accountability in its governance culture. Government officials are rarely 
held accountable to their decisions. In fact, the public’s demand for accountability is low 
historically. It puts no real urgency on improving government transparency. However, as 
China continues to integrate into the greater international society, western democratic 
values have made inroads into China. The country sees a rise in popular demand for 
government accountability and transparency in recent years. First of all, the public wants 
to know how their tax money is spent, which puts pressure on the government to disclose 
more information on public spending.  
Although the popular demand for accountability in theory should push the 
government towards a more open and transparent model, but the distrust between the 
public and the government runs deeper than the latter is willing to admit. As the public 
becoming increasingly critical about the information they received from propaganda-
sounding government reports, they demand independent sources for information and ask 
for more investigated reporting from the media to expose public sector corruption and 
government officials’ lack of accountability.  The ongoing anti-corruption campaign is 
the government’s response to the public sentiment. It has brought lots of cases of 
imprudent use of taxpayers’ money to light. But one unintended consequence of the 
nation-wide campaign is that government agencies and their officials, in wake of the 
increasing social scrutiny, become more and more cautious about data release, especially 
financial data, because of the fear of being investigated against using the same data they 
gave out.  The concern that every bit of information could be used to create a “gotcha” 
moment makes it not easier but harder to obtain information. Stanford research team 
experiences this difficulty first-hand. As a foreign academic institute affiliated team, the 
Stanford team often met with questions about the motive of this research as the beginning 
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of a conversation with government and company officials. Even though the intention of 
this project is academic and benign, the team still met a good amount of polite rejections 
to its inquiry because of the distrust of foreign entities by Chinese government and 
companies. Sometimes, “rules” are quoted as the reason to not give out information, 
although the team was never able to verify whether such rules against data release to 
outside entities ever exist.  
Despite the difficulties described above, the author found most of the Chinese 
government officials, company executives, and academics easy to talk to and very open 
to answer questions and discuss issues. In general, Chinese sources are happy to offer the 
official rhetoric and their interpretation of them. They are helpful in contextualizing 
issues. When it comes to answering questions about R&D investment, Chinese sources 
are helpful in terms of offering their personal knowledge, but they either do not have 
access to the comprehensive data or are reluctant to provide the access for reasons 
mentioned above.  
  The anti-dumping and countervailing investigations by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (U.S. DOC) against Chinese solar PV manufacturing companies and 
government exacerbate the already-bad data accessibility in China. Words about 
government R&D investment is treated as a type of unfair subsidies by U.S. DOC made 
Chinese interviewees hesitate to discuss this issue. During a few interviews with Chinese 
researcher16 and policymakers17, they declined to comment on innovation investment in 
China because they did not want their words to be used as evidence to support the trade 
accusations against China, even though that was not the purpose of the interviews to 
begin with.  
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17 Interviewee #63, #73 
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3.6.3. Solar Innovation Investment in China   
With the data difficulties being said, this study explored almost all the means 
possible to collect the R&D investment data since the 10th FYP. Methods for data 
collection include searching public databases, tracing government documents, and 
interviewing people who involved in funding decision-making. The results show that 
between 2000 and 2015, the total solar-related R&D spending from both the public and 
private sector amounts to $1,364 million (Table 3.4). Among which, Tier 1 Chinese solar 
PV manufacturing companies invested over a trillion USD in their own R&D effort.  
Government programs such as the NSFC, the National Basic Research Program 
(the 973 Program) and the National High-tech R&D Program (the 863 Program) also 
have consistently supported the solar innovation efforts although the amount of 
investment they made accounts only a fraction of the private investment. Both 
government and private companies devote resources to build solar-related SKLs and 
SETRCs. Traceable figures in all forms of investment are accounted for in the table. 
Provincial and local governments are supposed to be responsible for a big portion of the 
solar innovation funding, because there are so many of them. However, data availability 
and transparency become worse at the provincial and local level. As a result, the figure 
for provincial and local investment in Table 3.7 does not mean to be all-inclusive. Rather, 
it illustrates the multiple layers of funding sources in China and the amount of funding 
this study is able to track at each level. Section 3.6.3.1 to 3.6.3.3 will take a look at how 
public and private financial resources are allocated across the technology spectrum and 
what they have achieved.  
Table 3.7 Traceable Solar Innovation Spending in China from 2000 to 2015 
Program Investment 
NSFC (Comprehensive)  $26 million 
973+863 (Comprehensive) $48 million  
SKL + SETRC  
(Incomprehensive) (Public and private investment combined)  
$190 million  
Provincial Key Lab + Provincial ERTC (Incomprehensive)  $33 million 
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Table 3.7 Countinued  
Program Investment 
Infrastructure Program  Unknown  
Torch Program  Unknown 
Total public innovation investment  $296 million  
Chinese Tier-1 solar companies (Comprehensive) $1,194 million 
Total  $1,490 million 
 
Note: Data collection and analysis conducted by the author as part of the Stanford China Project.  
Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington DC.    
 
3.6.3.1. Solar innovation investment from the public sector  
3.6.3.1.1.     NSFC 
Public innovation spending data in China is notoriously difficult to obtain, with 
only one exception – NSFC. NSFC is the only government-run innovation program in 
China that has a publicly accessible database disclosing information related to all the 
projects it supported since 2000. Using this database (NSFC, 2015), this research traced 
NSFC’s spending on solar innovation over time across multiple technologies. The records 
show that NSFC’s investment has concentrated on the second- and third-generation 
technologies, which reflects its future-oriented mission.  
It is not a surprise that NSFC spends less resources on first-generation 
technologies, which are more mature than technologies that belong to the later 
generations. The first-generation technologies such as poly- and mono-crystalline solar 
cell and a-Si received $1.65 million research funding from NSFC between 2000 and 
2015, which is roughly about half of NSFC’s investment on the second-generation 
technologies (Table 3.8). Starting from 2012, NSFC expanded its support to HIT, a then 
emerging hot research area. $0.33 million has been spent on HIT since then. Appendix B 
details the number of projects and the amount of NSFC investment into different 
technologies. Figure B.1-B.3 in Appendix B describes the NSFC’s support of the first-
generation PV.  
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Among the second-generation technologies, CIGS sees an unbroken funding 
stream from NSFC starting from 2009, with 2014 being an exceptional year where 16 
CIGS projects were awarded a total of $1.89 million. Compared to the prolific CIGS 
record, CdTe receive modest attention from NSFC. Although the very first NSFC grant to 
CdTe was awarded as early as in 2001, CdTe did not get on to NSFC’s short list until a 
decade later. In total, there have been only four NSFC-supported CdTe research projects, 
comparing to 34 NSFC-supported CIGS projects. (Figure B.4 and Figure B.5 in 
Appendix B) The startling difference suggests that NSFC, from a strategic perspective, 
places its bet on CIGS rather than CdTe. This is because of two reasons. First, China 
wants to avoid direct competition with the world’s only at-scale thin film producer – the 
U.S. based First Solar, which specializes in CdTe production. In order to do so, NSFC’s 
resources have been directed to areas other than CdTe to avoid direct competition with a 
formidable incumbent Secondly, CdTe research in China failed to generate academic 
buzz due to the concerns for cadmium’s environmental impact on water and tellurium’s 
lack of natural availability. In addition to CIGS and CdTe, NSFC has also made a large 
amount of investment to other types of emerging thin film technologies such as nano-
structure thin film, FeO3 based technology, and etc. In total, NSFC spent $5.07 million 
between 2001 and 2015 on 58 thin film projects. 
The third-generation solar PV technologies experience the fastest growth in 
research support from NSFC. They encompass new and emerging technologies such as 
pervoskite, organic and dye-sensitized solar PV, quantum dot, and Copper zinc tin sulfide 
(CZTS) 2008 marks a watershed year for emerging technologies, when the first NSFC 
grants were awarded to pervoskite and organic solar PV projects, and for the first time 
more than one dye-sensitized solar PV research project received NSFC funding in the 
same year. The growth in NSFC supports to these three technologies has been 
exceptional since then. Take organic PV for example, the number of NSFC-sponsored 
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R&D projects grew from 1 in 2008 to 34 in 2015, making it the number one PV 
technology in NSFC’ portfolio (Table B.6 - B.11 in Appendix B).  
NSFC’s commitment to emerging PV technologies is reflected in both the number 
of projects it sponsors and the consistency of its sponsorship, especially in recent years. 
For both organic and dye-sensitized PV, at least 10 grants had been awarded to each of 
them every year since 2013, unlike the fluctuation observed in the first- and second-
generation technologies. In total, NSFC has invested $17.9 million into researching the 
third-generation emerging solar PV technologies since 2000. A total of 207 grants have 
been issued since 2006, among which 95% took place since 2010. On average, NSFC 
awards $86,000 per grant for emerging technologies. (Table 3.8) 
Table 3.8 NSFC’s Investment in Solar PV Research from 2000 to 2015, (Million $) 
Technology Total NSFC 
Investment 





First Generation Total 2.98 36 0.083 
C-Si 1.31 18 0.073 
Amorphous Si 1.34 14 0.095 
HIT 0.33 4 0.082 
Second Generation Total  5.07 58 0.087 
CIGS 2.79 34 0.082 
CdTe 0.31 4 0.077 
Other Thin Film 1.97 20 0.099 
Third Generation Total 17.90 207 0.086 
Organic 9.14 99 0.092 
Pervoskite 3.6 37 0.094 
Dye-sensitized 4.4 60 0.073 
Quantum Dot 0.32 3 0.106 
CZTS 0.45 8 0.056 
Total  25.96 301 0.086 
 
Note: Data collection and analysis conducted by the author as part of the Stanford China Project. 
 
 
It is not a surprise that NSFC puts heavy weight on emerging technology research, 
given the fact that its mission is to promote fundamental research in novel technology 
areas. Technologies like organic, pervoskite and dye-sensitized PV are the ideal 
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candidates because they are relative new concepts and a lot need to be learned about 
them. The eye-catching large number of grants given out by NSFC to these technologies 
allows a sneak peak into China’s PV R&D innovation strategy. The fact that China is 
almost head-to-head with the western innovation powerhouse in solar cell efficiency of 
the third-generation technologies suggests that NSFC’s strategy works. Section 3.4.1.2 
will provide evidence of this point. For mature technologies that currently dominate the 
market like silicon-based solar PV and CdTe, China has a large innovation gap to 
overcome compared to countries like the U.S., Japan, and Germany. The causes for the 
innovation gap are historical and require more resources and longer time to overturn. 
However, for emerging technologies, China did not lag at the start line compared to the 
rest of the world. The strong public R&D support from NSFC suggests that China intent 
to move head-to-head with the world’s leading innovation countries in these technology 
areas.  
Driving mechanism 3.2: The National Nature Science Foundation of China’s 
forward looking investment in the third-generation solar cell technologies has 
enabled China to stay competitive with world’s leading level.  
It needs to be acknowledged that, NSFC’s investment is tiny when compared to 
the U.S. NSF’s investment in solar PV, which totaled at $2.32 billion between just 2009 
and 2015 (NSF, 2015). NSFC’s 15-year budget is 10% of the US NSF’s 5 year spending.  
The average size of NSFC grant is smaller than that of a typical US NSF grant, too.  
3.6.3.1.2      973 and 863 Program 
The 973 and the 863 Program often work in concert with the FYPs, especially 
during the 11th and 12th FYP periods as the planning of solar innovation got more and 
more nuanced. They practically implement the tasks and goals outlined in the FYPs by 
issuing competitive grants and soliciting project proposals. However, the exact amount of 
R&D investment made through these two programs is very difficult to track, especially in 
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earlier FYP cycles. Relying on available public records and interviews with current and 
past funding decision-makers, this study discovers the following picture about the two 
flagship MOST programs.  
Typical 973 grants are about $3.2 million (¥20 million) to $4.8 million (¥30 
million). They usually last for 3-5 years.  For the 863 Program, a small-scale project 
usually receives about $150,000 (¥1 million) to $500,000 (¥3 million); for a key project, 
the amount of financial support ranges from $3.2 million (¥20 million) to $ 8.2 million 
(¥50 million); for a project that is labeled as “crucial”, $8.2 million (¥50 million) to 
$25million (¥150 million) could be allocated to support the research18.  
Through these two programs, MOST sets up innovation networks that cover 
major PV technologies including silicon-based solar PV, CIGS, CdTe, amorphous silicon 
PV, pervoskite, HIT, and multi-junction solar PV, which match perfectly with the 
technology priority proposed in the 12th FYP.  There are also 973 and 863 projects 
dedicated to solve bottleneck issues in the manufacturing stage, such as the production of 
silver/aluminum paste, backsheet, EVA, and tooling needed in cell and panel 
manufacturing. Between 2012 and 2015, MOST has persistently supported solar PV 
research. In 2012, four solar PV projects were funded; and the numbers for 2013, 2014, 
and 2015 were 2, 2, and 6 (CREIA, 2014). 
Based on information collected by this study, MOST’s investment in solar 
through 973 and 863 Programs in 2013 and 2014 were 25 million RMB (about 4.1 
million USD) and 18 million RMB (about 3million USD), respectively. Table 3.9 breaks 
down the investment by program, by technology over three FYP cycles.   





10th FYP (M$)* 11th FYP (M$)* 12th FYP (M$)^ Total 
(M$) 973 863 973 863 973 863 
a-Si 2.4  2.4 2.3 4.0 3.2 14.4 
                                                 
18 Interviewee #45, #52, #59 
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Table 3.9 Continued 
Technology 10th FYP (M$)* 11th FYP (M$)* 12th FYP (M$)^ 
Total 
(M$) 
CdTe  3.2  3.9  1.6 8.7 
CIGS  3.5   4.8  8.3 
DSSC 2.4  2.4 1.6   6.5 
HIT    0.3  4.8 5.2 
Black 
silicon     4.8  4.8 
Total  4.8 6.7 4.8 8.1 13.6 9.6 47.9 
 
Note: Data collection and analysis conducted by the author as part of the Stanford China Project.  
* Source: Interviews with funding decision-makers during the 10th and 11th FYP. 
^ Source: China Renewable Energy Industry Association (CREIA) research. 
3.6.3.1.3.     State Key Labs (SKL) and Key Engineering and Technology Research 
Centers (SETRC) 
There are two solar-related State Key Labs in China; both are based in large 
Chinese solar PV manufacturers. The PV Material and Technology SKL at Yingli and the 
PV Science and Technology SKL at Trina are both jointly financed by the companies and 
MOST. Companies are responsible for majority of the financial need of the labs. 
Susceptible to the same data availability problem, detailed information on how these two 
labs are funded is difficult to obtain. MOST publishes a list of SKLs, without detailing 
their R&D financing mechanism. Companies enjoy the reputation of SKLs, a status 
recognizing their innovation capacity, but they do not disclose the finances of the labs. As 
a result, the data presented in Table 3.10 are by no mean comprehensive. Instead, they 
represent this study’s best attempt to collect information from first-hand and second-hand 
information sources.  
There are four State Key Engineering and Technology Research Centers. The 
National PV Engineering and Technology Research Center at LDK, the National PV 
Equipment Engineering and Technology Research Center at the 48th Research Institute 
of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), and the National Photo 
Electronic Material Engineering and Technology Research Center at CAS Fujian Institute 
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of Material Structure Research. They represent the country’s effort to tackle three key 
components in solar PV manufacturing: the model, tooling, and materials. However, for 
similar reasons, funding information for SETRCs is difficult to track. Only partial 
funding information about LDK’s SETRC was found.  
Overall, SKLs and SETRCs are integral part of China’s solar innovation system, 
but the funding mechanism is too opaque to reveal exactly how much has been invested 
in these two systems by public and private sector players in China. However, judging by 
the hosts of SKLs and SETRCs, private companies are leading the research efforts, which 
means the nature of the SKL and SETRC research is inevitably practical and tailored to 
the need of the industry instead of being pure scientific investigation.  
Table 3.10 Traceable State Key Labs and State Key Engineering and Technology 
Research Centers Innovation Spending 
 
Lab/Research Center Home Institute Year 
Established 
Investment  
State Key Labs 
PV Material and Technology 
SKL 
Yingli  2010 At lease $90 
million investment, 
from both MOST 
and Yingli  
PV Science and Technology 
SKL 
Trina 2010 N.A.  
State Engineering and Technology Research Centers 
National PV Engineering and 
Technology Research Center 
LDK  2009  At least $100 
million investment, 
from both National 
Energy Agency and 
LDK 
National PV Equipment 





2011 N.A.  
National Photo Electronic 
Material Engineering and 






 N.A.  
Note:  
1.     Data collection supported by China Renewable Energy Industry Association (CREIA)  
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2.     Analysis conducted by the author as part of the Stanford China Project  
   
 
3.6.3.1.4.     Provincial level funding  
The difficulty to track provincial level funding is two-fold. First, as discussed 
earlier, data availability at the provincial level is less than ideal in many cases. Compared 
to the central government, provincial governments are less likely to have data 
management system in place to track how money is spend. Second, the structure of 
provincial level science and technology agency and the innovation programs they 
administer vary from place to place. The lack of consistency across provinces is not a bad 
thing because it allows provinces to experiment with different policies measures, but it 
does make a comprehensive accounting of all the solar-PV related programs almost 
impossible.  
With that being said, provincial level key labs and key engineering and 
technology research centers are two programs that can be found across the board. This 
study uses these two programs as an indication of provincial level government-sponsored 
innovation activity. Table 3.11 shows the traceable financing information about these two 
types of program. Very little data is publicly available. In cases where data is available, 
asset value instead of R&D investment is released.  
Table 3.11 Traceable Provincial Key Labs and Provincial Key Engineering and 
Technology Research Centers Innovation Spending 
 
 
Lab/Research Center Home Institute Year 
Established 
Asset Value  
Provincial Level Key Labs 
Liaoning Province Key 




2008 $2 million in 
asset value 
Henan Province key Lab 







$0.8 million in 
asset value 
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Table 3.11 Continued  
Lab/Research Center Home Institute Year 
Established 
Asset Value  
National Energy 
Administration PV 
Technology Key Lab 
Yingli   N.A. 
Provincial Level Engineering and Technology Research Centers 
Jiangsu Engineering and 
Technology Research 
Center for PV Vertical 
Integration  
Trina  2008 $30 million in 
asset value 
Jiangsu Engineering and 
Technology Research 






2013  N.A. 
Engineering and 
Technology Research 
Center for PV High 
Efficient Solar Cell  
CAS Material 
Insitute and 
Xinyou Solar  
2011 N.A. 
Hubei Engineering and 
Technology Research 




2005  N.A. 
Hubei Engineering and 
Technology Research 
Center for Invertor and 




Beijing Engineering and 
Technology Research 
Center for PV 









1.     Data collection supported by China Renewable Energy Industry Association (CREIA)  
2.     Analysis conducted by the author as part of the Stanford China Project  
   
3.6.3.2. The Effectiveness of Public Sector Investment  
3.6.3.2.1     Initial Driving Force of Solar PV R&D  
It is worth noting that public finance of solar PV R&D is the earliest investment 
into solar innovation. It happened years before private companies became noticeable 
players in the field. Public investment gave the field its initial momentum. Besides, 
various STI programs promote public-private partnership in research collaboration, which 
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facilitate the formation of innovation networks (Section 3.7. will discuss these innovation 
networks in detail). They also provide funding to new and emerging technologies, filling 
the void left by the private market.  
Driving mechanism 3.3: Public finance investment through government science, 
technology and innovation programs supplement the private sector investment by 
supporting initial basic research into nascent and risky technologies. They also promote 
collaborations between academia and the industry, facilitating the diffusion of 
knowledge, the development of innovation network, and the commercialization of 
innovation products.   
3.6.3.2.2.     Poor Policy Consistency and Continuity  
Nevertheless, it is helpful to understand China’s public finance investment into 
solar technology in context. The magnitude of Chinese public R&D is small, compared to 
its own private sector and also to the United States. Between only 2009 and 2015, the 
Office of Science under the U.S. Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) alone spent at least 
$321 million on solar related research (Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and 
Finance, 2016). In addition, the U.S. DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy (EERE), the ARPA-E program, and the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) 
all contributed to solar innovation in the U.S. in larger amount than the Office of Science. 
With the U.S. context, it is fair to say that the traceable solar innovation spending in 
China is small. Even if inflation and cost of living adjustments are taken into account, 
China’s public finance investment in solar innovation is still far from comparable to the 
situation in the U.S. Granted, research dollar stretches longer in China given the 
relatively lower cost to hire researchers, lower cost of living, and lower cost to do almost 
everything else, it is still striking to see how small the public R&D investment is in 
China.  
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People close to MOST policymaking19 and a Chinese solar entrepreneur20 all 
admitted that Chinese government and companies currently only spend a fraction of what 
the U.S. government and private companies spend on solar innovation. Even though the 
actual amount of public solar PV innovation investment is rising every year, it is going to 
take a long time before China catches up to leading innovative countries in the West. 
Given that, the Chinese’s plan is to do more with less. It meant to use innovation 
spending through the STI programs to create a “technology to market” cycle, which in 
theory is an effective way to invest in innovation. In an interview with MOST’s chief 
solar PV scientist, he revealed the thinking behind MOST’s attempt to support the full 
RDD&D cycle of key solar PV technologies over multiple FYPs. 21  
1. Ideally, MOST would support the initial fundamental physics research through 
the 973 Program (the basic science oriented program). A successful project would 
produce a small area prototype solar cell with decent efficiency.  
2. Then in the second FYP, MOST would use the 863 Program (the more practical-
minded program) to support the research of transferring the small area lab-made 
solar cell to a commercializable product. The ideal result of this stage would be a 
pilot cell production line.  
3. Lastly, in the third FYP cycle, MOST would provide seed fund via the 
infrastructure program to incentivize the commercialization of the product. At this 
stage, equipment manufacturers and cell producers would typically collaborate to 
realize the mass production.  
In concept, this is a sound approach. However, in practice, MOST’s support of 
technology innovation often lacks the continuity and the persistency that it inspires to 
provide. Table 3.12 reviews a list of MOST supported programs in the past 3 FYP cycles; 
the only technologies loosely resemble the ideal approach are DSSC, a-Si, and CdTe.  
 
                                                 
19 Interviewee #64, #93 
20 Interviewee #65 
21 Interviewee #73 
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Table 3.12 Number of MOST 973 and 863 Programs in the Past 3 FYP Cycles by 
Technology* 
 
Technology 10th FYP 11th FYP 12th FYP Total 
973 863 973 863 973 863 
a-Si 1  1 1 1 2 6 
DSSC 1  1 1   3 
CdTe  1  3  1 5 
CIGS  1   1  2 
HIT    2  2 4 
Black Silicon    1   1 
PERC      1 1 
Total 2 2 2 8 2 6 22 
 
* Notes:  
1. Information on the Infrastructure program is not available.  
2. Table B.1 in Appendix B shows the actual amount of funding broken down by technology and 
MOST program over the same three FYP cycles.  
3. Data collection and analysis conducted by the author as part of the Stanford China Project  
 
In general, even though MOST’s funding allocation records show some 
consistency and continuity in certain technology space, the effectiveness of its support is 
debatable. The 973 Program initially supported DSSC and a-Si during the 10th FYP. The 
support continued to the 11th FYP with both technologies receiving funding from the 863 
Program in addition to the phrase II support from the 973 Program. Research funding was 
made available again to a-Si in the 12th FYP while it ended for DSSC. Despite the 
consistent support, DSSC and a-Si technology have not reached the maturity for 
commercialization yet. In fact, few people sees them as viable candidates for mass 
market adoption. CdTe faces a different issue. American company First Solar has proved 
its market feasibility, but in China, only Advanced Solar Power (Long Yan) is able to 
achieve an at-scale production (350 MW) and it was not even supported by the 863 
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Program until 2014. Yet the two CdTe projects supported by the 863 Program in the 
earlier years did not demonstrate any significant real world commercialization 
achievement. Arguably, HIT and PERC may be the only successful examples of MOST’s 
investment. For both technologies, prototypes invented in China are currently produced 
by leading Chinese companies at a large scale.  
3.6.3.2.3.     Incompetent Technology Forecasting and Inaccurate Market Assessment  
MOST’s lack of policy continuity and consistency is a result of its weak ability to 
conduct technology forecast and follow market trend. As one well-regarded Chinese solar 
scientist said “ Government is very bad at detecting what types of innovation holds 
scientific and market potentials.”22 Historically, MOST and its predecessors followed the 
command and control approach where they do everything, from setting goals, picking 
promising technologies, raising and allocating resources, and singled-handedly 
supporting the entire cycle of technology development.  
The outcome of such approach is far from ideal. As seen in Table 3.12, MOST 
continuously invested in a-Si nor DSSC, aiming for their commercialization, but neither 
technology is considered as ripe for today’s market, not for the near future either. If 
MOST’s ultimate goal is to allow Chinese firms to reap the economic returns generated 
from mass-production of these technologies, then it fails at its goal badly.  
MOST’s unsuccessful attempted at building the “technology-to-market” pipeline 
can also be seen through CdTe and CIGS. For CdTe, it has been constantly supported by 
the 863 Program instead of the 973 Program, which means that MOST views the need for 
CdTe research falls more on the applied science side than on the basic-science side. 
However, evidence shows that CdTe cell efficiency progressed very slowly in China and 
the efficiency gap between the best Chinese CdTe cell and the world record CdTe cell is 
becoming bigger and bigger (see Section 3.4.1.3), suggesting that CdTe research in China 
                                                 
22 Interviewee #45 
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is still at its early stage where many fundamental scientific issues need to be addressed. 
This indicates MOST’s inaccurate assessment of the technology development stage of 
CdTe. Furthermore, the five 863 projects did not bring China any closer to successfully 
commercialize CdTe solar cells. The only CdTe manufacturer of consequences in China 
is the Hangzhou based Advanced Solar Power (ASP), and it achieved commercial 
production without any support from MOST programs.  
CIGS is another contradictory example to MOST’s policy design in the sense that 
it started with the 863 Program (applied research) in the 10th FYP but later was switched 
to the 973 Program in the 11th FYP, indicating that MOST first thought the 
commercialization of CIGS was within sight but only to realize years later that there were 
more fundamental science work to be done in this area. Fortunately, CIGS research in 
China did not completely rely on the STI programs under MOST. Rather, university- and 
research institute-funded projects complemented MOST’ effort, and they produced 
significant improvement to the cell efficiency of CIGS.  
Both examples of CdTe and CIGS illustrate MOST’s incapability in forecasting 
technology development path and setting technology development agenda. MOST does 
not demonstrate to have the best judgment about which technologies are 
commercialization-ready and which ones are still at early stage. This is because of three 
reasons. First, compared to private market players, government agencies like MOST are 
less in tune with the market demand for technologies. Second, even with accurate 
technology forecast and the ideal policy design in mind, when it comes to the project 
selection process, MOST’s decisions are often affected by the availability and quality of 
proposals. Interviews with policymakers at MOST 23 and scientists24 who were involved 
in the 973 and 863 project selection process revealed that sometimes, projects were not 
awarded to certain technology not because of a lack of intention to do so but due to the 
                                                 
23 Interviewee #73 
24 Interviewee #45, #59, #73 
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lack of high quality project proposal. Finally, MOST relies on academic consultants for 
advices about technological trend, which makes it susceptible to academic bias, or even 
academic lobbying. Anecdotes about some government science advisors exaggerating the 
potential of the technologies they work on over others have certainly been passed around 
in the academic circle, although no investigation has been done to look into the 
allegations.    
Evidence presented above show that government is bad at predicting technology 
trajectory and they do not have a good sense about the market demand of technologies. 
Therefore, they are not able to allocate resources in an effective and productive way. It 
puts the government in an awkward situation. On the one hand, it wants to push for a 
practical innovation agenda that produce industry-oriented and market-friendly outputs. 
On the other hand, without engaging players from the private sector, the bureaucrats 
inside the government have little information about what the industry and market need.  
Blocking mechanism 3.3: A lack of consistency and continuity, the less-than-
perfect technology forecast, and the inaccurate market feasibility assessment rendered 
MOST’s utilization of the science, technology and innovation programs inefficiency and 
ineffective.   
In summary, from the policymaking’s perspective, MOST has the good intention 
to bridge the gap between lab research and industrial production. It sent policy signals to 
encourage academic-industry collaboration; it also intended to use its flagship innovation 
programs strategically to facilitate technology transfer from the labs to production lines. 
However, the effectiveness of its programs suffers from a lack of consistency and 
continuity, their less than perfect technology forecast, and their inaccurate market 
feasibility assessment.  
3.6.3.3. Solar Innovation Investment from the Private Sector  
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Chinese solar PV manufacturing companies’ R&D spending experiences two 
phrases. Before 2011, companies’ investments into R&D were minimal. Most firms spent 
less than 1% of their total revenue on R&D. Yingli, Trina, Suntech and ReneSola showed 
stronger R&D investment record relative to their peers during this period, investing about 
1.5% to 2% of their total revenue in research. Since 2011, there has been a clear trend of 
companies up their game in R&D spending, a good number of Chinese firms doubled or 
even tripled their investment in R&D.  
There are two reasons as to why R&D investment among Chinese companies 
increased significantly in recent years. On the market side, one silver lining of the anti-
dumping and countervailing duties levied by the U.S. and the quota and price floor 
imposed by E.U. is that they made Chinese firms look for sources of competitiveness at 
places beyond just low costs. The higher R&D investment is a sign that Chinese firms 
started to take product innovation seriously, hoping it can yield long-term benefit for the 
companies.  
In addition to companies’ internal drive to invest more in R&D, government 
policy also played an unequivocal role in driving up R&D investment. In 2013, in the 
mist of the PV manufacturing sector reform in response to the trade cases, MOIIT issued 
the PV Manufacturing Industry Standards, in which it set a lit of R&D-relate criteria to 
PV manufacturing firms. The Standards required firms to spend at least 3% of its revenue 
and no less than ¥10 million ($1.6 million) every year on R&D. All companies are 
required to adhere to the criteria laid out by the Standards in order to continue stay in 
business in China. The importance of this government policy is that it set an industry-
wise floor for R&D investment. The result of implementing the Standards is that 
industry-wise R&D investment systematically went up while weaker players in the 
industry were forced to exit the market.  
Table 3.13 summarizes the innovation spending of current and previous Tier 1 
Chinese solar PV manufacturers between 2006 and 2014, ranked by their 2014 amount. 
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Cumulatively, these 9 companies spent $1.19 billion in R&D over 9 years, eclipsing the 
traceable amount of investment from the public sector by more than three-fold.   
The relative weight between public and private investment into R&D is consistent 
with the official rhetoric from Chinese government, which calls for the private sector 
actors to play the leading role in innovation while the government plays only a supporting 
role. Despite the relative big R&D spending, Chinese companies are still behind their 
American competitors by a long shot in the actual R&D investment. Table 3.14 shows the 
R&D spending from American tier 1 companies. They on average spend 2.2 to 8.6 times 
more in their in-house research. First Solar stands out as the largest corporate innovation 
player, investing well over $100 million per year since 2011, 6 times greater than average 
Chinese firms.  
Table 3.13 Chinese Solar PV Manufacturing Companies Innovation Spending 
Ranked by 2014 Value (Million$) 
 
Company 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Yingli 92.62 47.21 29.82 44.36 20.52 27.00 8.37 1.33 N.A. 
ReneSola 52.58 46.45 44.10 47.06 36.26 14.51 9.71 1.39 N.A. 
JA Solar 22.66 14.38 13.67 10.74 9.49 6.60 4.14 0.55 0.08 
Trina  22.26 19.93 26.51 44.12 18.63 5.44 3.04 2.81 0.19 
Jinko  17.31 10.68 9.10 3.61 4.26 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Hanwha 13.80 15.06 14.45 10.67 7.94 4.69 2.88 3.76 0.49 
Canadian 
Solar 12.06 11.69 13.00 19.84 6.84 3.18 1.83 0.39 0.04 
LDK 0.00 10.98 17.78 46.51 10.80 8.30 7.57 2.94 N.A. 
Suntech N.A. N.A 8.90 36.87 40.26 29.02 15.31 15.06 8.37 
Total 233.29 176.38 177.33 263.77 155.01 98.74 52.85 28.22 9.17 
Average 33.33 22.05 19.70 29.31 17.22 12.34 6.61 3.53 1.83 
Notes:  
1. Data source: Bloomberg Terminal Tier 1 company profitability data.  
2. 2014 data include only the first two quarters.  
3. Data are not available for Yingli and ReneSola, and LDK in 2006, and Jinko from 2006 to 2009 
because companies were not publicly listed in these years or because they did not report R&D 
spending information to the U.S. Security Exchange Commission.  
4. Data are not available for LDK in 2014 and Suntech in 2013 and 2014 because they were delisted 





Table 3.14 U.S. Based Solar PV Manufacturing Companies Innovation Spending 
(Million$) Ranked by 2014 Value  
 
Company 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
First Solar 71.4 134.3 132.5 140.5 94.8 78.2 33.5 15.1 1.7 
SunEdison 31.6 71.1 71.8 87.5 55.6 51.0 40.8 39.3 35.8 
SunPower 33.3 58.1 63.5 57.8 49.1 31.6 21.5 13.6 9.7 
    SolarCity Corp 17.2 0.4 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
SolarWorld N.A. 36.1 63.8 N.A. 3.0 17.7 N.A. N.A. 15.8 
Total 296.3 299.6 331.5 285.8 202.5 178.5 95.8 68.0 63.0 
Average 74.1 74.9 82.9 95.3 50.6 44.6 31.9 22.7 15.7 
American/Chinese 
Ratio 2.2 2.7 4.2 3.3 2.9 3.6 4.8 6.4 8.6 
 
Notes:  
1. Data source: Bloomberg Terminal Tier 1 company profitability data.  
2. 2014 data include only the first two quarters.  
3. Data are not available for SolarWorld in 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2014 because it did not report 
R&D spending information to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  
 
To summarize, evidence of companies’ financial commitment to innovation 
suggests that Chinese firms are increasingly attentive to the idea that innovation is 
important to a firm’s long-term competitiveness. They are the predominant investor in the 
first-generation solar cell R&D, eclipsing public finance investment by a magnitude. 
Collectively, they are the largest sponsor group of solar innovation in China, although 
their level of R&D spending is only a fraction of what is spent by their American 
competitors, suggesting that American companies still maintain a competitive edge on 
innovation over Chinese firms.  
3.7. Innovation Networks and Their Impact on Solar PV Innovation  
3.7.1. Macro Level: Innovation Ecosystem 
At the macro-level, there is a solar innovation ecosystem that facilitated by the 
MOST-run STI programs. They work as intermediaries to funnel national-level public 
innovation investment to the actual innovation players on the ground. Individually, each 
program occupies a niche in the technology development cycle with a certain level of 
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overlap with its adjacent programs by design. Collectively, they cover the entire RDD&D 
spectrum, as shown in Figure 3.11. Simply put, MOST divides the programs into two 
groups: programs related to fundamental scientific research, such as the 973 Program and 
the coordination with NSFC, are managed by the Office of Basic Research. Their 
principle function is to spur knowledge development and diffusion. Programs such as the 
863 Program, the Infrastructure Program, and the Torch Program are administered by the 
Office of High and New Technologies. Besides knowledge development and diffusion, 
they also try to create a commercial market for technologies and develop positive 
externalities that transcend the innovation subsystem.  
Depending on where they are on the RDD&D cycle, different STI programs 
incentivize, sometimes even requires, certain types of collaborations to be formed 
between research entities and private sector players in order to qualify for government-
sponsored solar innovation projects. For example, the basic research oriented 973 
program is instrumental in establishing collaboration between university-based research 
group and other research institutes. In contrast, the more applied-research-oriented 863 
Program prioritizes projects that are jointly conducted by research organizations 
(universities and research institutes included) and industry players. State Key Labs and 
State Engineering and Technology Research Centers are often based in solar PV 
manufacturers to support the company-driven, research organization-supported 
innovation model. The Infrastructure Program built commercialization networks that link 
PV products developed in research institutes with companies that have production 
capacity.   
The importance of the innovation ecosystem is that it builds a virtual 
infrastructure through which innovation players interact with one another and develop 




Figure 3.11 Innovation Ecosystem in China 
Note:  
1. Analysis conducted by the author as part of the Stanford China Project.  
2. Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington DC.    
3.7.2. Micro Level: Technology specific innovation networks  
The PV innovation ecosystem provides the right condition for technology-specific 
innovation networks to form. Drawing from insight collected over dozens of interviews 
with R&D experts from respective technology areas, over a dozen laboratory visits, as 
well literature review and data mining, this study discovers that innovation networks 
allow China to draw knowledge from a wide range of sources and use them to fill the 
historical knowledge gaps and therefore, improve its own innovation strength and achieve 
innovation progress. Interestingly, the innovation networks take on different forms; some 
are built on collaborations between institutions while others rely on key individual 
figures. Nevertheless, one common feature they share is that the networks are global. The 
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collaboration with overseas research institutes and the recruitment of academics with 
overseas training experience have meaningful contribution to the narrowing of the 
innovation gap between China and the developed world.  
This section zooms into specific technologies and maps out the innovation 
networks for the same five types of solar cell, the efficiencies of which were examined in 
Section 3.4.1 of this chapter. It means to test Hypothesis 1 through examining the 
formation of individual technology specific networks under the context of the broader 
innovation ecosystem and analyzing the link between them and the outcome in solar cell 
efficiency improvement.  
Hypothesis 1. Innovation networks facilitate knowledge production and 
diffusion, which lead to innovation progress.  
3.7.2.1. HIT Innovation Network: Big Institution Collaboration  
HIT research does not have a long history in China. It was not until the 11th FYP 
(2005-2010) when China launched two 863 HIT research projects that the country 
officially started HIT research. A group at the CAS Institute of Electrical Engineering 
(IEE), led by Dr. Wenjing Wang, was the first research institution to work on HIT in 
China. During the 11th FYP period, it received 80,900 RMB ($13,500) from the 863 
Program to work on a joint research program with Shanghai Jiaotong University and 
Shanghai Chaori Solar, a China-based PV manufacturing company.  
As earlier mentioned, MOST’s emphasis on engaging private sector players in 
innovation became more and more prominent during the 12th FYP period. Two more HIT 
projects were sponsored by the 863 Program and both are joint R&D venture by company 
and research institute. Building on the foundation it established during its previous 863 
project, the group at CAS IEE teamed up with Shanghai Chaori Solar again to further 
improve the efficiency of HIT cells and explore its commercialization. As of 2013, the 
collaboration produced an HIT solar cell at 20.25% efficiency. Another 863 project was 
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conducted by Trina and CAS Shanghai Institute of Microsystem and Information 
Technology (SIMIT), led by a Dr. Zhengxin Liu, a Thousand-Talent program recuritee. 
Dr. Liu horned his HIT research skill in Japan, the country that is the most advanced at 
HIT research. He received his doctoral degree from a Japanese University and worked at 
leading Japanese research institutes including the System Engineers Co., Ltd. and the 
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology before he was 
recruited by China’s Thousand-Talent Program to come back to China in 2009. Since 
joining CAS Institute of Microsystem and Information Technology, Dr. Liu quickly 
developed his research group to be the leading player in HIT research in China. His 
group’s collaboration with Trina yielded the highest-efficient HIT cell in China as of 
2013, reaching 22%. The ongoing collaboration between the two continues to push the 
efficiency boundary.  
In addition to the 863 projects, Chinese companies are collaborating with overseas 
research institutes. Yingli, together with the Energy research Centre of the Netherlands 
(ECN) has produced HIT solar cells of 20-21% lab efficiency. Suntech established a 
collaborative relationship with Fraunhofer ISE (the efficiency is unknown). (Figure 3.12) 
Evidence shows that the improvement of HIT cell efficiencies in China as seen in 
Figure 3.3 in earlier sections is largely a result of collaboration between Chinese 
companies and domestic and international R&D partners. The research networks they 




Figure 3.12. HIT Innovation Network: Big Institution Collaboration 
Note:  
1.     Data collection, and significant data analysis, conducted as part of the Stanford China Project 
by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  
2.      Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington, DC. 
3.7.2.2. CIGS Innovation Network: Domestic Collaboration and Foreign 
Acquisition  
The innovation network for Copper Indium Gallium Selenide (CIGS) features low 
profile domestic academic-industry collaboration and high profile overseas acquisition.  
There are many organizations working on CIGS solar cells in China currently. 
CIGS started to receive the funding since the 8th FYP, but it was not until the 863 project 
during the 10th FYP that the CIGS research started to produce substantial outcome. 
Nankai University was among the first Chinese institutes to work on the technology. 
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With R&D investment from MOST, Nankai mastered the techniques to self-design the 
equipment to produce CIGS solar cells and collaborated with Taiyang Company in 
Tianjin to build a pilot production line with the funding from the 863 project in the 10th 
FYP period. However, the production was not eventually shut down because it was not 
economically sustainable.  
Overseas returnee plays a big role in recent years. The group at CAS Shenzhen 
Institutes of Advanced Technology led by Professor Xudong Xiao emerged since 2010 
and established itself as the new leader in CIGS research in China. It produced a 19.07% 
CIGS cell in 2013, only 1% lower than the world record of the same year (Figure 3.4). It 
has significantly narrowed the gap between China and the world’s leading research. Dr. 
Xudong Xiao received his Ph.D from University of California at Berkeley in the U.S. and 
did his Postdoc training at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in the U.S. He was 
recruited by the Thousand-Talent program and returned to China and took post first at 
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in 2004 and then at the Solar Research 
Institute in Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced Technology in 2008.  
Other leading institutions of CIGS solar cells include Professor Yaoming Wang’s 
group in Shanghai Institute of Ceramics (CAS), Professor Daming Zhuang’s group in 
Tsinghua University, Beijing University, Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics (CAS), 
and Shenzhen institute of advanced technology (CAS). Many of these institutions 
collaborate closely with companies to develop pilot production lines. Tsinghua 
University worked with two private solar companies, Lanxing Terra Company at Weihai, 
Shangdong Province and Dikai in Guangxi Province. Peking University built a pilot 
production line with BESC in Henan Province as part of an 863 project; CAS Shenzhen 
Institute of Advanced Technology built its own 2MW pilot line using self-developed 
manufacturing techniques and equipment design. Nevertheless, none of these production 
lines scaled up.  
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The only at-scale CIGS manufacturer in China is Hanergy. Hanergy represents a 
different and unique innovation model. For a while, Hanergy was a celebrated case and 
got a lot of media attention. Instead of building its indigenous innovation capacity, the 
company has garnered R&D strength through a list of high profile global merge and 
acquisition. It acquired five overseas innovative thin film solar PV companies and 
became the owner of their R&D profiles (Exhibit 6 in Appendix B details the companies 
Hangery purchased and their technology profiles). Its global R&D center in Beijing is the 
central management entity that oversees its global research network. No actual research is 
conducted in its Beijing center. Hanergy’s goal was not to build its indigenous innovation 
capacity, but to acquire overseas promising thin film technologies that struggle with 
commercialization and marry them with China’s strong manufacturing capacity. By 
acquiring these companies and the intellectual properties and R&D capacity behind them, 
Hanergy internalized advanced CIGS knowledge into its own operation in China, 
narrowing the knowledge gap between China and world’s leading CIGS innovators25. Its 
mergers and acquisitions strategy expanded the scope of the CIGS innovation network in 
China and brought progress to innovation outcomes. Figure 3.13 illustrates the major 
R&D players in CIGS field. Commercialization activities are not included.  
                                                 




Figure 3.13 CIGS Innovation Network: Research and Foreign Acquisitions 
Note:  
1.     Data collection, and significant data analysis, conducted as part of the Stanford China Project 
by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  
2.      Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington, DC. 
3.7.2.3. CdTe Innovation Network: Returnees from Overseas 
CdTe solar cell in China started as early as 1980s, but government funding in this 
area has not been sufficient. NSFC started to fund CdTe research after 1990s but the 
amount of the funding was small, varying from tens to hundreds of thousand RMB. Two 
small scale CdTe-related 973 and 863 projects were launched during the 10th FYP (1995-
2000). Paralleled to the mundane government support was an inactive research field. 
There were only a few research group actively worked on CdTe research, the most 
noticeable among which was Sichuan University. It achieved an efficiency of 13.38% in 
2001 with the support from the 863 Program. Its 300 kW-level pilot production line can 
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produce 40cm x 30cm solar modules at an efficiency of 8.25%. But that was about all the 
achievement in this technology space in the first decade of the 21st century. As seen in 
Figure 3.7, CdTe research in China experienced a long period of stagnation. Between 
2000 and 2012, little cell efficiency improvement was made.  
Fortunately, the CdTe research landscape started to turn around in the 2010s. 
There has been an uptake in research interest and an increase in innovation players. One 
common characteristics of the new-coming players is that they all have strong overseas 
education and research background. Dr. Xiangxin Liu of Institute of Electrical 
Engineering (CAS) received his Ph.D degree from University of Toledo – the birthplace 
of CdTe – and went back to China via the Hundred-talents Program of Chinese Academy 
of Sciences. His group succeeded in producing a 0.02cm2 CdTe cell at 14.4% efficient in 
2014. Shanghai Center for Photovoltaic, together with Professor Deliang Wang from 
China University of Science and Technology, managed to produce a CdTe cell of nearly 
14% efficient on a 0.07cm2 glass substrate in 2012 and 14.6% efficient of 0.25 cm2 using 
chemical bath deposition method. Dr. Wang, received his Ph.D degree from Goettingen 
University in Germany and worked in Japan and the U.S. In the commercial space, Dr. 
Xuanzhi Wu, the founder of ASP, had decades of research experience at NREL before 
return to China as an entrepreneur. Dr. Xuanzhi Wu, a Chinese native and former senior 
researcher at NREL who set the world record CdTe efficiency in 2002, founded 
Advanced Solar Power (ASP) in Hangzhou, China in 2008. ASP’s module efficiency 
stands at about 12% in 2014, compared to the 14% commercial efficiency of U.S.-based 
First Solar. The company is producing 30MW capacities annually with self-designed 
equipment.  
The story of CdTe research in China once again provides evidence that an 
innovation network (a global innovation network in this case), drive the progress in solar 
cell research in China. The historical knowledge gap is difficult to be overcome with 
endogenous forces. However, with an innovation network that connects innovation 
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players from all around the globe, the gap can be narrowed. Even though there is still 
quite a distance between the record CdTe efficiency in China and the world level, the 
injection of foreign-trained researchers and the knowledge they bring and the research 
network they form are changing the research landscape in China.   
 
Figure 3.14. CdTe Innovation Network: Returnees from Overseas 
Note:  
1.     Data collection, and significant data analysis, conducted as part of the Stanford China Project 
by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  
2.      Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington, DC. 
 
3.7.2.4. Organic PV (OPV) Innovation Network: Chinese Scholars with Overseas 
Experience 
Research on OPV in China shows how a global network can facilitate technology 
leapfrog in China (Driving mechanism 3.1). There are two competing OPV research 
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groups, both lead by researchers who are China-educated but established international 
networks.  
Professor Yongfang Li from CAS Institute of Chemistry is the pioneer of OPV 
research in China. His research group produced an OPV cell of 2% efficiency in 2002. 
After retired from CAS Institute of Chemistry, he worked with a research group from 
Suzhou University and had improved OPV efficiency to about 8%. Although educated in 
China in the 1970s, he kept close communication with world’s leading OPV research 
groups. From 1997 to 1998, he was a visiting scholar at Dr. Alan Heeger’s group at 
University of Santa Barbara (UCSB), which set multiple world efficiency records. Again 
in 2000, he visited Dr. Yang’s group at UCLA for a year, another world’s leading 
research group. Keeping up with world’s leading institutes has allowed Li to stay on top 
of the latest research methodology and produced prolific research outcome.  
Another key OPV research group in China is led by Professor Yong Cao from 
South China University of Technology. Cao has a long history of participating in the 
global research community. He received his Ph.D degree from Tokyo University. He was 
a visiting scholar in Heeger’s group at UCSB from 1988 to 1990 and worked as a senior 
researcher at UNIAX, a company co-founded by Alan Heeger, from 1990 to 1998. Cao’s 
research group is head to head with Li’s group in OPV research. The efficiency records 




Figure 3.15. Organic PV Innovation Network: Chinese Scholars with 
Overseas Experience 
Note:  
1.     Data collection, and significant data analysis, conducted as part of the Stanford China Project 
by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  
2.      Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington, DC. 
3.7.2.5. Perovskite Innovation Network: A Combination of Overseas Returnees 
and Chinese Innovation  
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology produced the first Chinese-
made perovskite solar cell of 4.87% efficient in 2013. Back then, there were only a few 
institutions in China working on Perovskite, such as Dr. Liduo Wang’s group at Tsinghua 
University, Dr. Hongwei Han’s group at Huazhong University of Science and 
Technology, Dr. Qingbo Meng’s group at CAS Institute of Physics. However, since 
2013, there was a sharp increase in perovskite research in China. Because Perovskite and 
Dye Sensitized Solar Cell (DSSC) share similar scientific framework, many researchers 
who used to work on DSSC transitioned to perovskite research due to the promising 
prospect of the latter. The influx of innovation players created academic competition 
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among the first generation research groups and the newcomers such as Dr. Rui Zhu’s 
group at Peking University, Dr. Wang Peng’s group at CAS Changchun Institute of 
Applied Chemistry, etc. Some of the leading perovskite work in China was carried out 
via collaboration with world’s top research groups. Dr. Hongwei Han maintained a long-
term collaboration with the Gratzel group at EPFL in Switzerland, where he received his 
Ph.D degree, on DSSC and now both have shifted their interests to perovskite. Moreover, 
some group leaders have once did research in the world’s leading research groups. Dr. 
Rui Zhu received his Ph.D degree at Yang’s group in UCLA on organic solar cells. Dr. 
Qingbo Meng was a STA fellow in Japan from 1999 to 2002. Figure 3.16 illustrates the 
research networks.  
Although most of the early perovskite research was not funded by the 
government, with the surge in research interest, both the 863 and 973 Program categorize 
the technology as major areas for support in 2014. Today, perovskite is a heated research 
area in China. For example, more than 500 researches attended the first Conference on 
Perovskite Solar Cells & New Generation Solar Cells in Beijing in May, 2014. 
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Figure 3.16. Perovskite Innovation Network: A Combination of Overseas 
Returnees and Chinese Innovation 
Note:  
1.     Data collection, and significant data analysis, conducted as part of the Stanford China Project 
by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a member of the Stanford University China Project research team.  
2.      Information presented at Stanford China Project workshop in Washington, DC. 
 
These 5 cases of technology-specific innovation network highlight different ways 
that players interaction with each other under the formal institution. One thing they have 
in common is that they all leverage the globalization trend to access overseas knowledge, 
education, and research capacity. Research networks are formed not only between 
Chinese academic and industry players (such as in the case of HIT) but also between 
Chinese industry players and overseas research institutes (such as the Yingli-ENC case in 
HIT and the Hanergy case in CIGS) as well as between Chinese academic players and 
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overseas research groups through formal research collaboration (like the Han-Graztel 
collaboration in perovskite) and personnel exchange in forms of doctoral education, 
visiting scholar program, etc. These diverse modes of innovation network construction 
and knowledge exchange are shown to be the driving force of solar cell efficiency 
improvement in China. They serve as evidence that innovation networks, especially 
global innovation networks lead to solar PV innovation progress in China. As a result, 
this study fails to reject Hypothesis 1. Rather, it found that the Driving mechanism 3.4 to 
be true.  
Driving mechanism 3.4: The solar PV innovation subsystem in China built 
global innovation networks to take advantage of overseas research and educational 
resources and achieved technological advancement in multiple areas.  
3.8. Conclusions  
3.8.1. Summary of Findings  
This chapter studies the Chinese solar innovation TIS subsystem. It is found that 
formal and informal institutions significantly shape the structure of the subsystem, the 
networks and the interactions among actors. The subsystem has produced some progress 
in terms of advancing solar cell research and manufacturing capacity, and generated 
higher efficiency solar cells and an increasing number of papers and patents. However, 
although China is catching up quickly, it is still not at the frontier of the field. The 
innovation culture in China is pragmatic and practical, which results in more incremental 
improvement than breakthroughs.  
More specifically, the subsystem takes advantage of the visions and strategies 
developed in Five year Plans for PV technology advanced to build legitimacy and 
mobilize resources. The plans get more and more nuanced, cohesive, executable and 
measurable over time. A suite of STI programs administered by the Chinese Ministry of 
Science and Technology carried out the implementation of the visions. The programs 
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cover the entire RDD&D spectrum, aiming to provide comprehensive support to the 
entire “lab-to-market” span. FYPs and MOST’s STI programs are important institutions 
that undoubtedly influence the direction of search of the actors in the solar PV innovation 
TIS subsystem. Human and financial resources have been channeled to solar PV research 
because of the clear policy signals the plans and programs sent. The initial financial 
support they provided also helped. Networks between private sector industry players and 
academic researchers grew stronger under the guidance promoted by MOST. Both 
industry and academic players’ global innovation networks also expanded due to market 
dynamic and policy incentives.  The tighter connection between public and private 
players and their broader global networks become one of the driving forces in the system.  
Another important driving force is the growing amount of input to the system, in 
both capital and human resource form. In general, Chinese PV companies play a leading 
role in financially investing in solar PV innovation. This is consistent with China’s 
industry-oriented, practical innovation approach. It also reflects the maturation of the 
industry, which has gradually evolved from competing for low price to replying on 
innovation to stay competitive in the market. By getting companies more involved, solar 
innovation in solar PV TIS subsystem leverages both the corporates’ financial resources 
and their knowledge about the market’s demand for technologies. The latter also serves 
as a remedy to the government’s inability to set the right technology R&D agenda due to 
its lack of ability to accurately capture the technology trend in the markets. 
The subsystem is found to be able to produce substantial outcome in certain areas. 
An analysis of three generations of solar PV technology showed that company-led, 
universities and research institutes-supported R&D efforts produced the most significant 
outcome for the first-generation solar PV technologies. For the second-generation 
technologies, universities, research institutes and companies work independently, without 
much collaboration. The improvement is significant for CIGS but trivial in the CdTe 
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area.  For the new and emerging third-generation technologies, academics lead the 
research efforts and have show signs of rivaling world’s leading innovators.  
An investigation using patent data showed that the number of patents obtained by 
Chinese assignees skyrocketed since 2007, surpassing the total number of patents granted 
to all non-Chinese assignees combined. A similar rapidly rising trend is observed when 
looking at the number of solar-related patents granted to Chinese assignees in the U.S. 
although the actual number of patents is much smaller than that in China. Although the 
sheer number of patents suggests that China has improved its solar innovation capacity in 
the past decade, the fact that a much smaller number of solar PV patents was granted to 
Chinese entities the U.S., suggest that there is still a large room for quality improvement 
among Chinese patents. Further, an analysis of patent lapse rate shows that Chinese 
patents are less likely to renew and patents filed by Chinese academics have the highest 
lapse rate, indicating a lower patent quality.  
Compared to where it stood 15 years ago, the Chinese solar PV innovation TIS 
subsystem has come a long way. However, it still lags in solar cell efficiency and patent 
quality in certain technologies compared to world’s leading PV innovators. Innovation in 
China is often too incremental and not disruptive enough. The “catch up” mindset makes 
China comfortable to follow but lacks of the ambition to lead. The historical gap in 
scientific knowledge and methodology decides that China has to play a catch up game to 
certain extent, but the close tie between academics and the PV industry requires the 
former to be attentive to the latter’s practical concerns for cost and commercializability 
reason, which confines their creativity.  
The next section will discuss policy implications based on the findings. The 
implications are drawn from the study of the Chinese solar PV innovation system, but 
many of them have broader applications beyond country and industry boarders.  
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3.8.2. Policy Implications  
First and foremost, the improvement in China’s solar PV innovation strength 
benefited from having a national vision for PV innovation and the supporting policies 
that followed. The national vision legitimizes the status of solar PV innovation. It creates 
a friendly and certain environment for researchers, which in turn mobilizes talented 
people to devote their career to the field.  
Secondly, although a national vision and supporting policies are necessary for 
innovation to happen, policymakers should refrain from offering technical guidance 
without thoroughly consulting the science and technology community as well as the 
industry. In other word, the job of setting research agenda details should be left to 
scientists and technologists, and the decisions to commercialize technologies should be 
informed by the industry and market trend. Granted, there is a fine line between where 
policymakers’ “champion” role stops and the scientific and industrial communities’ job 
starts, but the rule of thumb is that politicians and bureaucrats should not be doing their 
job. Instead of putting its hand on every step of innovation, nowadays, MOST 
emphasizes its role in the following areas:  
1. Set strategic innovation visions. Use the visions to send policy signals to 
innovation players and the market. Influences their direction of search of 
innovation actors in the system by communicating clearly the priority area.  
2. Build a public research platform to facilitate knowledge development and 
diffusion and develop positive externalities. A public research platform is a 
physical space, supported by public budget, where research can be conducted and 
shared across the scientific community.  
3. Facilitate knowledge development and diffusion by supporting basic research 
that has significant impact on society and national economy and emerging 
technology research that could potentially turn into a game changer.  
Thirdly, government innovation policies and programs should consider the entire 
lab-to-market spectrum. Conventional RDD&D program design links research with 
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production and eventually the market, but it divides the continuous technology 
development process into artificial stages. It is often tricky to know where to draw the 
line between stages, as shown in the example of Chinese STI programs.  A better 
approach would be to integrate the entire RDD&D cycle to reduce overlaps and minimize 
the inefficient use of resources. This would require more collaboration and better 
coordination among players from both academia and industries.  
Fourthly, people are a valuable asset. An innovation system should not only be 
about technology, it should also be about people. An innovation system should foster its 
human capita by investing in education. Lessons from China showed how stop investing 
in education (cultural revolution) can leave a country with a huge knowledge gap that 
takes generations to overcome. So investing in education that promotes learning and 
creativity is necessary for innovation. However, in case of a historical knowledge gap, 
which many third world countries have, mechanisms should be put in place to leverage 
external resources to fill the gap. The Thousand-Talent program in China is an example 
of how active global recruitment of talented researchers brought knowledge that is not 
able to be draw endogenously from the system and produce significant advancement to 
the innovation system. In addition, knowledge and methodologies brought from the 
outside should not only be utilized, but also be codified into institutions such as the 
education system so that they generate long-term benefits.  
Last but not least, a well-established information collection and management 
system coupled with good transparency and accountability is crucial for evidence-based 
policymaking. Its importance transcends disciplines. You cannot manage what you 
cannot measure. Collecting and allowing access to information and data is the foundation 
for good governance. Information on public R&D investment and its distribution and 
output by sector, by technology, by source and by recipient would allow policymakers to 
understand and enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of their policies. Opening up 
data and information to the public would also allow third party researchers and analysts 
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to dissect the knowledge and possibly come up with ways to help design policies that are 
more effective and efficient. More openness will also lead to better accountability, which 
is always desirable.   
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CHAPTER 4.  
THE SOLAR PV MANUFACTURING SYSTEM IN CHINA  
4.1. Introduction  
China, the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon emitter, has made 
developing the clean energy industries one of its top priorities (National Economy and 
Commerce Commission, 2001; The 14th Session of the Standing Committee ofthe 10th 
National People’s Congress, 2005). Solar energy is at the forefront of China’s transition 
to clean energy economy. The solar energy industry in China has come a long way since 
its inception at the turn of the 21st century. Chinese solar PV installed capacity has grown 
rapidly since the passage of the Renewable Energy Law in 2006, reaching 7 GW annual 
installation in 2012 (Montgomery, 2013). In 2013, China installed close to 12 GW of PV 
capacity (BNEF, 2014a), surpassing Germany and the United States for the first time to 
become the world’s largest PV installer.  The figure was slightly lower in 2014, which 
was 10.6 GW, but it pushes the totally solar capacity of the country to 30GW (National 
Energy Agency, 2015). It is reported that in the first nine months in 2015, China added 
another 9.9 GW solar capacity to its fleet (National Energy Agency, 2015). The National 
Energy Agency, China’s energy regulative body, announced in October 2015 that China 
had set a goal of 150 GW for 2020 (Xinhua News Agency, 2015a).  
Behind the country’s fast deployment of solar PV is China’s world’s largest PV 
manufacturing industry, which has grown from almost non-existent in early 2000s to 
account for 70% of the global solar PV production in 2014 (GTM Research, 2013). 
Today, has at least 65GW of solar module production capacity (PV-Tech, 2014). Seven 
out of the ten World’s largest PV manufacturers in 2014 are Chinese (PV Tech, 2014).  
China is tailor-made to become a significant global solar manufacturing player for 
environmental, social, economical, and technical reasons.  
First, environmentally speaking, as a country plagued by heavy environmental 
pollution, China has an internal demand for clean energy like solar. The frequent off-the-
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chart PM2.5 readings in many Chinese cities have brought the air pollution crisis to the 
public attention. Heavy reliance on fossil fuel for winter heating and electricity 
consumption is the main reason for bad air quality. The public’s demand for cleaner 
power sources as a solution to the air quality issue has never been higher. The situation 
calls for more solar deployment, which has to be supported by solar manufacturing.  
 Second, from an economic perspective, solar PV manufacturing is a good 
candidate for economic development. As a fast growing clean energy manufacturing 
industry, solar PV production checks almost all the boxes. It creates jobs, which is very 
much needed for a country that has 1.5 billion population. The large skilled labor pool 
also makes China suitable for this industry. It produces GDP and generates tax revenues; 
both are highly preferred for a country that is used to see double-digit economic growth. 
It makes products that many believe holds the promise to the world’s energy future yet is 
not difficult to produce. For silicon-based solar PV, the most dominate type of 
commercial PV technology, the manufacturing processes can be broken into three parts: 
the preparation of poly-silicon is largely a chemical engineering process; the production 
of sola cells draw knowledge mostly from electronic engineering; finally the assembly of 
solar panel is a mechanical process. Figure 1. illustrates the process to produce a solar 
module. The point is that the steps required to transform raw materials eventually to a 
panel is small, compared to similar industries like the semi-conductor industry, or to 
other renewable energy technologies like wind turbine manufacturing. The knowledge 
required is well within the bound of China’s manufacturing skillset. Finally, given the 
rising global demand for solar panels, the room to export solar panel made in China is 
large. This is also a preferred feature because China has built its rapid economic growth 
based on an export-oriented model, and its decision-makers have developed a taste for 
export-oriented industries. The ability to export products is not only a neat business 
strategy, it also give the solar manufacturing industry political cloud.  
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Figure 4.1 Silicon-based Solar PV Production Process 
China’s ability to quickly develop a global competitive solar PV industry has 
caught the world’s attention, but it also puts the industry under scrutiny. Panels made in 
China are primarily known for its affordable price. Most of them have middle-of-the-road 
electricity conversion efficiency, an indicator that determines the amount of electricity 
generation from a panel and a key measure of the quality and performance of a panel. 
Complaints about the quality issues such as panel breakage, fast degradation rate, etc, 
about solar panels made in China were common in the late 2000s and early 2010s.  
Moreover, the rest of the world questions the real sources of Chinese manufacturing 
companies’ cost competitiveness. Solar panel manufacturers from the U.S., European 
Union, Australia, Canada and India raised questions about Chinese companies’ pricing 
practice and Chinese government’s role in supporting the industry. They claimed that 
Chinese firms sell their products at prices below their production cost, which lead to the 
anti-dumping allegation. The Chinese government was also blamed for unjustifiably 
subsidizing the industry, which resulted in the countervailing allegation. In the E.U. and 
U.S. cases, Chinese companies were found liable to dumping and receiving unjustifiable 
government subsidies and are penalized by selling price floor and export quota imposed 
by E.U. and import duty imposed by the U.S.  
Even though the punitive measures have been put in place for Chinese 
manufacturers, the debate about the real sources of their market competitive is far from 
settled. Many overseas companies who have their market share eaten by Chinese 
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companies believe that the main reasons that Chinese firms have been able to do so is 
because they engage in unfair business practice such as dumping and they receive a lot of 
subsidies from the government which significantly lower their cost. Some economists and 
business strategists reference factors such as low labor and land cost, loose labor 
regulation as reasons why manufacturing industries flourish in China (Cheng & Stough, 
2006; Zhou & Ma, 2000). The pollution haven hypothesis (Cole, 2004; M. S. Taylor, 
2004) poised that loose environmental regulations attracts foreign direct investment from 
development countries where costs for environmental regulations are higher to 
developing countries where the cost of compliance is low. Empirical studies find that 
although environmental regulations have a mixed impact on multinational companies’ 
offshoring decisions, they do have a sizable impact on company’s manufacturing cost 
(Bommer, 1999; Dean, Lovely, & Wang, 2009; List, Millimet, Fredriksson, & McHone, 
2003; Millimet & Roy, 2015). Some scholar found that the Chinese’s ability to conduct 
re-design, re-engineering, and process innovation has given them a leg-up in lowering 
cost (Nahm & Steinfeld, 2014b). Finally recent studies have found that supply chain 
development and economies of scale might have contributed to the building of China’s 
competitiveness in solar PV manufacturing (Goodrich, Powell, James, Woodhouse, & 
Buonassisi, 2013b). This chapter means to test these theories in both quantitative and 
qualitative fashion, to understand the real sources of China’s solar PV manufacturing 
industry’s comparative advantage and what they suggest about the industry and the global 
competition going forward.  
Using a sample size of 7 Tier 1 Chinese solar PV manufacturers, based on a 
classification developed by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, this chapter will first 
quantitatively examines the causal links between low solar panel production cost and a 
suite of factors that represent economies of scale, subsidies, innovation, and production 
input using an approach called fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA).  
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Many intangible factors, such as a country’s business culture, its political 
economy structure, the interactions among players along the supply chain, etc., are 
difficult to be quantitatively measured. In addition, quantitative analysis of factors like 
government incentives and subsidies, the scale and functions of the supply chain, etc., 
albeit possible, is bounded by data availability and quality. However, these factors, along 
with a few others, are all important determinants that affect the overall competitiveness of 
the solar PV manufacturing industry. In order to fully understand the formation and 
maintenance of the competitiveness of the solar PV industry, Sector 3 of this chapter 
draw from the rich qualitative data this research has collected and apply them under the 
TIS framework to study both the tangible and intangible factors that are believed to have 
an impact on the competitiveness of the solar PV manufacturing subsystem.  
4.2. Quantitative Analysis of the Sources of Competitiveness in the Solar PV 
Manufacturing Subsystem  
4.2.1. Hypotheses  
This research hypothesizes that three types of factors could affect the cost of 
producing solar PV.  
First, government subsidies are one way to lower the cost of production, besides 
other public benefits that they provides such as improving on labor skills, infrastructure 
readiness and capital accessibility (Sanjaya Lall, 2004). Empirical evidence from both 
developed countries (Jacobsson, Andersson, & Bångens, 2002; Kern & Smith, 2008) and 
new industrialized economies (NIEs) has suggested that government subsidies play an 
important role in shaping demands, fostering supplies, and enabling the development of 
their infant industries (Ayoub & Yuji, 2012; C Freeman, 1987a; Hamilton & Biggart, 
1988; S Lall, 2001; Sanjaya Lall, 1992; Lincoln & McBride, 1987). 
There are many types of subsidies that are used by governments in both China and 
the U.S. They can be grouped into five categories: investment subsidy/grant, tax 
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incentive, inputs subsidy, preferential lending, and infrastructure and social welfare 
contribution (Bayaliyev, Kalloz, & Robinson, 2011; Deutch & Steinfeld, 2013a; Sun, 
2013). Both countries use all five types of subsidies to support their solar PV industry, 
but to different degrees. Types of subsidies used in China include corporate income tax 
exemptions/reductions, tax credits for R&D spending, low interest rate bank loans, grants 
for production capacity expansion, grants for workforce training/electric infrastructure 
upgrades and etc. (Bayaliyev et al., 2011; Deutch & Steinfeld, 2013b; Sun, 2013). In the 
U.S., there is a tendency to avoid, or at least be very careful with, issuing direct 
government handouts, like grants or loans. Tax incentives, however, are considered as 
less controversial and therefore, are more commonly used. Tax incentives for PV 
manufacturing in the U.S. include corporate income tax credits and manufacturing tax 
credits, and Investment Tax Credits for PV installation (Center for Resource Solutions, 
2010; Deutch & Steinfeld, 2013b). There are some grants administered by the U.S. 
DOE’s SunShot Initiative and Solar Energy Technology Program. They are issued as a 
form of award for innovation and cost reduction, usually through a competitive process 
(U.S. DOE SunShot Initiative, 2014). U.S. DOE and state government also provide loans 
and loan guarantees to solar PV manufacturers. They lower the barrier to access capital, 
although depending on whether there are also low-interest clauses attach to the loans, 
they may or may not directly lower the cost to use the capital. With the above 
information, this study hypothesizes the following,  
Hypothesis 2. Subsidies lead to lower PV production cost.  
Economies of scale are another driver for low-cost production. Economies of 
scale refer to the phenomenon that the cost per unit of production decrease at an 
increasing rate as the scale of operation expands. It gives firms with large production 
capacity a cost advantage because they are able to spread their fixed costs over a greater 
number of goods, as well as conducting bulk purchasing and marketing, and exercising 
bargaining power in negotiations to access lower-cost financing (Arrow, 1962; P. 
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Krugman, 1991b; Kwon, 1986; Pratten, 1971). When applied to the PV manufacturing 
context, the theory of economies of scale suggests that firms with higher production 
capacity have lower production cost.  
Hypothesis 3. Larger production capacity leads to lower PV production cost. 
Firms can also creates economies of scale through vertical integration, which 
allows them to internalize its supply chain to eliminate or reduce the transaction costs that 
would otherwise occur in dealing with external suppliers (Teece, 1980; Williamson, 
2000). Studies have found that the PV manufacturing industry is going through a big 
wave of vertical integration, especially in China where a few large firms are expanding 
their footprint to both upstream supply industries and downstream business like PV 
station development (Neidlein, 2014). Empirical evidence suggests that there is a strong 
correlation between firms’ vertical integration strategy and their low production cost 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1971).   
Hypothesis 4. Vertical integration leads to lower PV production cost.   
Last but not least, innovation has long been held at the core of long-term 
competitiveness of all business. Technological innovation does not equate invention of 
new products. Rather, it encompasses not only product invention, but also the research 
and development that enables better product design, higher product quality, higher 
resource utilization rate, less input material requirements, and easier manufacturing 
processes, all of which would increase a firm’s competitiveness in marketplace. Although 
this competitiveness is often reflected in an increase of market share (Capon et. al. 1992) 
and better stock market performance (Chaney, Devinney, & Winer, 2014; Girotra, 
Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2006); evidence is mixed in terms of whether corporate R&D leads 
to lower production cost. In fact, classical economic theory suggests that R&D spending 
will increase the production cost because it drives up the overall variable cost. However, 
if take the long-term impact and the knowledge spillover into consideration, the, 
investment into R&D activities could lower the production cost of a firm. Given the 
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mixed evidence, this study uses author’s insight about the industry and the qualitative 
information collected from the fieldwork to inform the formation of the hypothesis. 
Quantitative information about firm’s R&D spending (Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 in 
Chapter 3) and company’s solar panel selling price matches with the qualitative 
information collected from the fieldwork that companies with higher R&D investment 
faces higher selling prices, which infers higher production cost. Therefore, this study 
hypothesizes the following 
Hypothesis 5. Firm-funded product innovation increases production cost. 
4.2.2. Quantitative Research Method and Data  
4.2.2.1. Fuzzy Set-Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) as A Research 
Method 
This research attempts to quantitatively understand the causal factors leading to 
the low solar PV production cost among leading Chinese firms using Fuzzy set 
qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA).  
Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis is a comparative approach that is fit to 
analyze the causal configurations of a set of variables that consistently appears or does 
not appear in order to produce certain outcome. It is based on the idea that causal 
relations are frequently better understood in terms of set-theoretic relations rather than 
correlations (Fiss, 2007; Ragin & Fiss, 2008; Ragin, 2000, 2008). It uses Boolean algebra 
to create algorithm to reduce numerous causal possibilities to a reduced set of 
configurations that lead to outcome (Fiss, 2011). The approach was introduced by Ragin 
(Ragin, 2014) and later extended (Ragin & Fiss, 2008; Ragin, 2000, 2008).  
Fs/QCA is grounded in set theory that allows for a detailed analysis of how causal 
conditions contribute to a particular. Peer Fiss in his 2011 paper stated the strength of 
fs/QCA in the following way. “This approach is uniquely suited for analyzing causal 
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processes because it is based on a configurational understanding of how causes combine 
to bring about outcomes. The basic intuition underlying QCA is that cases are best 
understood as configurations of attributes resembling overall types and that a comparison 
of cases can allow a researcher to strip away attributes that are unrelated to the outcome 
in question, in which one examines instances of the cause and outcome to understand 
patterns of causation” (Fiss, 2011). Since the goal of this study is exactly to understand 
under what causal conditions that firm can achieve a lower production cost, fs/QCA is 
perfectly suited for this work.  
4.2.2.2. The Operationalization of fs/QCA 
The internal calculation process of fs/QCA includes three steps. The first step is to 
list all possible combinations of the causal conditions in a data matrix known as a truth 
table. Assuming there are n causal variables, then the truth table should include 2n rows. 
Each row of this table is associated with a specific combination of variables. After this 
theory construction, empirical cases are then matched to the rows of this truth table. 
Depending on the empirical values on these variables, some rows may contain multiple 
cases while some only a few; and it is entirely possible that some causal variable 
combinations have no matching cases.  
The second step concerns limiting the potential solutions to a few highly possible 
ones by reducing the number of rows using two criteria: (1) the minimum number of 
cases required for a solution to be considered and (2) the minimum consistency level of a 
solution. “Consistency” in this case is defined as the degree to which cases correspond to 
the set-theoretic relationships expressed in a solution. Consistency can be estimated using 
the number of cases that match a given configuration of variables and at the same time 
exhibit the outcome (e.g. lower the PV production cost) divided by the number of cases 
that match the same configuration of variables but do not exhibit the outcome (e.g. does 
not lower the PV production cost).  
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In the final step, an algorithm based on Boolean algebra is used to logically 
reduce the truth table rows to simplified combinations. When using the fs/QCA pack 
software, the truth table algorithm is defaulted to the one developed by Ragin (2005, 
2008), based on a counterfactual analysis of causal conditions. Counterfactual analysis is 
useful to fs/QCA analysis because it helps alleviate the problem with having too few 
empirical cases for a too large amount of possible variable configurations. One can 
imagine that in the process of determining the possible causal configurations, even a 
small number of variables can quickly lead to a huge number of truth table rows. Yet, 
researchers are usually confined by the limited number of empirical cases that they have 
to fit the truth table. Fortunately, counterfactual analysis offers a way to overcome the 
limitations of a lack of empirical instances.  
To begin with, the truth table algorithm of counterfactual analysis gives two set of 
solutions: the parsimonious and the intermediate solutions based on “easy” and 
“difficult” counterfactuals, respectively (Ragin 2008). “Easy” counterfactuals refer to 
situations where a redundant causal condition is added to a set of causal conditions that 
by themselves already lead to the outcome in question. If either the presence or the 
absence of a particular variable would still lead to the outcome, holding the rest of the 
configuration constant, then the addition of that variable does not make a difference. In 
other word, an easy counterfactual works when adding another causal condition does not 
affect the outcome and therefore, the simplified solution is preferred. 
 “Difficult” counterfactuals are more complex, hence the expression. Unlike easy 
counterfactuals, which test the addition of one more multiple variables, difficult 
counterfactuals examine whether the removal of a set of causal conditions/variables 
leading to an outcome, assuming these variables are redundant. Unless empirical and 
theoretical evidence both suggest the additional causal condition is irrelevant to the 
outcome, which is rare, it is risky to drop the condition in order to reduce the solution to a 
simplified form.  
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Two sets of solutions will be developed based on the two types of counterfactual 
analysis: Parsimonious solution includes all simplified variable causal configurations 
regardless of whether they are based on easy or difficult counterfactuals. In contrast, 
intermediate solution only includes the simplified ones based on easy counterfactuals. In 
the fs/QCA world, causal conditions that belong to both parsimonious and intermediate 
solutions are deemed as core configuration, whereas peripheral configurations include 
those that appear in the intermediate solution but are eliminated in the parsimonious 
solution. The difference between core and peripheral conditions is the strength of the 
evidence relative to the outcome. In other word, core configurations are more causally 
likely to explain the outcome (Fiss, 2011).  
4.2.2.3. Variables and Data 
The cost of production is the outcome that needs to be explained. Three types of 
explanatory variables will be used. According to Hypothesis 2, a vector of variables that 
measure subsidies will be included in the fs/QCA analysis. Given the data availability, 
this study focuses only on capital subsidies that may result in lower cost to access capital 
and tax credits/exemption which lead to lower effective tax rates. Hypotheses H3 and H4 
suggest explanatory variables in the fs/QCA analysis should also include measures of 
economies of scale such as manufacturing capacity, actual PV cell and module 
production, and degree of vertical integration. Last but not lease, firm level R&D 
spending will be used as a measure for innovation. Besides the explanatory variables, a 
set of control variables will be used to control for variances in production input factors 
like labor productivity and electricity.  
As introduced in the Chapter 2, data used in this study come from Bloomberg 
Industries (BI)’s solar industry database, known as BI SOLAR (Bloomberg Finance L.P., 
2014a). As the end of 2014, 13 solar PV module producers were classified as Tier 1 
producers in BI SOLAR. Among the 13 PV module producers, 11 of them report 
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information on production cost, manufacturing capacity and production, which are three 
crucial variables to this study and 9 out of the 11 firms are Chinese. As a result, these 9 
companies make up the data sample for this dissertation  
Table 4.1 summarizes the key statistics of the 9 PV module manufacturing firms 
that comprise the sample of this study. Each firm is considered as one case. Although 
fs/QCA does not explicitly deal with time series, this study treats each quarter as an 
independent QCA analysis. As a result, 22 separate QCA analyses were done using 22 
quarterly datasets.  
Hypotheses proposed in earlier chapter lead to the following causal model 
Production Cost ~ Subsidies  * Economies of Scale * Innovation * Production inputs  
















Trina Solar China 7.60% 2006 NYSE Entrepreneur 
Yingli Green 
Energy China 6.90% 2007 NYSE Entrepreneur 
Canadian Solar China 5.80% 2006 NASDAQ Entrepreneur 
Hanwha 




JinkoSolar  China 5.00% 2010 NYSE Entrepreneur 
JA Solar China 5.00% 2006 NASDAQ SOE Spinoff /Join venture 
ReneSola China 4.10% 2006 NYSE Entrepreneur 
LDK Solar China 0.60% 2007 NYSE Join venture/ Entrepreneur 
Suntech Power China 5.8%* 2006 NYSE Entrepreneur 
Total  46.4%*    
 
Source: Bloomberg BISOLAR database.  
* Suntech’s market share is calculated based on 2011 data, the year before Suntech defaulted on its 
investor’s bonds. Total market share does not include Suntech.  
 
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the variables. Based on set-theory and Boolean 
algebra, fs/QCA requires variables to be on a 0-1 scale, where 0 represents complete 
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absence of the variable and 1 represents the complete presence. As show in Table 4.2, 
most variables used in this study do not come naturally on a 0-1 scale. Therefore, they 
need to be transformed, or in the fs/QCA language “calibrated” to be QCA ready.  
Calibration is essentially a process of benchmarking the values of a given variable 
across cases. The calibrated values indicate each case’s relative position in relationship to 
each other. For example, in this study companies’ production costs in each given quarter 
are benchmarked according to the highest cost of that quarter. The highest cost is 
assigned the value of 1, which means it represents the fully presence of high production 
cost. All the other companies’ production costs are then benchmarked to the highest cost 
and take on values that are a fraction of 1. Once the transformations are done to all 
variables in all quarters, they become the empirical data inputs to the fs/QCA software 
package. The software will then calculate the fuzzy score for all cases (companies) in 
each variable based on the empirical data inputs and three assigned anchors: the 95 
percentile value (cutoff for full membership), the 50 percentile value (cross-over point), 
and the 5 percentile value, (cutoff for full non-membership). The software will then 
compute a truth table showing all the possible causal combinations of variables. The next 
step is for the researcher to make a judgment call as to what are the acceptable levels of 
case frequency and causal pathway consistency. Due to the small-N nature of this study, 
the case frequency was set at 2, which means at least 2 cases have to be present in order 
for a causal configuration to be passed on to the next analytical step. The minimum 
consistency was set at 75%, as recommended by the literature.  
Table 4.2 Summary of Variables 




Cost of goods sold of 
solar PV in a given 
quarter 
$/W Continuous 
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Table 4.2 Continued  
Explanatory Variables – Subsidies 
Variable Definition Unit Type QCA Transformation 
Cost of Debt 
The effective rate that a 
company pays on its 
current debt in a given 
quarter 
% Continuous 
As a % of the 
highest cost 
 
Cost of Equity 
The rate of return a firm 
pays to 
its equity investors in a 
given quarter 
% Continuous 





Total tax paid over pre-
tax income in a given 
quarter 
% Continuous As a % of the tax rate range 
Explanatory Variables – Economies of Scale 
Capacity The possible output of a firm in a given quarter MW Continuous 




The level to which a firm 
internalizes the upstream 
and downstream 
processes into its own 
operation 
N.A. Discrete As a % of full integration level 
 Explanatory Variable – Innovation 
R&D 
Spending 
Corporate R&D spending 
as a percentage of 
corporate revenue 
% Continuous As a % of the highest spending 
Explanatory Variable – Production Input  
Electricity 
Rate 
Average electricity price 
paid in a given quarter $/kWh Continuous 
As a % of the 
highest cost 
4.2.3. Results  
Table 4.3 and 4.4 show the results of the pre-2010 era and post-2010 era. In the 
pre-2010 era, the co-appearance of low electricity cost, low R&D investment, low cost of 
debt and low cost equity lead to lower solar panel production costs among Chinese 
players. The impact of vertical integration, module capacity and tax rate are mixed and 
there are no consistent pattern among these three variables and between them and the rest 
of the four variables that lead to low PV production cost. However, in the post-2010 era, 
the higher level of vertical integration consistently co-exist with the four variables 
identified in the pre-2010 era as factors that cause low production cost. Even though the 
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evidence on module capacity in the same era is not as consistent as the other five 
variables, there is no contradicting trend regarding module capacity. In other word, the 
presence of large module capacity, in combination of low electricity cost, low R&D 
investment, low cost of debt and low cost equity, leads to low solar panel production cost, 
although in a few large module capacity has a neutral relationship with low PV 
production cost, meaning neither the presence or the absence of large module capacity 
matters. There is still no clear pattern regarding the level of tax rate’s causal relationship 
with low production cost.  
One explanation as to why the patterns are different before and after 2010 is that, 
the economies of scale production of the Chinese PV companies only started to form 
since 2010. Before that period, companies all operated at a small scale. The fact that 
vertical integration and module capacity become meaningful causal factors for low cost 
production only after the economies of scale was formed suggests that there is a tipping 
point for manufacturing scale’s impact on production cost.  










capacity Tax rate 
2010 Q1      ? ? 
2009 Q4     <>  <> 
2009 Q3     <>  <> 
2009 Q2     ? ? ? 
2009 Q1     <> <> ? 
2008 Q4     ? <> <> 
2008 Q2     ? ?  
2008 Q1     ?  ? 
Summary      ? ? 
 139 
 means the closer to 0 the variable is, the more likely it leads to lower production cost. 
 means the closer to 1 the variable is, the more likely it leads to lower production cost.  
<> or <> means 2 possible causal paths, one being  or  and the other being neutral.  
/ means neutral.  
? means two opposing causal paths.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Post 2010 Results 
 






capacity Tax rate 
2013 Q3 
      / 
2013 Q2 
       
2013 Q1 
      / 
2012 Q4 
       
2012 Q3 
      / 
2012 Q2 
     <> <> 
2012 Q1 
       
2011 Q4 
      / 
2011 Q3 
     /  
20112Q1 
     <> <> 
2011 Q1 
     /  
2010 Q4 
     /  
2010 Q3 
     <> <> 
2010 Q2 
     <> <> 
Summary 
     
Pro  Mixed 
Notes : 
 means the closer to 0 the variable is, the more likely it leads to lower production cost. 
 means the closer to 1 the variable is, the more likely it leads to lower production cost.  
<> or <> means 2 possible causal paths, one being  or  and the other being neutral.  
/ means neutral.  
? means two opposing causal paths.  
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4.2.4. Discussion of the fs/QCA results  
Therefore, hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected based on the finding about cost of debt 
and cost of equity. The lower level of cost of debt and cost of equity suggest the existence 
of government subsidies, and they are causally related to lower panel production cost.  
Effective tax rate is another area that government subsidies could affect the 
production cost. However, there is no consistent evidence that lower tax rate leads to 
lower production cost.  
Evidence on hypothesis 3 and 4 is mixed. It is found that module manufacturing 
capacity expansion and vertical integration could decrease the production cost of Chinese 
and only when they reach certain scale. The Chinese manufacturing capacity reached 
economies of scale around 2009 to 2010 (Figure 4.2). Before 2010, the capacity 
expansion and vertical integration do not have a consistent effect on production cost 
because the production had not reached a critical mass. However, the tipping point came 
in 2010, where the solar PV production capacity reached the economies of scale. Since 
2010, strong evidence shows that they drive down the cost of production. The evidence 
suggests that economies of scale is not an abstract concept. Rather it has to be backed up 
with real at-scale production (as seen in the production capacity growth in 2010) in order 
to realize its impact on production cost reduction.  
 
 141 
Figure 4.2 Annual Solar PV Production by Country (MW) 
Source: Earth Policy Institute 
 
Corporate spending on R&D activities turns out to increase manufacturing cost. 
The same result is true regardless of using R&D spending of the current term or 2 year 
cumulative R&D spending as the measure. As a result, hypothesis 5 is rejected.  
Due to data availability, a few factors that are believed to also have impact on PV 
cost production are not included in the models presented in this paper. These factors 
include subsidy measures such as free cash grants and land subsidies; economies of scale 
measures such as the level of clustering and agglomeration; innovation measure like 
process innovation; and production input measures such as cost of labor.  
It is important to realize that in spite of the insights that these models offer, 
statistical analysis is bounded by the quality and span of the dataset. Instead of treating 
the statistical analysis in isolation and taking the results that they generate as the final 
verdict, a more sensible approach is to combine statistical analysis results with on-the-
ground understanding of the industry. This study strives to do the latter by conducting a 
rigorous analysis based on extensive interviews with Chinese and American solar PV 
Industry executives, PV technology R&D personnel, government officials and 
policymakers, and industry organizations. Interview data on China were collected during 
five research trips to China (three out of the five trips were conducted as part of the 
Stanford China Solar Project Team) where the author conducted 124 interviews with 109 
individuals from four solar PV related fields: manufacturing, technology R&D, PV 
deployment, and policymaking/consulting/industry association, attended 2 academic 
conferences and 2 trade show, and took 28 site visits to 16 silicon, solar cell, solar 
module, and manufacturing tooling production plants and 9 site visits to 9 different PV 
research labs, 2 visit to industrial parks, and 3 site visits to distributed solar PV 
deployment sites. The methodology section of his work includes more details. 
Information collected from these activities is an enormously valuable resource that 
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provides lots of insights regarding the sources of manufacturing competitiveness in 
China. The next section will develop a typology of potential sources of a manufacturing 
industry’s competitiveness based on qualitative data and use it to dissect the strengths and 
weaknesses of the solar PV manufacturing subsystem in China.  
4.3. Qualitative Analysis: Sources of Competitiveness of the Solar PV 
Manufacturing Subsystem in China 
Factors that explain the source of competitiveness of the solar PV manufacturing 
industry spread across five dimensions as show in Table 4.5. This section will examine 
each factor using the TIS framework, explain their functionality and the mechanisms 
through which they contribute to or block the development of the solar PV TIS in China, 
especially the manufacturing subsystem.  
Table 4.5. Determinates of Solar PV Manufacturing Competitiveness 
Agglomeration 
Economies 
Firm Strategy Cultural Resource Policy 
Economies of 
scale 
Flexibility  Work ethic Low cost 
















 Management Desire to 
lower cost 




    Loose labor and 
environmental 
regulation  
4.3.1. Agglomeration Economies Factors  
Agglomeration economies are found by this study to be a big contributing factor 
to China’s low cost production of solar panels. Agglomerations, stemming from 
economies of scale, industrial clusters, and network theory (Glaeser 2010; Krugman 
1991), offer a region, an industry or even a firm multiple layers of benefits, including 
transportation, communication, market power, etc. The following subsections explore the 
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ways in which the solar PV industry in China establishes agglomeration economies and 
uses them for its own advantage.  
4.3.1.1. Economies of Scale  
Economies of scale are the benefits associated with the size of production. It 
refers to the phenomenon that the cost per unit of production decreases at an increasing 
rate as the scale of operation expands. It gives firms with large production capacity a cost 
advantages because they are able to spread their fixed costs over a greater number of 
goods, as well as conducting bulk purchasing and marketing, and exercising bargaining 
power in negotiations to access lower-cost financing (Arrow, 1962; P. Krugman, 1991b; 
Kwon, 1986; Pratten, 1971). When applied to the PV manufacturing context, the theory 
of economies of scale suggests that firms with larger production capacity have lower 
production cost. Quantitative analysis shown in Section 4.2 of this chapter found that 
when firms’ production capacities reach a critical mass, economies of scale would lead to 
lower solar panel production cost. 
The solar PV industry in China uses economies of scale to its advantage. Since 
the 10th FYP in 2000, the central government started to promote the industrialization of 
the PV manufacturing industry through “economies of scale” development. The total 
solar cell manufacturing capacity grew from almost non-exist in 2000, to 500MW in 
2005, to 8.9 GW in 2010, and eventually in 47 GW in 2014 and the actual production was 
33 GW in the same year. During this process of building economies of scale, a great deal 
of policy, financial, and human resources were mobilized (resource mobilization). As the 
theory predicts, the manufacturing cost declined accordingly. Average cell selling price 
among tier 1 Chinese producers declined by 91% between 2005 and 2014 (Bloomberg 
Finance L.P., 2014b). During the same time period, the price of solar PV made by 
American manufacturer declined by only 50% (Bloomberg Finance L.P., 2014b).  
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The key link between manufacturing capacity expansion and the creation of 
economies of scale is that the former provide opportunities to Chinese manufacturers to 
take productivity and quality improvement of their production lines to a whole new level. 
Interviews with multiple Chinese PV manufacturers showed that every time they build a 
new factory or add additional production lines to an existing factory, they adopt new 
versions of manufacturing equipment and materials26. Newer materials and equipment 
are either cheaper or better than the older versions, and often times both. Newer 
equipment is usually more automated than older ones, reduce the need for manual labor 
and in turn lower the labor cost. Newer equipment also does better in stability, reliability, 
and precision measures, which means they produce better quality PV panels. Similarly, 
new materials that are adopted in new production lines during a capacity expansion 
would also allow solar cell efficiency improvement and increase product quality.  Lastly, 
newer equipment is also likely to have bigger capacity (i.e. move from 25MW capacity 
per line to 30MW or 35MW capacity per line) so that the same number of workers would 
produce more panels27. The improvement in productivity leads to cost shaving.  
Driving mechanism 4.1: Continuous capacity expansion allowed Chinese 
manufacturers to create economies of scale, during which process the 
manufacturers kept upgrading their production lines with better equipment and 
high quality materials, which led to higher productivity and lower cost. 
One can feel startling differences between the production lines of a company that 
routinely goes through capacity expansion and one that does not just by talking a walk at 
the workshops. During a visit to Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province, we visited one Chinese 
factory and one American factory. The Chinese factory is the main solar cell production 
base of a Tier 1 company, the capacity of which grew from 600MW in 2010 to 2GW in 
2014 while the price of their cell fell from $1.17/W to $0.24/W during the same time 
                                                 
26 Interviewee #71, #72, #89, #97, #99, #104 
27 Interviewee #104 
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period. The building where the cell and module production workshops were located 
looked new and well maintained the work area was spacious and well lit, the level of 
automation was high, and the production line workers were mostly machine operators 
whose job looked routine but not intense. In contrast, the American factory has only 
45MW capacity and it was located in a small old building. One striking observation about 
this American cell producer’s facility was how labor intensive it is. Unlike the next-door 
Chinese facility, the American factory workshop was packed with workers who work 
intensely around the clock to perform their tasks. Considering it was essentially the same 
manufacturing process between these two factories, the American facility’s level of 
automation was noticeably lower, which inevitably lows its productivity and 
consequently increases the unit production cost and hurts its market competitiveness. As 
of Q4 of 2014, the production facility of the American company had not expanded it 
capacity yet since it opened its door in 2011, which means it had been locked in the 2011-
vintage manufacturing technology for at least 3 years while the Chinese factory went 
through at least one round of capacity expansion accommodated with tooling upgrade.  
Both theory and empirical evidence supports the idea that economies of scale 
create cost advantage at the firm level. The comparison between the Chinese factory and 
the American-owned factory in the same city showed that Chinese companies’ cost 
advantage does not simply come from the fact that they are located in China. Rather, the 
ability to continuously expand the manufacturing capacity offers a suite of cost reduction 
opportunities.   
4.3.1.2. Supply Chain  
In his seminal paper, Krugman used economic model to demonstrate the 
increasing return to high-density economic geographies (Krugman 1991a). He found that 
regions have a cluster of manufacturing activities to start with are likely to attract more 
similar manufacturing firms because of the existing large share of demand for similar 
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supplies and the suppliers and infrastructures to fulfill the demand. The concept of 
“economies of agglomeration” or “clustering” is well documented in economics and 
urban development literature (N. Coe, Kelly, & Yeung, 2007; Ellison, Glaeser, & Kerr, 
2007; Ellison & Glaeser, 1999; Fujita & Thisse, 2013; Gordon & McCann, 2000; Head, 
Ries, & Swenson, 1995). The idea is that firms could increase their marginal return 
through locating close to peers of similar kind or close to their upstream supplier or 
downstream consumers. The increasing return on economies comes from sources such as 
the ability to save on transportation cost, share common labor pool and infrastructure, and 
the knowledge spillover.  
The Chinese solar PV industry is a living testimony of the clustering theory. The 
emergence and rapid development of the supply chain cluster in the Yangtz river delta 
area in China demonstrated how a dense supply chain cluster can provide an environment 
for entrepreneurial experimentation, resource mobilization, market creation, 
knowledge development and diffusion, creating positive externalities, and eventually 
legitimize and strengthen the industry. Chapter 5 of this dissertation is dedicated to study 
the role played by supply chain in the development of the PV industry in China.  
4.3.2. Firm Strategy Factors 
Firm strategies are firms’ response to market conditions given their resources and 
constrains imposed by the environment they embedded in. This study discovers that on 
the one hand, large Chinese PV companies operate just like any other publicly traded 
multinational in a sense that they use modern business management approaches in their 
day-to-day operation. However, this is a departure from the traditional experience-based 
management style that is common among many Chinese companies. On the other hand, 
the leading Chinese PV companies studied in this dissertation differ from their western 
competitors in their pursuit of low cost manufacturing via process innovation and 
working with a large number of local supplies.  
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Besides studying large Chinese PV manufactures, it is also crucial to stress the 
role played by small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and how their firm strategies shape 
the course of the solar PV industry in China. They are instrumental in the creation and 
maintaining of the cost advantage of the PV manufacturing industry in China.  
4.3.2.1. Flexibility 
Flexibility in manufacturing means the production system’s ability to react and 
adapt to internal and external changes relatively easily and swiftly without incurring high 
cost (Chan & Chan, 2010; Fohrholz & Gronau, 2011).   
The Chinese PV manufacturing industry has a relatively flexible and adaptable 
supply chain. It started with entrepreneurial PV producing companies and their SME 
supplier with diverse backgrounds. The rapid global PV market expansion combined with 
favorable government industrial policy mobilized a great deal of resources. Section 5.2 in 
Chapter 5 will give a full account of the history of supply chain development, but the 
entrepreneurial spirit allows the suppliers to use their respective specialties to carve out 
a market niche that suits their expertise. For example, the engineering background of 
Suntech’s former CEO allowed the company to excel in product quality and led its 
Chinese peers in innovation. CGL-Poly’s leading position in silicon processing, which is 
a capital and knowledge intensive sector, benefited from its parent company’s ties to 
Ministry of Defense’s R&D budge. Unlike large companies represented by the previous 
two examples, the PV industry in China is made of a large number of SMEs with various 
backgrounds and they entered the sector with their own specialties. The supply chain 
section described how non-solar specific suppliers transferred their specialties developed 
for other industries to serve the solar PV industry. This flexibility on the supplier’s side 
made the initial rapid development of the industry and its supply chain possible.  
The suppliers’ flexibility and adaptability continued to be an important factor as 
PV manufacturers’ need for supplies became faster, more diverse, and more sensitive to 
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cost. Because the suppliers in China were flexible to begin with, they are able to keep up 
with PV manufacturer’s fast evolving demand. This is crucial in terms of realizing the 
cell and module innovation that PV producers designed in their labs, as well as achieving 
the cost-shedding goals set by PV producers. As said the deputy director of the 48th 
Research Institute  
“ Any new product design by PV manufactures’ R&D teams will remain in their 
labs until material and tooling suppliers can come up with matching tools and parts to 
realize it in mass production.”28  
It highlights the often-overlooked importance of suppliers in knowledge 
development and diffusion. They are instrumental in bring innovations from blueprint to 
reality. The flexibility demonstrated by suppliers in China in terms of modifying their old 
products or design new products to meet PV manufacturer’ new product design or cost 
reduction goals has certainly enabled innovation and especially the rapid cost reduction 
observed in the industry in the past decade.  
An important aspect of being flexible is the ability to quickly responding to 
change. Conveniently, things usually move fast in China. When encountered by a large 
order, Chinese PV manufacturers and suppliers can ramp up their production quickly by 
adding more hours and shifts to their workers without incurring a high cost. In cases of 
capacity expansion, the Chinese have the advantage of building a new factory at a speed 
faster than it is in many other countries.  This is not just a function of laying the bricks in 
a faster speed. Rather, ready infrastructure and fast administrative approval process are 
also key to enabling flexibility. Three-decade long experience with building industrial 
park created a well-practiced system to facilitate industrial development. In well-run 
industrial parks, standardized factory workshop, electricity connection, and workforce 
training programs are available for new factories to utilize as soon as they move in29. 
                                                 
28 Interviewee #104 
29 Interviewee # 90 
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Even in the absence of industrial parks, the speed of building electricity grid, factory 
space, and other types of infrastructure is relatively fast because of the pro-industry 
administrative mindset and the convenience associated with publicly owned land.    
Driving mechanism 4.2: Flexibility in the tooling and material supply chain 
enabled a short product lab-to-production line cycle. Flexibility in infrastructure 
supply made it easy and quick to bring on new production capacity. Both lower 
transaction costs and allowed companies to be agile and adaptable. 
Besides the flexibility resides in the supply chain and the macro-factors related to 
running PV production factories, at the micro-level, Chinese companies also demonstrate 
efforts to stay flexible and therefore, competitive. One paradox is that automation can 
significantly increase productivity but it sacrifices flexibility. Human are infinitely 
flexible, but machines are not. Human can observe, assess, analyze, and adjust. In short, 
human can learn; yet machines can only do so to the extent that their operators is capable 
of doing. As a result, higher level of automation, as productivity-enhancing as it can be, 
reduces the amount of flexibility that a production process could have and it could have 
serious cost and product quality consequences. For example, in a highly automated 
production line, a breakdown of a single part at an early step can bring the entire 
production process to halt. A few practices were observed during factory tours conducted 
by the author in China.   
At the solar cell production line of a tier 1 Chinese company, an additional 
mechanical arm was added to a testing machine to ensure that in situations where the 
solar cell transportation belt is halted, this additional mechanical arm can bring cells from 
elsewhere to keep the testing machine occupied. If it were not for the additional 
mechanical arm, the testing machine would have to be paused when the transportation 
belt ceases to work; but with the arm, the downtime is avoided and the productivity of the 
line is higher than it otherwise would be, which indirectly lowers the production cost. In 
module (not cell) manufacturing stage, Chinese companies in general deploys more 
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manual labor partly because it requires less precious, partly because the value of modules 
are significantly higher than cells, which means a botched batch of product would inflect 
greater cost on companies. By using more people instead of machines for module 
assembly, manufacturers essentially put in many check points throughout the production 
process in order to avoid mass mid-produce.  
4.3.2.2. Learning and Process Innovation 
Learning by doing refers to the fact that knowledge grows over time as 
individuals constantly engage in a particular type of practice. Its primary function is 
knowledge development and diffusion. The acquisition of knowledge constitutes 
“learning” and learning is a product of experience. Learning is associated with repetition 
of certain type of performance. In the solar PV manufacturing context, as a assembly line 
worker repeats the same operation for a long period of time, his or her proficiency 
improves and the time required to finish the same amount of work decrease and hence, 
the cost of production decreases as a result of higher labor productivity. In explaining 
how experience leads to economies of scale, Arrow pointed out in his seminal piece 
about learning that “favorable responses [to problems emerged during manufacturing 
processes] are selected over time” (Arrow, 1962). The essence of his argument is that it is 
not only the repetitive nature of doing the same thing leads to productivity gain, it is also 
the purposefully selection of best work routines that improves the productivity. Similarly, 
Frederick Winslow Taylor in his study of scientific management illustrated how 
productivity increases and cost decreases through constant experimentations in order to 
find the “optimal” allocation of man power (Taylor 1911).  
Literature has documented how things like internal manufacturing processes 
improvements, discovery of new tools and devices, as well as customer based re-
engineering can lead to less input requirements, lower idol time, higher labor productivity 
and lower production cost (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Cohen, W. M., & Levin, 
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2007; C Freeman, 1987b). The term “process innovation” is used to describe such 
phenomena. 
Unlike product innovation, process innovation has a murkier but also more 
encompassing definition. It refers to improvements of internal production processes, and 
discovery of new tools, devices and knowledge as well as customer based re-engineering. 
It is inseparable with learning and requires human ingenuity combined with experimental 
spirit, knowledge, and creativity (Arrow, 1962; Bengt Åke Lundvall, 2007; R R Nelson 
& Winter, 2009).Process innovation can lead to higher product quality, higher labor 
productivity, less inputs requirement, lower production cost, and any combination of 
these outcomes (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Cohen, W. M., & Levin, 2007; Freeman, 
1987). There is a tendency in literature and in day-to-day thinking to overlook process 
innovation, or considered it not as important as “hardcore” product innovation. As 
Lundvall pointed out, this bias needs to be overcome because product and process 
innovation are interrelated, and latter is crucial to the former (Lundvall, 2007). Scholars 
also found that process innovation can be a significant source of firm competitiveness, 
which gives process innovation additional significance (Li, Liu, & Ren, 2006; Nahm & 
Steinfeld, 2014; Yam et. al., 2004). 
The Chinese manufacturing industry did not pioneer process innovation, but it has 
been able to use it for its greatest advantage.  Evidence from both the Chinese 
manufacturing industry in general (Breznitz & Murphree, 2011; Li et al., 2006; Yam et 
al., 2004) and its energy technology manufacturing industries in particular (Bullis, 2011; 
de la Tour et al., 2011; K. S. Gallagher, 2014; Lewis, 2013; Luo, 2013; Nahm & 
Steinfeld, 2014a) shows that China excels in conducting process innovation, which gives 
Chinese manufacturers an unique advantage over their foreign competitors.  
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Interviews with CTOs from tier 1 Chinese PV and wafer producers show that 
Chinese companies leverage the power of process innovation significantly30.  Yingli’s 
On-line research program and Trina’s Golden Line innovation are such examples. The 
On-line research program is referred to as the “grass root innovation” program at Yingli. 
It means to optimize production efficiency at factory floor by mobilizing production line 
workers to contribute their ideas and best practices that developed from daily work 
(resource mobilization). Just like the slogan of the research program says, “Everyone is 
an innovator.” the program aims to tap into the low-cost, handy ways possessed by 
workers to improve production line performance and reduce production costs. One 
successful example coming out of the program is the reengineering of wire saw by a wire 
saw operator to cut wafers thinner and in a more uniformed way. It increased wafer yield 
and improved the efficiency of solar cells (thinner wafer results in lower electric 
resistance and therefore, higher efficiency). This process innovation does not 
fundamentally change the wire saw designed, but by adding a few minor tweaks to the 
machine it leads to higher product quality and allegedly can save over one million dollars 
in production cost every year31. In a way, the On-line research program is complementary 
to the science-based research that happens at Yingli’s State Key Lab.  
The Golden Line program at Trina is an intermediate step linking the research 
conducted at the State Key Lab with mass production. Typically, solar cells suffer 
efficiency losses when they are transferred from research labs to production lines. The 
goal of the Golden Line program is to ensure the most efficient “lab to production line” 
transition through a pilot production line where test production is carried out in 
conjunction with simulation, feedback, re-innovation, and re-engineering. It is reported 
by the company that products came out of the Golden Line can achieve a 0.6% efficiency 
gain and a 7.4W to 10.5W module power output gain in actual mass production.  
                                                 
30 Interviewee #31, #46, #53 
31 Interviewee #31 
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Another example comes from GCL Poly. By reconfigure the equipment 
arrangement on the factory floor, GCL was able to cut the material transportation time 
and reduce the number of workers required on the production, which eventually lowered 
the cost of production.  
The mechanical arm example given in the last section is another example. 
Examples of cost-reducing process innovation in Chinese solar PV factories are ample, 
and Chinese companies are certainly proud of these low-key yet practical innovations 
because they further the companies’ cost advantage at a minimal cost.  
Driving mechanism 4.3: Process innovations stemming from work experience 
and daily practice on production lines optimized the production process at little 
cost. They increased productivity and lowered cost. 
4.3.2.3. Management  
The adoption of modern business management method has been on the rise 
among large Chinese companies and is credited for improving product quality and the 
overall business performance32. Having a management principle is important to Chinese 
companies that have global ambitions, because for a long time, Chinese manufacturing 
industries rely on advantages in labor supply, natural resources, and lax regulation. Yet, 
business management was based primarily on experience rather than on scientific 
principles. As manufacturing industries in China eager to transition to the higher value-
added part of the global production network while maintaining their cost competitiveness, 
they all realize that efficient management of their entire production process is key. For 
leading Chinese solar PV makers, the traditional experience-based management method 
no longer fits their image and their relative position in the industry. For all intents and 
purposes, Chinese companies need a modern management brand to legitimate their 
position as industry leaders.  
                                                 
32 Interviewee #57, #58, #71, #88, #89.  
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Among all the modern management schools, delicacy management is the most 
popular among Chinese PV manufacturing companies. Delicacy management stemmed 
from three fields: scientific management founded by Frederic Taylor (Taylor 1911), 
production quality control principles originated from W. Edward Deming (Deming, 
1986), and the Toyota Production System (Ōno, 1988; Roos, Womack, & Jones, 1990; 
Shingo & Dillon, 1989; Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1991). It was spearheaded by Japanese 
carmaker Toyota, and has a huge amount of following in China (Shu-qin, 2010; Xu, Lu, 
Shi, Wang, & Peng, 2010; Xueying, 2011).  
Delicacy management requires managers to turn abstract business strategies into 
specific production or operational goals, break them down to executable and assessable 
tasks, and monitor and evaluate the implementation of the tasks on a timely manner 
(usually daily). It demands a high level of division of labor with skilled and motivated 
workers at each step of the production process to accomplish the tasks. Under delicacy 
management, the input and output of each production process is standardized and 
quantified. It is through the attention to details at every single production step, delicacy 
management strives to improve product quality and reduce production cost. Furthermore, 
instead of treating each worker and production process as an isolated unit, delicacy 
management calls for a systematic approach. In other word, the approach values the 
optimization of the entire production process because at the end of the day, it is the 
totality of all the production steps that decides the performance of a factory.  
In addition, delicacy management requires attention to details. It develops 
routines that institutionalized the best practice at each production step and attaches 
specific quantifiable and assessable goals to them, and it uses real-time information to 
monitor the performance of both the individual components and the system as a whole. It 
diagnoses weak links and optimizes the linkages between processes. From the TIS lens, 
delicacy management is a framework that guides the managers to discover tacit 
knowledge embedded in their business operation that can be scaled up to improve the 
 155 
productivity of their human and financial capital. In so doing, it fulfills the knowledge 
development and diffusion function of TIS.  
Delicacy management approach is appealing to Chinese PV manufactures because 
it is predicated on key principles like division of labor, quality control, and lean 
production, all of which contribute to the low-cost bottom line of Chinese PV 
manufacturers and their increasing desire to increase product quality. As a result, delicacy 
management is followed by a good number of tier 1 Chinese PV manufacturing 
companies. Among companies studied by this work, two tier 1 Chinese PV producers, 
(Trina Solar and Jinko Solar) two large second tier solar panel producers in Wuxi (Gaojia 
and Hareon Solar)33 and one large supplier (GCL Poly34) all specifically mentioned 
delicacy management as a key element of their competitiveness, although this list does 
not mean to be all inclusive. Exhibit 1 in Appendix C uses a case study of GCL Poly to 
illustrate how delicacy management is implemented in Chinese factory in both a top-
down and a bottom up manner in order to improve production efficiency and quality.  
Even with companies that did not specifically touted delicacy management, factory tours 
and interviews with their executives show that principles and practices resemble delicacy 
management are widely used. There is a strong taste among all Chinese PV producers 
and their major suppliers for some type of systematic and scientific management 
approach that reduces labor and material input, cuts waste in time and materials, and 
controls product quality.  
In fact, the specific brand of the management style is not the quintessential part; 
Chinese firms’ pursuit for a scientific method to approach their growing industrial 
enterprise is at the heart of the story. In a way, delicacy management is an easy concept 
for Chinese companies to get on board with because it provides a philosophy and a 
methodology to deliver the outcomes Chinese manufacturing firms need, i.e. production 
                                                 
33 Interviewee # 65, #71, #88, #91  
34 Tour ID #3; Interviewee #62, #63 
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cost reduction and product quality improvement. But the brand itself is a means instead 
of the goal. At the end of the day, Chinese PV manufacturing companies desire a 
systematic scientific management approach. Realizing that their traditional experience-
based management approach was limiting, Chinese companies decided to pursue modern 
management methods that can transcend their business to a model that is better suited for 
global competition in the 21st century. Having a scientific management system is the 
standard practice of modern western companies (think about the World’s Fortune 500 
companies). By adopting delicacy management, or any other modern management 
approach for that matter, Chinese PV companies are conforming to existing rules to 
improve their legitimacy as leaders of the industry.  
Conveniently, delicacy management matches well with the manufacturing culture 
and resources in China: it requires skilled worker; it drills down to specific details of a 
manufacturing process; it leverages process innovation for improvement and 
optimization; it requires an adoption of modern technologies; and it delivers cost 
reduction and quality improvement. To certain extent, delicacy management combines 
lots of the traditional advantages that Chinese firms have and the new values they want to 
pursue and packages them in a scientific way. It provides a scripture to upgrade business 
operation and unleash the previously untapped cost reduction and quality improvement 
potentials. The experience has so far been positive among Chinese companies as many of 
them attributing their global competitiveness partly to the adoption of delicacy 
management and other similar approaches35.  
Driving mechanism 4.4: The adoption of scientific management approaches 
improves companies’ business and production performance and lends them 
legitimacy among their peers.   
                                                 
35 Interviewee #58, #65, #71, #88, #91 
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4.3.3. Cultural Factors 
4.3.3.1. Work Ethic 
Work ethic in China is unique. Employees are wiling to put in extra hours at work 
so much so to an extent that it becomes a norm at some institutes. During a visit to a 
university research center on a Friday late afternoon, quite to the author’s surprise, all 
graduate students and researchers were still at work at 6:30pm. Some of them were 
leaving for dinner but said they would come back after dinner. The same center also 
frequently meets on weekends to discuss research progress. Working long extra hours on 
a “voluntary basis” is common among office-based jobs. Examples of highly devoted 
employees are often praised for their work ethic and touted as role models for other 
employees to follow. It creates a hardworking culture (or a epidemic, depending on one’s 
point of view).  
For labor-intensive sectors like manufacturing, due to past high-profile labor 
rights dispute cases (Bilton, 2014; Clifford & Greenhouse, 2013), they are under heavy 
public scrutiny for labor exploitations. In terms of work hour regulation in China, the 
upper limit of work hours is set to be no more than 167 hours per mouth, equivalent to 21 
8-hour working days per month.  
All Chinese Tier 1 solar PV manufacturers run their production lines around the 
clock. Factories that operate at maximum or close to maximum capacity run on a 24/7 
basis. They divide their workers into either four 8-hour shifts36 or three 12-hour shifts. In 
so doing, companies are able to run their production capacity 24 hours a day 7 days a 
week while still comply with the law. These workdays may seem long from a western 
perspective, but it is common in the Chinese manufacturing sector. Workers are used to 
                                                 
36 Three of the four shifts keep the production line up and running for three consecutive 8-hour segments 
while the fourth shift takes a day off. 
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such schedule and do not think twice with the night shifts and weekend shifts as long as 
they get their scheduled shift-off.  
Workers are not the only group that is used to work in the evening and on 
weekends. As mentioned earlier, researchers, university professors are working bees too. 
But the list does not stop there. During the multiple research trips to China, the author 
had many meetings on weekends with people from all sectors, including universities, 
companies and government. A large number of these weekend meetings were conducted 
at interviewees’ office where they stepped out from their weekend work schedule for a 
talk and then went back to work again after the interview37.   
There is no cheaper way to mobilize human resource than building a business 
culture that treats hardworking as a default. When working extra hours becomes a social 
norm or is even expected, the cost of extracting extra productivity from labor is close to 
zero (resource mobilization). However, the elephant in the room in this situation is issues 
related to labor rights. But the power of social norms is that they coerce certain behavior 
patterns and make it culturally acceptable.  Section 4.3.5.4 on loose labor and 
environmental regulation will explore the negative side of such labor practice in more 
depth.  
Driving mechanism 4.5: Hardworking culture in China mobilizes human 
resources at a very low cost and extracts productivity from them.  
4.3.3.2. Pragmatic Mindset  
Economic and social culture in China since the implementation of economic 
reform in the late 1970s has been inherently pragmatic in a sense that the country engages 
an experimental approach to economic development. Pragmatism as a school of 
philosophy centers on the role of experiment and experience in shaping ethic, value, 
belief, and knowledge (James, 1995). It advocates that those concepts could be best 
                                                 
37 Interviewee #52, #60, #61, #64, #70, #81, #82, #93.  
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viewed through their practical use; and in order to get a flavor of their practical use, one 
needs to go out and do things, to practice, to conduct experiments, and use those 
experiences to inform his or her worldview and belief system (James, 1995; Morgan, 
2007; Rescher, 1977). Pragmatism rejects ideology, theory, and even truth for their own 
intrinsic sake. Rather, it suggests that any of the above concepts would only be 
meaningful if it has a useful practical aspect. It resonates with Confucianism, which in 
part is a pedagogy that advocates for learning for the sake of serving the society.  
Modern Chinese history, especially since the economic reform in the late 1970s, 
started to see pragmatism’s influence on policymaking. The economic reform broke the 
ties with planned economy and adopted principles of market economy. It started in one 
pilot program and eventually rolled out to the whole nation, against strong ideological 
oppositions within the communist party. This action was inherently pragmatic because it 
proposed to let the results decide the legitimacy of the action, rather than leaving it to 
ideological criteria. This experiment-oriented policy approach can also be seen in China’s 
design of its greenhouse gas regulations. China created 5 pilot cities and 2 pilot provinces 
since 2011 to test different carbon emission trading schemes. The cap-and-trade systems 
implemented by different cities and provinces vary from how they treat price floor, price 
ceiling, credit banking and borrowing, industry coverage, etc. The idea is to explore 
different policy design and understand their merits and drawbacks. Information collected 
at the municipal and provincial level directly informed the final design of the national 
cap-and-trade system, which was announced in September 2015. Exhibit 2 in Appendix C 
gives a short history of Pragmatism in China.  
Driving mechanism 4.6: Pragmatism opened the doors for policy-related 
entrepreneurial experimentations in China, which changed the course of China’s 
economy.  
The point of referencing the pragmatic mindset is not to investigate the 
philosophical underpinning of contemporary Chinese economic culture, but to use it as a 
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lens through which we can interpret the observations made about the solar PV industry 
and explain how they affect the competitiveness of the industry.  
The pragmatic mindset is manifested at two levels in the solar PV industry in 
China. At the strategic level, the pragmatic mindset influences the direction of search. 
Almost all players in the industry are committed to the notion that one does not innovate 
just for the sake of innovation. Rather, there should be social and commercial missions 
guiding all the endeavors (The innovation chapter detailed this mindset). At the process 
level, the pragmatic mindset leads to knowledge development and diffusion as the 
Chinese accomplish the social and commercial missions largely by conducting 
experiments. The remaining part of this section will elaborate on both points.  
The social mission shared by many Chinese scientists and engineers is to make 
China self-sufficient in designing and producing all three generations of solar cells, 
instead of relying on foreign technologies and imported tooling and materials. The 
commercial mission is to capitalize on the technologies designed in labs by producing 
and selling them at a reasonably low cost. For a very long time, the goal of innovation in 
China had placed less emphasis on producing new or the best solar technologies (defined 
in cell efficiency terms), but on finding the right balance between technical advancement 
and commercializability. Players in the solar PV industry, from R&D, to material and 
tooling suppliers and eventually to cell and module manufacturers, all buy in to these 
pragmatic missions.  They work in concert to develop and produce solar PV products that 
have reasonable efficiencies and can be mass-produced at a low price.   
Empirical evidence from the past 15 years of solar deployment experience shows 
that the system cost is the number one determinant of market adoption. Even though 
economic theory suggests that products can differentiate from each other based on many 
other attributes such as quality, brand, etc. (Berry, 1994; P. Krugman, 1980), but none of 
them has been able to outweigh the significance of cost in determining PV technology 
adoption. (It is only since 2010 that market studies started to find a rising demand among 
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customers for quality and efficiency.) Given the situation, Chinese’s pragmatic mindset 
played a big role in determining which direction Chinese companies would go. Guided by 
the practical and yet basic concern for survival, the Chinese PV industry interprets this 
market phenomenon as to place issues such as highest solar cell efficiency as secondary 
concerns and focus on making lower cost products that can sell. Under such thinking, 
firms’ strategy became finding the sweet spot on the “efficiency-cost spectrum” that 
delivers decent products but with a low enough price. In other word, the pragmatic 
mindset influenced firms’ direction of search: instead of pursuing high efficiency (high 
road firm strategy), Chinese companies decided to compete for low cost (low road). 
History later shows that Chinese solar panels successfully tackled the biggest barrier in 
early-stage solar PV adoption – high hardware cost – and gained a huge global market 
share (market creation).  
Driving mechanism 4.7: The pragmatic mindset influenced the search for a 
business strategy and led Chinese companies to pursue a low-cost manufacturing 
strategy, which contributed to their dominance of the cost-sensitive mainstream 
market.  
One example given by Advanced Solar Power (ASP), a rising Chinese CdTe solar 
cell producer, highlights this point. When comparing itself to the world’s largest CdTe 
producer, the U.S. based First Solar, the chairman of the Chinese company pointed out 
that the entire production process at First Solar is conducted in clean rooms whereas only 
a number of steps are done in clean room in his Chinese factory. The rationale behind this 
so-called “selective sophistication” approach is that as sophisticated as it sounds, the 
marginal efficiency gain from producing solar cell in a 100% clean room environment is 
small yet the cost increment is relatively big. First Solar’s average cell efficiency is two-
percentage points higher than that of ASP, but the average cost is about 25% higher38. In 
the practical mindset of ASP, they would rather scarify the efficiency by a little bit in 
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order to keep the cost low. The selective sophistication approach gives ASP a boost in the 
efficiency-cost ratio, which they think is a “bigger bang for the buck”. A similar example 
has to do with the decision made by many tier 1 Chinese companies to mass-produce 
Passive Emissive Rear Contact cell, a.k.a. the PERC cell (detailed in the innovation 
chapter). PERC on average has a higher efficiency than conventional silicon-based solar 
cells, but its efficiency is lower than truly high-efficient solar cell such as IBC or HIT. 
But the costs to produce IBC and HIT are higher because they require completely 
different manufacturing processes from conventional silicon solar cell whereas PERC 
only requires a moderate modification of existing silicon cell production line. Therefore, 
PERC has a lower cost than IBC and HIT. Once again, because of the better efficiency-
cost ratio, most Chinese companies, with the exception of Trina, opted for making PERC 
as their high-end product. High cell efficiency is not the top priority of most Chinese PV 
manufacturers. Although they all intend to move up the value chain by providing higher 
efficient product, but the pragmatic attitude compels them to walk a fine line between 
efficiency and cost.  
On the process level, Chinese are good at doing experiments. The CTO of Trina, 
Pierre Verlinden, said it this way  
“Chinese are fierce experimenters.”  
According to him, the R&D personnel working for him do experiment at a speed 
that he has never seen. A Belgium native, Verlinden is a Stanford-trained world-
renowned solar PV scientist. He was the technology-brain of Sun Power, the largest 
American silicon solar cell producer, in its early years. His experience spreads throughout 
Europe, the United States and Australia. Yet he said that his R&D team at Trina conducts 
experiments at a speed that cannot be matched by western researchers.  This is partly 
because they are hardworking people, and partly because they believe in the value of 
experiments. It may sound unflattering, but the Chinese do experiments without much 
planning. They play it by ear; they do not wait until every detail of the research is sketch 
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out to conduct experiments. Instead, they do them in an exploratory and experimental 
way. “Cross the river by feeling the stones” is the Chinese idiom that describes such 
approach.  
Similar sentiment was expressed by the chairman of ASP, who himself had been a 
scientist at the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory for 20 years before returned 
to his native land to become an entrepreneur. Instead of being an observer of the 
experimental spirit demonstrated by the Chinese PV researchers, he is one practitioner of 
it. He insisted that all manufacturing equipment used in his factory need to be self-
designed and domestically manufactured because he wants to be able to conduct 
experiments with them quickly and easily39. More examples of conducting experiments 
with domestically produced equipment will be introduced in the supply chain chapter of 
this dissertation.  
Just like they do not innovate for the sake of innovation, the Chinese do not 
conduct experiments for the sake of the deed only. Experimentation is their methodology 
for discovery. It is low-key, and that is a feature rather than a bug. Low-key means that 
the barrier for participation is also low, which allows a greater number of people can 
participate rather than just the elite few (resource mobilization). It enables process 
innovations that are carried out by workers at the most grass root level of a production 
process, in addition to other more knowledge-demanding types of innovation. In fact, 
China is known for process innovation, which, despite its low-key nature, is proven to be 
a cost effective way to improve product quality and also lower the cost. This brings the 
logic to a full circle because pragmatic mindset at the strategic level in the solar PV 
industry also seeks to strike a balance between quality and cost. The goals at both the 
strategic and process level are compatible and congruent. As a result, they enable and 
legitimize each other.  
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Driving mechanism 4.8: Pragmatism encourages experiment-based 
knowledge development and diffusion with a broad participant base.  
Admittedly, the pragmatic approach has its limitations. One has to be very careful 
to not slip into interpreting pragmatic as “whatever works”. Yet, some players in the 
Chinese PV industries are certainly guilty of such interpretation. When pursuing lower 
production cost, some manufacturers cut corners by using cheaper and inferior materials. 
In keeping up the commercialization mission, researchers sometimes trade in-depth 
scientific investigations for short-term research that yield results faster. While Chinese 
R&D personnel are praised for their fast experiment speed, their experiments are often 
experience-based and lack of sound theoretical guidance. Last but not least, the pursuit of 
economic efficiency makes manufacturers and researchers become better and better at 
developing routines to make cookie-cutter products at the cost of diversity, novelty, and 
creativity. Issues with product quality, lack of innovation capacity, and cheap but non-
differentiable solar panel products all hurt the legitimacy of the industry.  
Blocking mechanism 4.1: Untruthful interpretation of pragmatism led to 
short-sighted research and business practices that harmed the reputation of the 
Chinese solar PV industry.  
The pragmatic mindset has allowed the PV industry in China to be flexible, cost-
sensitive, and innovative at the process level, which are all important abilities to have in 
order to compete in the marketplace. But pragmatism as practiced in China does not offer 
a long-term view for companies that look to transcend their business beyond competition 
at the price point.  
4.3.3.3. Desire to Reduce Cost  
Players in the Chinese Solar PV manufacturing sector have strong indigenous 
desire to continuously reduce cost. Their unabashed pursuit of product cost reduction 
through various means are outstanding. Coming from the country’s long low-cost 
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manufacturing culture, Chinese solar PV manufacturing sector inherited the cost 
imperative from a long list of industries that came before it. They built China’s bone fides 
as the world’s factory and the supplier of affordable products. Chinese take pride in their 
ability to produce goods cheaply. Today, Chinese PV manufacturers are pursuing low-
cost manufacturing harder than ever because China’s cost advantage over other countries 
is shrinking these days due to factors like rising labor cost, currency appreciation, and 
trade tariffs which drive Chinese manufacturers to look into other factors like innovation 
for future growth. Just like the vice president of a GCL Poly said in an interview  
“Cost reduction is baked in the manufacturing culture in China. This unabashed 
chase for lower cost throughout the entire supply chain is hardly seen anywhere else in 
the world.”40  
Indeed, the motivation to reduce cost permeates the entire Chinese solar PV 
supply chain and is wholehearted embraced by all the players. Solar cell and module 
producers naturally demand lower cost because they directly face market competition. 
Their demand translates inwardly into their own organizations and outwardly to their 
technology, tooling and material suppliers and influenced their direction of search.  
Within the production entities, managers build a company culture that places high 
priority on cost reduction. Taking a tour at any Tier 1 Chinese solar PV factory, visitors 
will see some version of “strive to achieve cost reduction” on a banner hanging at the 
most noticeable place in the workshop. Engineers, technicians and production line 
workers are all encouraged to contribute to the cost reduction quest through either low-
key process improvement or highbrow innovation. Often time, companies set up 
incentive programs to invite new ideas from their employees, and ideas that are proven to 
improve manufacturing performance improvement and reduce cost will be financially 
rewarded (Exhibit 1 in Appendix C).  
                                                 
40 Interviewee #57.  
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The desire to continuously lower the production cost does not only exist inside 
PV manufacturers; technology developers, tooling and material suppliers also share the 
drive to reduce cost. As noted in the innovation chapter, Chinese researchers in the solar 
cell realm are generally practical-minded in a sense that they care about the 
commercializability of their technologies as much as they care about technical merits. 
After talking with a large number of solar scientists in China, especially those who work 
on the first-general solar cell, it is noticed that very few of them agrees that they will 
trade low-cost and manufacturability for higher solar cell efficiency. The fact that almost 
all the leading solar cell scientists in China are collaborating with Chinese manufacturers 
on R&D projects suggests that their direction of search is influenced by companies, 
making them sensitive to cost and production feasibility. It, in turn, creates a concerted 
effort between technology developer and manufacturer to reduce cost.  
Finally, the desire to reduce cost receives a large buy-in from the supply chain. 
Indigenous to China’s manufacturing culture, suppliers are sensitive to cost too. In order 
to compete in the market, tooling and material suppliers need to prove their cost 
competitiveness, too. This is simply a market dynamic. In addition, there is an organized 
effort lead by big PV producers to engineer supply chain-wise cost reductions. In other 
word, large PV producers mobilize resources contained in the supply chain to achieve 
deeper cost reduction. Large leading Chinese PV manufacturers hold annual suppliers 
conventions. Among the many purposes of such conventions, communicate the PV 
manufacturer’s goals of near-term and their long-term cost reduction with its suppliers is 
one of them.  
According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s analysis of Tier 1 Chinese 
companies’ production cost, 65% of solar cell production cost is material related, the 
portion is higher for solar module production – 78%.  Manufacturing equipment cost 
accounts for another 20% and 5% for cell and module production, respectively, using the 
predominant depreciation rule used by Chinese companies (BNEF, 2014b). As a result, 
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material and tooling related costs for cell and module production take up 85% and 83% 
of the total production cost. It means that much of the final cost reduction has to come 
from the supply chain. The communication about cost between the buyer (Chinese PV 
manufactures) and the suppliers is one way to directly tap into the cost reduction potential 
in the supply chain. Buyers squeeze their suppliers, push them to deliver better product at 
a lower price. The large production capacity of the top tier Chinese companies, usually at 
the level of 2-3GW, means that they have a big bargaining power over their suppliers. 
The power dynamic puts the PV manufacturers in the position to initiate the supply 
chain-wise cost reduction effort, to motivate their suppliers, some times even pit them 
against each other, to achieve the final cost goal. On the suppliers’ side, their desire to 
stay competitive and retain the customers would motivate them to come up with ways to 
reach the cost reduction goals, usually through ways such as increase production 
productivity, using alternative cheaper materials, fundamentally redesign a higher 
performance, lower cost product, or even squeeze their own suppliers etc. In a way, the 
suppliers and PV manufacturers use some of the same mechanisms to reduce cost 
because they are all manufacturing companies at their core, despite of different scale.   
Generally speaking, the desire to reduce cost is strong in the PV manufacturing 
industry in China and all players at each step of the supply chain share this drive41. The 
long tradition of producing affordable goods gives Chinese PV manufacturers a mindset 
that motivates them to keep pursuing further cost reduction. There is no observable self-
consciousness among Chinese players in the industry. Instead, they are proud of their 
cost-oriented approach and credit large part of their success to it. They credit their large 
market share to their cost advantage (market creation).  
Driving mechanism 4.9: Chinese PV manufacturers’ desire for cost reduction 
mobilizes a concerted effort to do so throughout the entire supply chain and 
influenced their suppliers’ direction of search.  
                                                 
41 Interviews #47, #52, #58, #59, #65, #71, #73, #89, #96, #97, #98, #104 
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In the meantime, the Chinese are also surprisingly frank with the downside of 
their approach, i.e. lower cell/module efficiency, lower product quality. The heavy 
emphasis on low cost has taken away energy that could have been spent on research and 
development, quality control etc. Similar to the drawback related to the pragmatic 
mindset, problems stemmed from these areas hurt the reputation and the legitimacy of the 
industry. Evidence presented earlier in this chapter and in the innovation chapter show 
that measurers have been taken to address the issues. However, the pursuit for low-cost 
production is not going to change, as expressed by the deputy director of the 48th Institute 
“ It may sound paradoxical, but companies need to producer better products at lower 
costs in order to stay competitive in the market.” 42 
Blocking mechanism 4.2: Single-minded pursuit for low-cost led to problems 
with product quality and lack of real innovation which hurt the reputation of the 
industry.  
4.3.4. Resource Factors 
4.3.4.1. Skilled Labor with Low But Rapidly Rising Cost  
Historically, low labor cost had given China a huge cost advantage in 
manufacturing; it was the primary reason why multinational corporations moved to China 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Bureau of Labor Statistics at the U.S. Department of Labor 
reports that the average hourly compensation for manufacturing employees in China was 
only $0.74 in 2004 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015b), compared to $29.31 in the 
U.S. in the same year(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015a). Both numbers include 
basic wage and social benefits and insurance. The large population base in China created 
an abundant supply of labor, which is the main reason for the shockingly low wage in 
China. Even compared to its Asian peers, China’s wage in early 2000 was still an outlier. 
                                                 
42 Interviews #104 
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Taiwan’s average hourly compensation wage in 2002 was $7.28. Philippine was the 
closest to China, but it paid a higher amount at $1.1.  
The low wage had allowed Chinese manufacturers a huge cost competitiveness in 
industries like textile, apparel, and toy industry where labor intensity is high. Solar PV 
manufacturing has a mid-level labor intensity. It certainly benefited from the nation-wide 
low labor cost, although to a less extent relative to other labor-intensive industry. 
Furthermore, the increasing level of automation has decreased the labor requirement by 
PV producers by a significant amount. For a 30-35 MW solar cell production line, it used 
to take up to 120 people to operate. Today, a well-automated cell production line only 
requires about 30 people to keep it running. As a result, labor cost only accounts for 
about 10% of the final product cost43. As a result, even if labor cost remains low, it only 
affects a small portion of the production cost.  
However, all signs suggest that labor cost is rising in China. Just like China’s 
economy grew at double digits every year between 2004 and 2013, labor cost has been 
growing rapidly too.  By 2009, hourly compensation in the manufacturing sector grew to 
$1.74, a 235% jump from its 2004 level. Latest data show that the average annual wage 
tripled between 2004 and 2014 (China Labour Bulletin, 2015). The rising standard of 
living in China, policies that require and enforce minimum wages, and the lower supply 
of labor all contributed to the rising labor cost. Interviews with executives at large 
Chinese PV manufacturers revealed that China is no longer the lowest cost country 
mostly due to the rising labor cost44. Companies are looking at Southeast Asian countries 
like Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam as potential outsourcing destination for their lower 
labor cost.   
Interestingly, even if the labor cost is lower in certain Southeast Asian countries, 
companies with factories located in those countries still report a higher production cost. 
                                                 
43 Interviewee #8, #51, #54, #79, #96, #100 
44 Interviewee #57,  #63,  #67,  #96 
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Insights from company executives45 suggest that weak supply chain in countries other 
than China drives up the cost. In addition, productivity in those countries also suffers 
from unskilled labor.  
In fact, China’s labor related advantage is not limited to just low cost. Its large 
pool of well-trained skill labor also makes a difference. Scholars have long stressed the 
importance of skilled and educated labor to firms’ competitiveness (Susan 
Christopherson & Clark, 2007). In the example of the Chinese solar PV industry, 
production line workers at tier 1 Chinese PV producers usually are high school graduates; 
a large portion of them graduate from vocational schools where they were trained with 
manufacturing skills. Engineers and technicians often have college degrees and 
understand basic mechanical designs of the machines. Besides education level, 
experience also matters when it comes to evaluating the quality labor force. As described 
above, large Chinese PV manufacturers concentrated in manufacturing hub regions with 
long industrial tradition, where the labor pool is not only large, but also skilled, 
experienced, and multi-talented. Their knowledge diffuses from one manufacturing sector 
to another (knowledge development and diffusion). The workers recruited by PV 
companies are often not green hands. Instead, they are likely to be veteran workers with 
years of experience in a related industry. They had already received training and 
accumulated experience with operating machinery and performing tasks on production 
line by the time they came on board. They are a key part in building China’s 
manufacturing advantage.  
4.3.4.2. Ready Infrastructure  
Infrastructure in China has come a long way since the beginning of its open door 
policy in the late 1970s. China today has an impressive portfolio of infrastructure, 
including the world’s largest high-speed railway system and expressway system, a 
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rapidly growing aviation network, and an expansive electric grid featured high voltage 
and ultra-high voltage transmission line.  
China’s has the world’s largest railway system and the world’s largest high-speed 
railway system. The latter spread over 11,250 miles (18,000 km) by the end of November 
2015. A similar length is currently under construction or in planning (Securties Daily, 
2015). High-speed trains travel at a minimum 124 miles/hour (200km/h). An 824 miles 
(1318km) high-speed train ride from Beijing to Shanghai, China’s largest two cities, 
takes less than 5 hours. The system transported an average of 2.49 million riders per day 
in 2014, and has 3.16 billion riders since its initial operation in 2007 (Securties Daily, 
2015). Some of the passenger high-speed railways also transport freight. In addition, 
there is another 2,760 miles (4,000 km) of high-speed rail just for freight. This network of 
high-speed trains connects all but two Chinese mainland provincial-level jurisdictions.  
Even more expansive is China’s expressway system. It is estimated that the 
Chinese expressway system surpassed the U.S. Interstate Highway System in 2011 to 
become the world’s largest highway network by length. As of 2014, the total length stood 
at 69,560 miles (111,950 km) (Ministry of Transportation of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2014).  
China has also been building a large number of airports. There were 182 
commercial airports in China at the end of 2012, the 12th FYP called for adding another 
82 airports between 2011 and 2015 (China Daily, 2012). The medium term planning 
foresees a future with 244 airports by 2020.  
Both theory and empirical evidence suggests that transportation infrastructure is a 
necessary factor for economic development. Public investment in infrastructure is more 
efficient than private investment and it boosts the private sector productivity both within 
and beyond the region where the investment was directly made (Cohen and Paul 2004). 
The logic is simple and easy: modern production networks, may they be regional or 
global, require an interconnected web through which goods and services can be produced, 
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distributed, and consumed ( Coe, Dicken, and Hess 2008; Coe et al. 2004; Lazzarini, 
Chaddad, and Cook 2001). Manufacturing industries require goods to be physically 
passed around. A well-developed transportation infrastructure allows producers and 
suppliers to connect with each other at a low transaction cost. The convenience of 
material transportation can also expand the manufacturers’ sourcing scope (where they 
buy inputs from) and their reach to end markets.  
Even for the Chinese solar PV manufacturing industry where the supply chain is 
more clustered and compact compare to many other counties, good transportation 
infrastructure can still allow them to manage their inventor in a timely and dynamic 
fashion. As a result, PV manufacturers do not have to carry heavy inventory; instead, 
with easy and low cost transportation, they can order supplies with short lead-time. 
Smaller on-site inventory stock improves PV manufacturers’ cash flow, which means 
they can spend less of their short-term cash spending on stocking input materials. This 
improves companies’ financial flow and allows them to be agile and lean in their 
production. Most emerging Southeast Asian countries suffer from their less developed 
transportation infrastructure. Even though they have a labor cost advantage, it is offset by 
the logistic-related limitation.  
Besides transportation infrastructure, China also has a massive electric power 
sector and an increasingly modern electric grid. The electric power system in China is the 
world’s largest; it has 1505 GW of generating capacity which generated 5583TWh of 
electricity in 2014 (CIA, 2015). Providing electricity access has long been seen as a 
priority by the communist government. In Mao’s era, electricity provision was seen as a 
quasi public good that should be provided by government. Since the economic reform in 
the late 1970s, electricity access was seen not only as a social mission, but also a 
necessity for economic development. Regardless of the rationale, multiple government 
led campaigns expanded electricity grid to rural counties and townships. As a result, 
despite its large population, China has a high level of electricity access. World Bank 
 173 
reports that electricity access in China was 94.3% in 1990. The number rose to 99.7% in 
2010. By 2011, 100% of Chines population had electricity access (World Bank, 2015).  
The relentless effort to provide electricity service builds a foundation for China’s 
economic development. Today, even as companies look to Southeast Asian countries for 
the next place to manufacture goods, they all acknowledge that the lack of reliable access 
to electricity in those countries is a big concern of them (Patel, 2014). 1 out of 10 people 
without electricity access lives in Southeast Asia. Even in regions with electricity access, 
the quality of the electricity and reliability of the grid is a big concern. In an interview 
with a tier 1 Chinese company that has a Southeast Asian factory, its vice president told 
the story about their Southeast Asian factory having to downsize their production because 
it demands high electric voltage and stable frequency that the grid of their Southeast Asia 
host country was unable to provide46.  
Besides access to grid and grid quality, the grid connection for new 
manufacturing plants is relatively easy and swift in manufacturing regions in China. Land 
in China is public-owned and therefore, when it comes to extend transmission 
infrastructure to new areas, there is almost no property right issue to be battled out, unlike 
in countries such as the U.S. where private property owners have veto power in 
approving new transmission projects and often engage in long bargaining and 
negotiations process with transmission authorities.  
In summary, the solar PV manufacturers in China do have an electricity-related 
advantage, but it is not the low cost, as conventional wisdom usually portrays. The 
conventional wisdom may be true for the residential sector, which is heavily subsidized 
by the government for social reason, but for the industrial and commercial sector, the 
average electricity rate is higher in China than, for example, in the U.S. Table 4.6 
compares a list of key production factors between leading Chinese and American solar 
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panel production firms. On average, Chinese Tier 1 companies pay higher electricity rate, 
and the difference is statistically significant.  
Table 4.6 A List of Key Production Factors, 
A Comparison Between Tier 1 Chinese and American Firms 
 
 U.S. Average China Average T-Test^ 
Production Cost ($/W) 3.14 2.79 No 
Electricity Rate ($/kWh) 0.08 0.09 ** 
Average Interest Rate (%) 2.98 3.88 ** 
Effective Tax Rate (%) 12.85 8.02 No 
Module Capacity (MW) 613 1090 ** 
Module Production (MW) 170 218 ** 
R&D Spending (%) 3.16 1.52 ** 
 
^Note:   
** Indicates the difference is statistically significant at 0.05 level 
No indicates the difference is not statistically significant  
Data source: Bloomberg Solar Industry Database  
 
The real electricity-related advantage in China is the electric infrastructure that 
provides not only access to the quintessential production input, but also with reliable grid 
and good electricity quality. These features ensure the productivity of the PV 
manufacturing plants. Finally, the fact that grid connection is made easy and fast also 
makes continuous manufacturing capacity expansion possible.  
Both low-cost skilled labor and ready infrastructure are not advantages unique to 
the PV industry in China. They are shared across all the sectors. The most significant way 
they contribute to the development of the solar PV industry is that they enable the 
development of positive externalities that allow other parts of the system to function at a 
more efficient and productive way.  
4.3.4.3. Easy Access to Capital (Historically)  
Conventional wisdom often dismisses the cost and difficulties to obtain capital in 
China, thinking that loans and investment are at debtor’s disposal. However, the fact is 
that capital is not inexpensive. Rather, the interest rate charged in China is even higher 
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than it is in the U.S., as shown in Table 4.6. The bond buying program and the 
quantitative easing approach used by the United Sates Federal Reserve Bank have kept 
the interest rate in the U.S. extremely low since the 2008 global financial crisis. It 
dramatically lowers the interest rate for American firms to take on loans for PV 
manufacturing firms. However, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), a.k.a. China’s 
central bank, has kept the benchmark lending rate at no lower than 5.1% in the post 
financial crisis era, which results in higher costs to access capital in China.  Table 4.7 
shows the history of benchmark lending rate adjustment in China since the 2008 global 
financial crisis. The rate was as high as 7.41% right before the crisis. It dipped to 5.31% 
by October 2010 in an attempt to stimulate the economy by the PBOC. It rose back to 
6.31% by July 2012 but fell again since then as the Chinese economy entered a medium 
growth rate period. Regardless of the downward adjustments, the cost to borrow money 
in China today remains high. Just for comparison, during the same time period, interest 
rate in the U.S. was kept at 0%.  
 
Table 4.7 Benchmark Lending Rate Adjustments in China 
Since 2008 Financial Crisis 
 
Date of Adjustment Before Adjustment After Adjustment 
May 2015 5.35% 5.10% 
March 2015 5.60% 5.35% 
November 2014 6.00% 5.60% 
July 2012 6.31% 6.00% 
June 2012 6.56% 6.31% 
July 2011 6.31% 6.56% 
April 2011 6.06% 6.31% 
February 2011 5.81% 6.06% 
December 2010 5.56% 5.81% 
October 2010 5.31% 5.56% 
December 2008 5.58% 5.31% 
November 2008 6.66% 5.58% 
October 2008 7.20% 6.66% 
September 2008  7.41% 7.20% 
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It is a myth that money is cheap to obtain in China, but Chinese companies do 
benefit from uninterrupted capital flow while the capital markets in Europe and the U.S. 
were largely frozen in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis.  
Bayaliyev et. al. found that the amount of loans provided to Chinese PV 
manufactures in 2010 and the first half of 2011 could be as high as $40 billion. 
(Bayaliyev, Kalloz, & Robinson, 2011)  Former Secretary of Energy Steven Chu had said 
in a Congress testimony that China Development Bank alone provided $34 billion to PV 
manufacturers within eighteen months in 2010 and 2011. His testimony highlighted a key 
financial player in the development of the Chinese PV industry, China Development 
Bank (CDB). Owned solely by Chinese central government, CDB is a “policy bank”. Its 
primary role is to facilitate the nation’s economic development according to government 
policies. As the economic development arm of Chinese government, CDB has financed 
thousands of projects involving infrastructure, energy, strategic industry, and etc. The PV 
manufacturing industry falls under the categorical of emerging industries, and had 
received large amount of loans form CDB.  
Compared to venture capitals and investment banks in the west, which make their 
decision based on market risk and returns, CDB makes its lending decisions only partially 
based on market-oriented criteria. To a large extent, CDB’s lending decisions were 
heavily influenced by the economic plans and policies the central government issues. 
This reflects the unique reality of Chinese economy. While the economy is going through 
a transition from a central-planned economy to a market-based economy, both types of 
economy have their influences on CDB’s business model. On the one hand, it functions 
like a private investment bank that lends money and expects returns on its capital.  On the 
other hand, it carries out national economic development plans by shouldering the 
investment risks with the private players and being the first one to lend to emerging 
industries.  
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The biggest contribution of players like CDB is that they enable the financial 
liquidity, or in TIS framework language, they facilitate financial resource mobilization.  
Chinese PV manufacturers were able to assess capital relatively easily, especially during 
the time where creditors in the West were reluctant to lend debt seekers, including 
European and American PV manufacturers, during the global financial crisis. The ability 
to access capital allowed Chinese manufacturers to expand their production capacity and 
to take advantage of the renewable-energy-friendly stimulus package in the world’s 
major economies (market creation). For example, evidence collected by the Stanford 
China Solar Project show that CDB offered substantial corporate debt between 2009 and 
2011. In its peak year, CDB issued a $30.41 billion credit facilities to five leading 
Chinese PV manufacturers, JA Solar, LDK, Suntech, Trina, Yingli, in 2010. Between 
2005 and 2013, CDB dominated in the provision of corporate debt, extending $31.35 
billion in credit facilities to Chinese PV manufacturers, which accounts for 93% of the 
total (Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance, 2016). But again, the cost of 
CDB’s capital is not cheap. Available company financial documents compiled by 
Bloomberg Industry SOLAR (Bloomberg Finance L.P., 2014a) and interview with a 
CDB official47 all confirm that CDB loans were charged market interest rates, which 
includes a base rate around 6% (slightly higher than the then benchmark lending rate set 
by PBOC) and a market prime rate, which is decided on a case by case basis according to 
companies’ bankability, plus fees. It can be argued that the advantage of having policy 
banks like CDB is that Chinese PV manufacturers did not have the same difficulties as 
their Western competitors do in terms of proving their bankability in order to access debt. 
However, for the money they borrow, they pay a good amount of interest rates.  
In addition to CDB, other national commercial banks such as the Export-Import 
Bank of China and Bank of Communication, and local banks in Jiangsu, Hebei, and 
Zhejiang Province have also financed the PV manufacturing industry.  
                                                 
47 Interviewee #60 
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Driving mechanism 4.10: Easy access to capital in China allowed Chinese PV 
industry to gain financial resources to sustain its growth at a time companies outside 
of China struggled with access to capital.  
It is fair to say that historically, easy access to capital allowed then existing 
Chinese PV manufacturers to quickly expand their production capacity and fostered the 
creation of many new PV production companies. However, because the lending was 
driven by both market demand and national policies, arguably, acts like the CDB loans in 
2010 had contributed to an environment where credits were too easy to get. Policy-driven 
lending made financial prudence, which is supposed to be the key criterion in a lending 
decision, take a backseat. It led to capital flow into building new factories that was based 
on self-reinforcing hypes rather than on prudent market analysis. This rapid expansion of 
capacity eventually resulted in the accumulation of large amount of excess capacity, an 
overflow of low-quality, low-efficiency solar PVs, and the trade dispute with E.U. and 
U.S.  
Blocking mechanism 4.3: Easy access to capital in China scarified financial 
prudence and led to the building of financially unsound projects that sow the seeds 
for the later industry crisis.  
Since 2012, policy banks and commercial banks have dialed back their lending to 
the PV manufacturing sector, partly due to problems with excess capacity and partly 
because of the free-market-oriented financial sector reform in China, Chinese PV 
producing companies no longer enjoyed the easy access to capital. Instead, they are now 
on their own to secure finances. Interviews with a number of CFOs of leading Chinese 
PV manufacturers48 all suggest that as CDB’s intervention drew down, so did the 
magnitude of corporate debt that the companies are able to get. It reflects the new reality 
in the PV manufacturing sector in China, which is access to the debt market is becoming 
more and more difficult because the profit margin of solar cell and PV manufacturing is 
                                                 
48 Interviewee # 54, # 79, # 96, # 100 
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very thin due to the fast dropping solar panel price. Although companies compensate the 
lack of corporate debt availability with other financial sources such as the stock market 
and private equity, the truth of the matter is that even though Chinese companies 
historically had an advantage in access capital, the changes in market place and policy 
direction have largely removed the advantage.  
4.3.5. Policy Factors 
4.3.5.1. A National Vision and Industrialization Strategy 
The Chinese solar PV manufacturing sector benefited from the national vision and 
an industrialization strategy for the industry. The vision and the strategy created 
legitimacy for the industry, mobilized resources, and influenced the direction of search 
of industrialists, and invited entrepreneurial experimentations. Scholars have theorized 
and empirically proved that national visions and strategies are important and beneficial to 
a nation’s manufacturing industry (Bryson, Clark, & Vanchan, 2015; Clark & Clavel, 
2012; Clark, 2012; Mitchell, 2010). 
In 2000, the solar industry appeared for the first time in the nation’s 10th Five 
Year Development Plan, the single most important economic development of the country. 
Although there could be multiple ways to approach the solar industry, i.e. to approach it 
as an alternative energy industry or as a technology innovation subject, the Chinese 
government treated it as a manufacturing industry with both domestic and international 
market potentials. From a strategic perspective, the 10th FYP set the tune of 
industrializing the manufacturing of renewable energy technologies, including solar PV. 
The fundamental principle promulgated by the plan was “industrial development through 
creating economies of scale”. It emphasized the scaling up of solar cell and panel 
production and the development a robust PV supply chain to create agglomeration 
economies. It sets specific panel manufacturing and supply chain development goals by 
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calling for a 15 MW annual solar cell manufacturing capacity and a fully-developed PV 
module supply chain by the end of 2005. These clear policy signals set a trajectory for 
everybody who wanted a piece of the solar PV pie to follow. In fact, they mobilized a 
diverse group of entrepreneurs and industrialists to take part in the industry (resource 
mobilization). Seeing the market opportunity created by the national vision oversea-
trained Ph.D such as Suntech’s former CEO Shi Zhengrong, local entrepreneur like 
Yingli’s CEO, Miao Liansheng, and self-made industrialists like Trina’s CEO Gao Jifan 
all entered the market with their respective specialties. Furthermore, their companies all 
followed the industrialization strategy, i.e. economies of scale, while building their PV 
manufacturing business.  The national vision and industrialization strategy’s significantly 
influenced their direction of search, and arguably owed its early stage success to the 
vision and strategies laid out in the FYP.  
Economies of scale production and supply chain development continued to be the 
emphasis in the 11th FYP (2006-2010), albeit innovation and solar deployment started to 
gain momentum during that period too. During this period, the solar PV manufacturing 
industry has achieved its legitimacy not only as an industry while it became a poster child 
of China’s export-oriented economy. It did not only gained global market dominance, but 
more importantly did so with its own brands like Suntech, Trina, Yingli, etc.  
In the 12th FYP (2011-2015), acknowledging the industry’s reliance on import for 
key tooling and material inputs as well as the low value-added products it produce, the 
strategic focus of the industry planning shifted from creating economies of scale to 
integrating solar supply chain development with innovation, aiming to achieve higher 
level of supply chain self-sufficiency and produce higher-efficient solar panels. The new 
strategy once again influenced the direction of search. As detailed in the innovation 
chapter, more financial and human resources were devoted to solar cell R&D. The next 
chapter will discuss how domestic players increased the level of manufacturing 
equipment self-sufficiency through R&D. The take home message is that the evolution of 
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the industry did not happen purely organically. Rather, policy and strategizing played a 
big role in mobilizing innovation, manufacturing and financial resources to tackle the 
industrialization goals outlined in the FYP.  
When the industry was hit by restrictive trade measures coming from Europe and 
the U.S., a suite of industrial standards were issued by the Chinese Ministry of Industry 
and Informational Technology (MOIIT) to set the minimum requirements to further 
strengthen the innovation and manufacturing capacity, and increase the product quality of 
domestic companies. The result of the industry standards was that large self-sustainable 
firms solidified their positions while small and financially vulnerable companies were 
either acquired by large firms or existed the market competition.  
A body of literature argues that the biggest difference between China and western 
economies, represented by the U.S., in terms of how industries are run is that the former 
has a set of industrial policies while the latter shuns away from it (Dobbin, 1994; C 
Freeman, 1987a; Christopher Freeman, 1989; Prestowitz, 1988). This dissertation argues 
that both countries have industrial policies in one form or another. Corporate tax breaks, 
investment tax credits, and business development grants existed in the U.S. are in essence 
industrial policies. It is just that for political reasons the phrase industrial policy is 
avoided. The quintessential difference between industrial development in China and the 
U.S. does not lie in the use of industrial policy, but rather in whether one uses national 
vision and strategies to legitimize a technology by making a commitment to its 
development.  
To support an industry is to make a technology choice for the future. The decision 
made by the Chinese government to promote renewable energy industries decided that 
renewable technologies would play a bigger role in the country’s energy mix. The battle 
over solar in many U.S. states are not simply a disagreement about the merits of the 
technologies. In fact, opponents of solar are well aware of the technology’s merits and its 
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potential to erode fossil future energy’s future market share. To fight against solar is the 
incumbent players’ attempt to ensure they stay relevant in the future.  
In absence of a national vision and industrialization strategy, technologies would 
have to fight it out. Neo-classic economics theory predicts that in an ideal free market, 
new technologies with real value will prove themselves eventually and replace the 
incumbents. However, it failed to acknowledge that industrial development is risky, 
unpredictable, longwinded, and requires a lot of serious efforts, rather than costless, 
spontaneous as neo-classic economics theorists assume (Bergek et al., 2008; Clark, 2013; 
Sanjaya Lall, 2004; Mitchell, 2010; R R Nelson & Winter, 2009; Rodrik, 2004). Plus, the 
ideal conditions descripted by theory never exist. Markets in real world are full of 
distortions that favor incumbent players. Therefore, an organic growth of a new industry 
will have to break a lot of barriers. Odds often stack against them.  
The Chinese solar PV industry has benefited from the national vision and 
strategies that the central government laid out. The national vision created policy 
certainty; the economies of scale production and supply chain development strategies set 
the industry in a fast lane for development from the very beginning and enabled them to 
develop strength to seize the market opportunities in E.U. and the U.S. Later, the strategic 
shift from economies of scale to innovation along the entire value chain after 2013 meant 
to facilitate the industry restructuring in the aftermath of trade conflicts. The vision and 
strategies implemented at the national level create a concerted, rather than fragmented, 
effort to facilitate the development of the industry.   
Driving mechanism 4.11: China’s national vision and industrialization 
strategy for solar PV lent the initial legitimacy to the industry. The perceived 
legitimacy mobilized entrepreneurs and industrialists to enter the market. The 
expectations brought forward by the national vision and strategy also influenced the 
players’ direction of search in order to realize the expectation.  
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4.3.5.2. Government Subsidies and Incentives  
4.3.5.2.1.     Facts and Anecdotes of Government Subsidies and Incentives  
When it comes to unpacking the manufacturing advantages in China, government 
subsidies and incentives are controversial areas. Granted, government subsidies are one 
way to lower the cost of production besides other public benefits that they provide such 
as improving labor skills, infrastructure readiness and capital accessibility (Lall 2004). 
Subsidies for the industrial sector, along with trade policies, are frequently labeled as 
sub-categories of industrial policy.  However, they are often seen by neoliberals as 
interventional, inefficient and protective (Noland & Pack, 2003; World Bank, 1993). 
Proponents of industrial policy have argued that from both empirical and theoretical 
perspective, there can be a healthy role for the government beyond what neo-classical 
economic theory is willing to prescribe. From a historical perspective, Wade, in his book 
Governing the Market (Wade, 2003) argued that, 
“The remarkable thing about the core Washington Consensus package is the gulf 
between the confidence with which it is promulgated and the strength of supporting 
evidence, historical or contemporary. There is virtually no good evidence that the 
creation of efficient, rent-free markets coupled with efficient, corruption-free public 
sectors is even close to being a necessary or sufficient condition for a dynamic capitalist 
economy. Almost all now-developed countries went through stages of industrial assistant 
policy before the capabilities of their firms reach the point where a policy or (more or 
less) free trade was declared to be in the national interest.” 
There are many types of subsidies in use in China, among those the following five 
types are commonly used by MOIIT and National Development and Reform Committee 
(NDRC) to support the solar PV industry: investment subsidies/grants, tax incentives, 
inputs subsidies, preferential lending, and infrastructure and social welfare contributions 
(Bayaliyev et al., 2011; Deutch & Steinfeld, 2013b; Sun, 2013).  
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The following section provides a summary of solar PV-related government 
subsidies and incentives, and an analysis of how they affect the PV manufacturers in 
China. It needs to acknowledge that because of the trade conflicts with E.U. and U.S. 
over government subsidies, it is sensitive to discuss them with government officials and 
company executives in China. Collecting comprehensive data on them is even harder due 
to information restrictions. What is presented here is an incomplete list of solar PV 
related subsidy and incentive programs based on the two countervailing duty 
investigations conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) against Chinese 
PV manufacturing industry from 2012 to 2014 (U.S. Department of Commerce 
International Trade Administration, 2012b, 2014b) and anecdotal information collected 
from semi-structured interviews in China conducted by the author and her colleagues 
from the Stanford China Solar Project team. They meant to provide a peek into the nature 
and forms of the industrial policies in China. Table C.1 and Table C.2 in Appendix C 
provide information on findings from the US DOC investigation and anecdotal examples, 
respectively. Information collection and table compilation were conducted as part of the 
Stanford China Solar Project.  
Investment subsidies/Grants 
Similar to the Investment Tax Credits (ITC) in the U.S., investment subsidies 
mainly takes place in the deployment sector, but because large Chinese PV manufacturers 
all have a sizeable deployment division in operation, deployment subsidies such as the 
Golden Sun program, Thousand Roof program, and Feed-in Tariffs can also be leveraged 
by PV manufacturers to diversify their revenue flow. Next section will discuss the role of 
these solar PV deployment-oriented programs in detail.  
There are also grants given to companies. These are cost-free capital hangouts 
from provincial and local governments to companies, often earmarked for particular 
purposes such as R&D, overseas expansion or marketing. Table C.1 in Appendix C 
includes more details.  
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Tax incentive 
Tax incentives given to Chinese PV manufacturers usually take on three forms: 
refund of value added tax (VAT), refund of corporate income tax, or both. Under the 
Renewable Energy Law, qualified PV manufacturers can apply for exemptions of half of 
their VAT. Corporate income tax can also be fully exempted in the first three years of the 
plant operation, and then be halved for the next three years. Many local governments also 
offer incentive packages that exempt the VAT and corporate income tax by certain 
amount over a period of time (Grau et al., 2012). See Table C.1 in Appendix C for more 
details. 
Input subsidies 
In principle, NDRC allows preferential land contracts for industries that are 
promoted in the FYPs. Specific contract terms vary by projects. By some account, the 
rent for a manufacturing plant can be as low as $150 to $250 (¥900 to ¥1500) per 
thousand square meters49. On top of what is sanctioned by the central government, local 
governments often allow large manufacturing companies to rent or purchase land with a 
deeper discounted. Interview with City of Wuxi government shows that it provided 
favorable land lease terms to the Suntech50. The countervailing investigation conducted 
by the U.S. DOC confirmed the finding (U.S. Department of Commerce International 
Trade Administration, 2012b, 2014b), and listed City of Changzhou and City of Xinyu as 
providing subsidized land to Trina and LDK solar, the finding of which was also 
confirmed by interviews with local officials conducted by this study 51.  
Besides subsidized land, there are also documented incidents of input subsidies on 
polysilicon and aluminum. See Table C.1 in Appendix C details. 
Preferential lending 
                                                 
49 Land subsidies http://baike.baidu.com/view/7114578.htm  
50 Interviewee #92 
51 Interviewee #81, #82, #91, #92 
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As discussed earlier, the capital advantage that Chinese PV companies had was 
not mainly in terms of low interests rate but the low hurdle to access capital at a time 
when other world major economies experienced a contraction in capital provision. U.S. 
DOC’s investigation mostly supported this argument. None of the loans that companies 
received from CDB were called out in the investigation, affirming their legality. 
However, the other policy bank, the Export-Import Bank of China was found to provide 
low interest loans to Chinese companies for the purpose of promoting exports.  
Infrastructure and social welfare contribution 
Local governments in China often facilitate the infrastructure development for 
their industrial constituencies and subsidize some companies by chipping in to 
companies’ social welfare plans. The latter could be understood as a form of labor cost 
subsidization. As a socialist society, China relies on governments at all levels to play an 
important role in building the social safety net, including health care, pension, schools, 
etc. Besides legal requirements, local governments sometimes use additional social 
welfare contributions to industrial parks and/or companies in their jurisdictions as an 
incentive for economic development. For example, Wuxi municipal government officials 
told story about the government used to pay for part of the social security and pension 
fund of a star solar company in Wuxi52. It indirectly lowered the company’s labor cost. In 
other cases, the welfare subsidies are used to attract and mobilize human resources. For 
example, still in Wuxi, world’s leading PV scientists and entrepreneurs who chose to 
work in the city were rewarded with a free car, an apartment and a lab or subsidized 
factory infrastructures53.  
Local governments also subsidize infrastructure such as public transit systems 
linking the industrial parks and residential areas of the town, standardized ready-to-move-
in factory space in industrial parks, or even schools for industrial park employees. One 
                                                 
52 Interviewee #90, #91, #92 
53 Interviewee #91 
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interesting example is the international school in Trina Solar Industrial Park in City of 
Changzhou in Jiangsu Province. Trina is the world’s largest solar PV producer. It 
continues to expand its global footprint and benefits from having a global workforce. Its 
research and development strength has grown significantly after recruiting a renowned 
Belgian PV scientist as its CTO. However, during it international recruiting process, 
Trina noticed that one of the biggest concern for their foreign employees was their 
children’s education. To ease the concern, Trina built an international school right in the 
heart of the industrial park with financial and administrative assistant from Changzhou 
municipal government. The school does not directly affect the production cost at Trina in 
any positive or negative way, but it increases the company’s attractiveness among 
potential foreign recuritees and allows the company to build a better workforce, which 
contributes to their long-term competitiveness.   
4.3.5.2.2.     Impacts and Consequences of Government Subsidies 
There are a lot more examples of government subsidies and incentives given to 
the solar PV industry, especially and manufacturing sector, in the 2000s. However, the 
generous government supports have caused controversies and led to countervailing 
claims coming from E.U. and the U.S. Nowadays, subsidies and incentive programs 
targeted the PV industry have shifted from the manufacturing sector to the deployment 
sector. The reasons for this shift are two-fold.  
First, the maturation of the manufacturing sector allows companies to be 
financially more self-sustainable. Second, the Chinese industries and the industrial 
policy-making body in the government learned a lesson from the first decade of the 21st 
century that subsidizing and incentivizing the industry development is not without 
consequence, especially when the decisions to subsidize and incentive were not made in a 
rational way.  
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The institutional underpinning that caused the turmoil in the PV manufacturing 
sector between 2012 and 2014 was the single-minded pursuit of economic growth. 
Maintaining a fast growing economy has become the commanding height of Chinese 
governments at all levels. The flawed government official promotion system in China 
places an overwhelming weight on officials’ economic development performance. As a 
result, local government officials pay a disproportionally large amount of attention to 
GDP growth and job creation numbers in his or her tenure, at the cost of almost 
everything else. Since solar PV manufacturing sector is a perfect candidate for economic 
development, considering the GDP, jobs and trade surplus it generates, many local 
governments chase after the solar PV industry. They would do all they can to first attract 
PV manufacturing firms to locate in their jurisdictions and then ensure the continuous 
operation of the factories during their tenures.  
Two problems follow such logic. First, the officials have no incentives to 
safeguard the common sense market entrance screening procedures, especially when 
there were no well-written rules about it. They become addictive to creating short-term 
economic growth and captive to companies that can fulfill that prospect. Second, when 
companies that received government supports ran into trouble during the industry 
downturn, local officials had a hard time letting them go because if the factories shut 
show, GDP growth and job creation would slow down too, which would directly affect 
their career advancement. The skewed incentive structure created an inherent tension 
between the central and local governments. When the industry was in a good shape, the 
incentives were aligned between the central and local governments: they all wanted the 
industry to flourish. However, when the industry ran into trouble, there was a divergence 
in reactions from the two sides. Local governments were attached to the particular firms 
located in their jurisdictions; they wanted to protect them from going out of business. In 
contrast, the central government’s goal was to ensure the survival of the whole industry, 
not necessarily particular companies.  
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Nevertheless, with local GDP and their own career advancement on the line, local 
officials in many cases were unwilling to follow the central government’s guidance to 
restructure the industry. This inherent tension between the two levels of governments 
created a vicious circle. On the one hand, the central government issued new industry 
standards, tightened its policy and financial supports for existing firms, and drafted 
regulations to raise the bar for new market entrance. The changing policy and financial 
environment made it harder for the troubled PV firms with low qualifications to make 
any move. Some were even forced to exit the market. However, on the other hand, local 
governments often bypassed the central government’s guidance and continued pledging 
policy and financial supports to troubled PV firms. Unfortunately, their attempts were 
proven futile given the more powerful macro policy landscape to restructure the industry. 
Much of the local governments’ effort to inject financial resources into bailing the falling 
solar PV firms turned out to be a waste of money.   
Nonetheless, the trade wars with the E.U. and U.S. over subsidies and the punitive 
measures imposed on Chinese panels did ring an alarm to Chinese policymakers. They 
are becoming more and more prudent in using subsidies and incentives in not only the PV 
manufacturing industry but also the manufacturing sector as a whole. Overall, 
government subsidies and incentives certainly mobilized resources for the solar PV 
industry in China, but the repercussions from them were also damaging to the industry.  
Blocking mechanism 4.4: Local governments’ entrenched ties with the PV 
manufacturing sector led to irrational economic decision-making in the utilization of 
subsidies and incentives, which subjected the industry to excess capacity issue and 
trade frictions.  
4.3.5.3. PV Deployment Policies 
The solar PV manufacturing sector and the deployment sector are closely linked. 
The former make the products that the latter use to generate emission-free renewable 
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electricity. The whole premise for treating the PV manufacturing sector as a sector of the 
future is not because of the inherent virtue of the PV manufacturing processes but 
because of the clean electricity generated from the PV panels holds the promise to solve 
some of the most pressing environmental issues face by mankind.  In other words, solar 
PV manufacturing is not an end but a means to a new energy future.  
The PV manufacturing sector and the deployment sector are mutually dependent. 
The latter relies on the former to provide solar panels; and the former depends on the later 
to sell their products. In fact, deployment policies are crucial in creating market demand 
for the manufacturing sector (market creation). If use wisely, it can create a “demand-
pull and supply-push” virtuous cycle (Brown, Chandler, Lapsa, & Sovacool, 2007). 
Not only PV manufacturing and deployment sector are intertwined, they also 
transcend national boarders. In today’s globalized world, PV manufacturing and 
deployment are global games where manufacturers can choose to sell their products to 
either domestic or overseas customers, and consumers have the freedom to select from a 
variety of domestic and international brands.  
The Chinese PV manufacturing industry is the beneficiary of this global PV 
market. The boom in global PV deployment started in Germany in the early 2000s with 
the first of its kind feed-in tariff (FIT) program, followed by similar programs in other 
European countries like Spain, Italy and France. FIT is a deployment incentive that offers 
a guaranteed buyback price to solar electricity generator for a long period of time (15-25 
years). It provides price and market certainty to solar adopters in order to incentivize 
deployment. The renewable portfolio standards (RPS) implemented in a number of U.S. 
states also expanded the market for solar PV (Marilyn A. Brown, Gumerman, Sun, Sercy, 
& Kim, 2012). RPS requires a certain percentage of electricity generation coming from 
renewable sources. States like California, New Jersey, North Carolina, etc. also include a 
solar carve-out that mandates a minimum level of solar adoption within RPS. Demands 
for solar panels created by these deployment policies were largely met by cheaper 
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products from China. 60% of the solar panels sold in 2012 were from China (GTM 
Research, 2013). The fast capacity expansion of the manufacturing capacity in China in 
the first decade of the 21st century was fueled directly by the booming overseas market. 
Continuous capacity expansion created economies of scale and fostered the maturation of 
domestic Chinese PV supply chain, which among many other factors, further cut the cost 
of Chinese solar PV. Consequently, cheaper Chinese PV lowered the cost of solar 
electricity in the overseas markets, increased the competitiveness of solar as a source of 
electricity supply, and spurred a greater diffusion of solar. Ultimately, the deployment 
policies overseas created a virtuous cycle (Figure 4.3) that benefits both the solar 







Figure 4.3. Virtuous cycle of solar PV manufacturing and deployment 





















This virtuous cycle highlights a key function of deployment policies in the 
development of the solar PV industry, which is it spurs positive externalities. 
Deployment policies do not only promote the adoption of solar PV as a form of 
electricity generation, they also create markets for the PV manufacturing sector and 
provide necessary condition for future manufacturing capacity expansion.   
Nonetheless, the geographic mismatch between the deployment market and the 
solar PV supply can be problematic. The fact that their taxpayers’ money was spent on 
buying Chinese products and fueling the expansion of the Chinese PV industry did not sit 
well with politicians and PV manufacturers in Europe and the U.S. Protective trade 
measures were taken. Anti-dumping and countervailing allegations were brought forward 
in both places and the final rulings restricted the export markets for Chinese PV 
manufacturers. The Chinese PV manufacturing industry felt the immediate impact of the 
trade rulings; the large manufacturing capacity it built in anticipation of a growing 
overseas market suddenly became excessive. A number of Chinese manufacturers went 
out of business.  
However, the industry was saved from a disastrous collapse in part by the 
deployment policies rolled out by Chinese government. Compared to its the world’s 
largest PV manufacturing capacity, China’s domestic PV deployment had been 
incommensurable for a long time. During the peak of its export era, 90% of the solar 
panels made in China in 2012 were sold overseas, domestic demand constitutes only 
10%. Before 2013, there were two major distributed solar incentive programs: the Solar 
Roofs Program and the Golden Sun Demonstration Program (Exhibit 3 in Appendix C 
provides detailed description of these two program). By the time the two programs ended 
in 2013, 3.38GW of distributed solar had been installed as a result of these two programs 
(Chinese Academia of Sciences, 2014).  
 193 
However, critics pointed out that the capital investment-based subsidies did not 
incentivize developers to pay attention to project quality and final electricity generation. 
In 2013, Chinese government replaced the Golden Sun and Solar Roof Program with a 
nation-wide FIT program. The FIT was first implemented in 2007, shortly after the 
Renewable Energy Law of 2006 went into effect. Initially, it was only implemented in the 
power sector via a bidding process. After four years of experiment, NRDC set the first 
nation-wide FIT for utility-scale solar PV at ￥1.15/kWh ($0.18/kWh) and ￥1/kWh 
($0.16/kWh) for solar projects that complete before and after December 31, 2011. 
Starting from 2013, both distributed and utility-scale solar were included in the FIT 
scheme. The term of the contract is usually 20 years. Table 4.8 summarizes the current 
FIT scales in China.  
Table 4.8 FIT for Utility-scale and Distributed Solar Since 2013 
Solar Resource Area Utility-scale 
Solar  
￥/kWh ($/kWh) 




I: Excellent Solar 
Resource  
0.90 (0.14) 
Retail rate + 0.42 
(0.07) 
Production cost + 
0.42 (0.07) II: Good Solar Resource 0.95 (0.15) 
III: Fair Solar Resource  1.00 (0.16) 
 
For distributed PV, many provincial and local governments in China also offer 
their own subsidies. In the most extreme case, distributed solar PV in City of Xiuzhou in 
Zhejiang Province enjoy five levels of incentives. In addition to the FIT offered by the 
central government, there are provincial level, city level, and Xiuzhou-specific special 
provincial level FITs, plus the capacity based investment subsidy offered by Xiuzhou 
Municipal government. By the third quarter of 2015, 15 out of the 32 provincial level 
jurisdictions offer additional FITs and investment subsidies to distributed PV54.  
                                                 
54 Interviewee #67, #81, #82.  
 194 
Besides FITs, grid companies are required by the Renewable Energy Law of 2006 
to develop grid connection agreements with utility-scale solar plants to purchase all their 
generations. Similarly, mandated purchase also applies to excess electricity produced by 
distributed solar generators. The mandated connection and purchase policies meant to 
reduce market uncertainties for solar projects and further spur the deployment. In 2013, 
in conjunction to the reform of FITs, the central government issued a few official 
documents to increase the enforcement of mandated connection and purchase.  
It is hardly a coincident that multiple solar regulations, incentive programs, and 
official documents were issued in two time periods, 2009 and 2013. The Solar Roofs and 
Golden Sun Program were established to jumpstart China’s domestic deployment market 
in wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, an event which caused many European 
countries to temporally cut back them solar subsidies. Furthermore, the rollout of the 
nation-wide FITs program that covers both utility-scale and distributed solar, together 
with the emphasis on measures that provide certainties to solar generators in 2013, were 
in response to the sharp decline in PV export to European and American market due to 
the trade conflict. The timing of the events and the intentionality behind them is a clear 
sign that deployment policies were used not only as a way to spur solar energy adoption 
but also as means to expand domestic deployment market for Chinese PV manufacturers 
in order to absorb the excess production capacity.  
In summary, Chinese PV manufacturing industry benefited from having access to 
three largest global markets during their fastest growth periods: the European market 
between 2000 and 2012, the U.S. market between 2005 and 2012, and its domestic 
market from 2009 till present. The strong demand created by European and American 
solar deployment policies partly provided an environment for Chinese manufacturers to 
grow their production strength and gain dominance in the global market. When that 
strategy ceased to work due to the trade conflicts, solar deployment policies promulgated 
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by Chinese government rescued the PV manufacturing industry by unleashing the 
potential in the previously untapped domestic market.  
Driving mechanism 4.12: Deployment policies in Europe, the U.S., and China 
drove the creation of solar PV markets in the respective regions, which consumed 
the produce made by Chinese solar PV industry and enabled the formation and 
revolution of its economies of scale style development.   
4.3.5.4. Loose Labor and Environmental Regulation 
China has loose labor and environmental regulations compared to developed 
nations. The “hardworking” culture discussed earlier is in part fueled by the lack of labor 
rights protection. Salary-based employees are rarely compensated for their overtime. 
Hourly-based factory workers are usually not compensated with a pay differential for 
their night and weekend shifts as long as it is within the total amount of working hours 
allowed by the Chinese labor law. In comparison, the same practice would not be allowed 
in western developed countries. Looser labor regulations in China make it easier and 
cheaper to mobilize workers. The output of Chinese production lines is high while the 
cost of labor is lower as a result, but they come at the price of the pay and work-life 
balance of the workers.  
Looser environmental regulation is another area where Chinese firms, especially 
silicon and wafer manufacturing firms, had taken advantage. According to interviews 
with a high level executive of GCL Poly55, the world’s largest polysilicon and wafer 
producer, China supplies over 70% of the world’s wafer demand and over 50% of the 
world’s polysilicon demand in part because of the affordable energy cost and less 
stringent environmental regulations compared to countries like Germany, Japan, and the 
U.S.  The process to produce polysilicon and wafer requires a lot of energy and emits 
large amount of pollutants. Both the command-and-control type of environmental 
                                                 
55 Interviewee #74 
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regulations that require polluters to install pollution control equipment and market-based 
regulations that allow polluters to explore cheaper ways to reduce emissions would 
inevitably impose compliance cost to heavy polluters like polysilicon or wafer producers. 
They add an additional layer to the production cost. Furthermore, in countries like 
Germany and some states in the U.S., part of the costs to comply with stringent 
environmental regulations like the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and 
California’s AB 32 are internalized into the energy costs, resulting in higher electricity 
prices. In China, air and water pollutant emission standards are set at a lower level 
compared to developed countries, and the social cost of emissions has not been 
internalized into the electricity price yet. Therefore, the electricity cost is cheaper in 
China compared to those countries and regions. On top of the lax environmental 
regulations, the existing laws in China are not well enforced, leaving loopholes that can 
be exploited by emitters.  
Looser environmental standards and weak enforcement create a “low-cost” 
business environment that is favored by industries with heave emissions. This 
phenomenon is described in literature as “race-to-the-bottom” or the pollution haven 
hypothesis (Bommer, 1999).  Although it has not triggered the overseas polysilicon and 
wafer producers to migrate their production to China (due to other business concerns), it 
certainly gives domestic Chinese players a cost advantage.  
Chinese companies are well aware of the fact that their operations in China 
benefited from the loose labor and environmental standards. In an interview with the 
CFO of a Tier 1 Chinese company, he listed more stringent labor and environmental 
regulations as one of the factors that may lead the company to shift their operation in 
China to countries that have even less stringent regulations56.  
However, things are changing in China in the environmental field. The notorious 
air quality has prompted the government to take actions on controlling pollutions. A suite 
                                                 
56 Interviewee # 96 
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of actions has been taken to curb energy consumption and reduce the amount of 
emissions produced during the energy production process. The most anticipated change 
of all is China’s upcoming greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade program, which 
would impose emission upper limits to heavy emitters including the power sector and 
most manufacturing industries. Once the cap-and-trade program becomes effective, it will 
increase the cost of production for firms in the solar PV value chain in China, and level 
the playing field between China and countries with stringent environmental regulations, 
although it will also make outsourcing production to lower wage country with looser 
environmental regulations more attractive to Chinese producers.  
In addition to the nation-wide GHG reduction program, the solar PV 
manufacturing industry also faces a new set of environmental and energy productivity 
requirements put out by MOIIT in its Solar PV Manufacturing Industry Standards of 
2013 (Ministry of Industry and Information Technologies of China, 2013). The standards 
put forward specific energy productivity goals (in kwh of electricity/output term) tailored 
to each link of the PV manufacturing value chain. Only companies that meet the 
requirements are allowed to stay in the industry. The Standards also specified the 
environmental regulations that companies need to comply, which cover the following 
areas: air and water quality, odor, hazardous waste, solid waste and noise. However, the 
Standards do not have any legal power to enforcement the compliance.  
In summary, lax labor and environmental regulations and loose enforcement have 
historically given the Chinese PV industry advantages in factory-wise productivity and 
cost. Nevertheless, as China is taking actions to improve its environmental quality and 
rise labor standards, more stringent regulations are expected to be implemented and they 
will shrink the advantages that Chinese firms use to have.  
To summarize, this section explored 15 factors that are found by this study to 
have impact on the competitiveness of Chinese solar PV manufacturing companies. They 
span across a wide spectrum of categories, from firm specific strategies to industry-wise 
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agglomeration economies, to macro level factors such as culture, resources, and national 
policies. It has to be concluded that it is impossible to pin the cost advantage of the solar 
PV industry in China on one factor. Rather, just like what the quantitative analysis has 
found, it is a combination of a set of interconnected factors that shape the industry. The 
factors discussed above either historically or currently contribute to the continuous 
reduction of the solar PV production cost, although some of them build a long-term 
advantage, such as economies of scale, supply chain clusters, modern management 
methods, etc., whereas others are unsustainable forces, for examples loose environmental 
regulations, cheap labor cost, etc.  
4.4. Conclusions  
This chapter combines quantitative analysis with on-the-ground fieldwork to 
understand the sources of competitiveness of the solar PV manufacturing industry in 
China. The quantitative analysis suggests that a combination of low electricity cost, low 
R&D investment, low cost of debt and low cost equity lead to lower solar panel 
production costs among Chinese players before 2010; vertical integration, module 
capacity and tax rate are mixed show no consistent causal pattern vis-a-vis low PV 
production cost. However, in the post-2010 era, the higher level of vertical integration 
consistently co-exist with the four variables identified in the pre-2010 era as factors that 
cause low production cost in China. Although evidence on module capacity in the same 
era is not as consistent as the other five variables, whenever the presence of large module 
capacity is found to have an impact it always leads to low solar panel production cost in 
combination with low electricity cost, low R&D investment, low cost of debt and low 
cost equity, and high level of vertical integration. Different causal patterns before and 
after 2010 suggests that there is a tipping point for the impact of manufacturing scale on 
PV panel production cost.  As PV panel production truly reached a large enough scale 
around 2010, vertical integration and module capacity became meaningful causal factors 
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for low cost production around the same time. It indicates that “economies of scale” is 
not an abstract concept. Rather, it takes a critical mass of production capacity in order to 
realize the benefits associated with economies of scale.  
Due to data availability, many intangible factors were not explored in the 
quantitative analysis, but they were not left unexplained. Instead, drew from rich 
interview data, this dissertation developed a typology that categorize the potential sources 
of competitiveness of the solar PV manufacturing industry into five groups that cover 
both the micro and macro aspects of the industry and the political economy it embedded 
in. This study further examined their impact of these 15 factors on the development and 
maturation of the PV manufacturing industry in China.  
First and foremost, policies played a big role in shaping the industry. The national 
vision and industrialization strategy for the PV manufacturing industry promoted by the 
Chinese central government since the 10th FYP brought the industry to a fast track for 
development. The vision and strategy established economies of scale and supply chain 
development as two main principles and later added innovation as the third one. The 
underlying theory behind the first two principles is that they lead to the formation of 
agglomeration economies, which can lend advantages to firms, the industry and regions 
where the industry locates. In fact, the principles structurally shaped the industry and 
enabled the building of the world’s largest PV manufacturing capacity and a highly 
concentrated supply chain that is unmatchable elsewhere. Resource factors like skilled 
labor, good infrastructure and easy access to capital certainly created a friendly 
environment for manufacturing. Besides the macro-level policy and structural factors, at 
the micro-level, Chinese companies are flexible, and willing to tap into both low-key and 
highbrow strategies such as process innovation and modern scientific management 
approaches to build their competitiveness. In addition, cultural factors such as pragmatic 
mindset, work ethic and the unabashed pursuit for low cost are just as salient as the 
tangible factors in making China a unique place for solar PV manufacturing.  
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However, the same set of factors, when poorly utilized, could also impede the 
development of the industry. The same factors that are instrumental in creating the cost 
competitiveness among Chinese firms, such as pragmatism, the determination to continue 
to drive down cost have, to some extent, diverged the attention that could otherwise have 
been paid to scientific and technological innovation and product quality improvement. 
Today’s Chinese solar PV industry, despite its lion share of the global PV market, is still 
known as the provider of affordable but low-end solar PV products. Many companies 
struggle to transcend their business to the higher end of the solar PV value chain because 
of the weak innovation capacity and the lack of desire to carry out long-term, risky and 
R&D-laden projects. In addition, the overshoot in manufacturing capacity expansion 
fueled by irrational policy decisions made by local governments – such as local free cash 
grants, imprudent preferential lending and tax breaks, etc –contributed to the “quantity 
over quality” culture, resulting in trade conflicts with its major trading partners, rendered 
a good portion of the manufacturing capacity in China excessive.  
In conclusion, Chinese solar PV manufacturers’ market competitiveness is a result 
of a suite of factors that work in conjunction with one another. Both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence suggests that economies of scale and government subsidies are 
causally related to the low cost production of the industry. Qualitative analysis further 
uncovered the nuances embedded in economies of scale and how it and supply chain 
development mutually reinforced each other to create agglomeration economies. 
Government assistant subsidies and incentives had shown to be useful in short-term at the 
initial stage, but are problematic in the long run. However, government policies can be 
helpful in setting an industrialization vision and strategies as well as in fostering domestic 
demand for the manufactured good. This study also finds that contextual factors matter. 
The working culture, the pragmatic mindset, as well as the loose environmental and labor 
regulations are all part of the unique characteristics imprinted by the development path 
that the country has taken and should not be overlooked. Finally, more investment into 
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R&D was not found to be a causal factor leading to low cost production in China. Quite 
to the contrary, the opposite was found to be true by the quantitative analysis. However, 
qualitative analyses show that Chinese companies can strengthen their long-term 
competitiveness by conducting scientific and technological innovation that does not only 
contribute to low-cost production but also improve product quality and conversion 
efficiency. .  
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CHAPTER 5.  
THE SOLAR PV SUPPLY CHAIN IN CHINA  
5.1. Introduction  
The most quintessential characteristic of China’s PV manufacturing industry is its 
supply chain. It has unmatchable size, density and robustness, and it has become a key 
enabling factor for the continuous productivity improvement and solar panel production 
cost reduction discussed in Chapter 4.  
Scholars have been studying regionally compact industries and their supply chains 
for a long time. They have found that industrial clusters that connect manufacturing firms 
and their suppliers create agglomeration economies and they strengthen firms’ 
competitiveness and spur regional economic development (Clark, 2013; Gordon & 
McCann, 2000; Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, & Gereffi, 2008; Tan, 2006). Comparing to 
industries such as the photonic and automotive industry –the supply chains of which have 
existed for decades – the history of solar PV supply chain in China is short. It started 
shortly after the solar PV manufacturing industry began to gain traction in early 2000s. 
But just like the manufacturing industry, the supply chain developed rapidly, partly 
because of the unprecedented market opportunity and a suite of national policies and 
industrialization strategies in China. An intricate relationship was established between the 
supply chain and the PV manufacturing industry. They mutually reinforced each other’s 
growth and maturation. In an era where China’s low labor cost is undercut by Southeast 
Asian countries, a robust supply chain gives Chinese solar panel manufactures a unique 
advantage.  
The supply chain development does not only interact with the manufacturing 
sector, it is also closely related to the innovation system. The development and 
maturation of China’s domestic solar PV supply chain is as much a history of 
manufacturing innovation as industrial clusters development. As China moved from 
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almost completely replying on imported equipment for cell manufacturing to 85% self-
reliance as of 2014 (CCID, 2015a), R&D in tooling, materials, and cell and module 
production played a big role. Nevertheless, China’s domestic PV supply chain is only as 
strong as its innovation capacity; many problems that trouble the innovation system 
(detailed in Chapter 3) also impede the further growth of the supply chain.  
There has been very few in-depth studies of China’s solar PV supply chain. In 
2013, a group of researchers from the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
concluded that supply chain is the single most important reason that panels made in 
China are cost-competitive (Goodrich et al., 2013a). However, their approach used a very 
limited sample size (2 Chinese companies) and relied heavily on modeling and simulation 
instead of contextual knowledge. To fill the void, this chapter means to build on deep on-
the-ground knowledge gained from intensive fieldwork conducted in the Chinese solar 
PV manufacturing industry to accomplish five tasks.  
It will first tell the history of the supply chain development, and uses it to explain 
the interconnection between policy and markets. It will then dissect the characteristics of 
the today’s supply chain and analyze its strengths and weaknesses.  The third task is to 
provide a thorough argument for why building a domestic supply chain is central to the 
competiveness of a manufacturing industry. Fourthly, a case study of the 48th Research 
Institute, a leading Chinese solar PV manufacturing tooling supplier, will bring the first 
three points together and contextualize them. Finally, policy recommendations in terms 
of using supply chain to enhance manufacturing sector competiveness will be provided.  
5.2. History of China’s Solar PV Supply Chain  
China’s solar PV supply chain grew out of its manufacturing system. When 
Chinese PV manufacturers first selected places to build factories in the early 2000s, 
supply chain was an important factor that they took into consideration, along with other 
 204 
factors such as cost of labor, labor skills, local business environment, etc. The presence of 
local suppliers would certainly boost the chance of a region in getting a factory deal.  
5.2.1. Pre-2000 Era:  Emergence of the first generation, non-solar specific suppliers    
There was practically no solar PV supply chain before 2000. Most of the so-called 
solar PV suppliers back then did not supply to the solar industry exclusively. They first 
developed as material and equipment suppliers to industries that preceded solar such as 
the home appliance industry (such as electric wire and ribbon suppliers, etc.) and the 
building industry (such as glass suppliers). When the solar PV industry started to boom 
these material and equipment suppliers seized the opportunity and began to tailor their 
production to PV manufacturers. For the PV manufacturing industry’s perspective, the its 
initial development benefited from a supply chain that was first built for non-PV 
manufacturing industries. In a broader context, the industrialization in China since the 
late 1970s built a robust manufacturing infrastructure in the country, which includes a 
large number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), especially in the Yangtze River 
Delta (YRD) area (Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Shanghai) and Pearl River Delta (Guangdong-
Fujian) area. They function as material and equipment suppliers to large manufacturing 
companies. These SMEs are often started by local entrepreneurs in the so-called township 
and village enterprises form. These entrepreneurs engaged in their entrepreneurial 
experimentations and often offer products that are generic enough to be used by multiple 
industries (Putterman, 1997; Weitzman & Xu, 1994). For examples, materials needed in 
solar module production, such as electric cables, glass, aluminum frame, etc, are also 
needed in the manufacturing of consumer electronics, furniture, and so on. Therefore, 
different manufacturing industries often share common suppliers. The merits of such 
model include maximizing supply chain efficiency by avoiding building redundant 
suppliers and increasing supply chain resilience with versatile suppliers.  
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5.2.2. 2000-2012: Co-development of solar PV manufacturers and solar-specific 
suppliers  
The existence of the suppliers was appealing to a good number of solar 
manufacturers. When the first generation Chinese solar PV manufacturers like Suntech, 
Trina, and Canadian Solar first started to build their factories in the early 2000s, they all 
took advantage of this shared suppliers model in the YRD area and consequently, they 
form the initial solar PV manufacturing cluster. The emergence of this cluster in turn has 
had a profound influence on the direction of search of existing and future suppliers and 
shaped the supply chain development in the following two ways.  
First, the sizable demand from these companies created a big market for existing 
local material and tooling suppliers. As the Chinese solar industry entered it fast growth 
period during 2005-2010, many local suppliers pivoted their business from supplying to 
traditional manufacturing industry in the region to focusing more or even exclusively on 
the emerging PV industry. For example, Flat Glass in Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province started 
as a generic glass manufacturer primarily for the construction industry.  After a number 
of solar panel manufacturers opened their factories in its surrounding area, Flat Glass 
began to produce solar-grade glass in 2006 and supplied them mainly to PV producers in 
the YRD area (influence on the direction of search). As of 2014, Flat Glass is the 
world’s largest solar-grade glass manufacturer, and their market expanded from the 
regional market to the globe. SME suppliers’ strategy to pivot to the solar PV industry 
was the first step towards building a solar PV supply chain. They co-located and co-
developed with their customers.  
Second, the explosive growth of the PV manufacturing industry in the mid 2000s 
created a market for new material and tooling suppliers. As discussed in Chapter 4 
Section 4.3.5.3, Chinese PV manufacturers seized the market opportunities created by 
pro-renewable legislations such as German Renewable Energy Act (EEG), the Royal 
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Decree 436/2004 in Spain, and the state level Renewable Portfolio Standards in the U.S. 
and exported a large amount of affordable solar panels overseas. At the initial stage of 
solar PV deployment in all markets, the high panel cost was the biggest barrier. 
Consumers and developers in European and North American markets looked for cheaper 
panels to improve the economics of their projects. Chinese panels were attractive given 
their prices. As a result, Chinese PV manufacturers saw large demand from overseas. 
They responded by quickly ramping up their production capacity to keep up with the 
demands.  
The strong growth of the PV manufacturing sector demanded an equally strong 
domestic supply chain. If the first generation suppliers were what attracted a large 
number of solar PV producers to locate in the YRD area, then the entrance of new 
suppliers was the reason that they stayed and grew to be the industry leaders, because 
with the new suppliers a complete solar PV supply chain was finally formed. The 
newcomers contributed to the buildup of a complete supply chain in two ways. First of 
all, they filled the void left by the first generation suppliers. For historical and technical 
reasons, the first generation suppliers could not meet all the materials and tooling demand 
of PV manufacturers. This is partly because the YRD area historically has strong light 
industries but the solar PV manufacturing requires equipment and certain materials such 
as silicon and wafer that have to come from heavy industry in other regions in China or 
even from overseas. In addition, many first generation solar PV suppliers simply did not 
have the technical ability to meet the material and tooling demand from their customers. 
However, whenever there is a void, there is an opportunity. A new generation of solar 
PV-specific suppliers came to the marketplace to fill the blank in the late 2000s.  
GCL Poly, the current world’s largest polysilicon and wafer producer, is the 
poster child of the second-generation solar-specific suppliers. Before GCL Poly entered 
the solar market in 2006, Chinese PV producers relied mostly on importing polysilicon 
and wafer (two main types of feedstock for producing silicon-based solar panels) from 
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Germany and the U.S. This is because polysilicon and wafer production are capital-
intensive processes that also have high knowledge and technical requirements; few 
Chinese companies had both the technical and financial capabilities to do business in this 
area. However, the public listing of Suntech, Yingli and Canadian Solar at New York 
Stock Exchange in 2005 and 2006 spurred a wave of manufacturing capacity expansion 
of in the YRD area. Market demand for polysilicon and wafer soared and the price for the 
former was pushed up to as high as $500/kg at one point. Against such backdrop, GCL, a 
former non-stated owned power company, formed GCL Poly and entered the upstream 
solar supply chain. It invested a large amount of capital to mastering the technical 
knowledge and know-hows of silicon production (knowledge development and 
diffusion) and quickly established itself as a significant player in the silicon and wafer 
business.  Today, GCL Poly has its main polysilicon production facility in Xuzhou in 
Jiangsu Province, and 3 wafer production plants in Changzhou, next to Trina Solar (the 
world’s largest solar PV producer), 3 more in Suzhou, next to Canadian Solar ( a global 
top 5 solar PV producer), another 3 in Xuzhou next to its own polysilicon facility, and 3 
in Taicang in Jiangsu Province, 50 miles northeast of Suzhou. GCL Poly’s factory 
locations reflect its strategy to form a strong connection with PV manufacturers in the 
YRD area. The result is that both GCL Poly and its local customers grew significantly 
since the mid 2000s. GCL Poly became the world’s largest polysilicon producer in 2011, 
the world’s largest wafer producer in 2012, and has remained at the crown till today (Q4 
of 2015). At the same time, its local customers have seen their cell manufacturing 
capacity grow from just over 500 MW in 2006 to near 17,000MW by the end of Q2 of 
2015, a more than 30-fold increase.  
Flat Glass and GCL Poly are two snapshots of how a fast-growing industry can 
drive the development of its supply chain and in turn further its own growth. There are 
many examples like them in China’s solar industry. The bottom line is that the market for 
solar material and tooling suppliers is large and the first generation generic suppliers 
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were not able to fulfill all the demand. The market opportunity invited a large number of 
newcomers to enter the industry in order to fill the gap left by the incumbents at the same 
time the incumbents also continue to solidify their position in the industry. By the early 
2010s, the supply chain concentrated in the YRD area reached a state that was complete 
and robust.  
Driving mechanism 5.1: The booming solar PV manufacturing industry 
created market opportunities that did not only attracted generic suppliers but also 
spurred the birth and growth of solar-specific suppliers, many of which developed 
specialties that filled holes in the supply chain. As a result, the supply chain grew 
bigger and more complete over time. (Illustrated in Figure 5.1) 
 
Figure 5.1 Mechanism of Solar PV Supply Chain Development in the 
Yangtze River Delta (YRD) Area 
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5.2.3. 2012 – Present: Trade wars and government orchestrated industry 
restructuring  
The explosive growth of the PV manufacturing sector in China was not free of 
controversy. American and European PV manufacturers have alleged that Chinese firms 
sell their products at prices below their production costs, which led to the anti-dumping 
investigation initiated by the U.S. (U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade 
Administration, 2012a, 2014b) and the E.U. (European Commission, 2013a). The 
Chinese government was also charged for unjustifiably subsidizing the industry in order 
to achieve price advantage, resulting in the countervailing allegation (U.S. Department of 
Commerce International Trade Administration, 2014b). Spearheaded by German solar 
PV manufacturer SolarWorld, the initial complaints were later co-signed by the Coalition 
for American Solar Manufacturing and the EU ProSun, both are solar industry 
association in U.S. and in E.U. respectively. They were brought forward to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce in October 2011 and the European Commission in September 
2012.  
In October 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) issued its final 
determinations on the first round of anti-dumping and countervailing investigations, 
alleging that Chinese firms and government had been engaging in both dumping and 
unjustifiably subsidization. U.S. DOC imposed import duties ranging from 18.32% to 
249.96% on solar cells made in China (U.S. DOC, 2012a, 2012b). Following the U.S. 
DOC determinations, the E.U. trade commission issued similar findings, although the 
Chinese PV manufacturers were able to negotiate to change the penalties from tariffs to a 
price floor (0.56 Euro cents per watt minimum sales price) and a sales allowance that is 
equal to half of the European market size (European Commission, 2013a, 2013b).  
The second round of anti-dumping duties that Chinese firms received from U.S. 
DOC’s final determination in December 2014 ranged from 26.71% to 165.04%, and the 
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countervailing duties were between 27.64% to 49.79% (U.S. Department of Commerce 
International Trade Administration, 2014a).  
These restrictive trade measures limited the access to overseas markets and posted 
a big challenge to Chinese firms that rely heavily on exports. At one point, nearly 90% of 
the solar panels made in China were sold overseas (GTM Research, 2013). The 
manufacturing capacity expansion occurred during the booming years became excessive 
in front of the new market situation. A sever overcapacity issue plagued the industry. 
Firms that took on debt to build new factories were confronted with not only idled 
capacity but also financial difficulties to pay back loans. Many firms, especially SMEs 
went out of business. The solar PV industry standards issued by MOIIT further 
accelerated the restructuring of the manufacturing sector (for details, Section 4.3.5.4 in 
Chapter 4). As a result, large firms consolidated their power by absorbing SMEs; small 
and weak companies exited the market; and surviving companies shift their focus from 
singled-minded chasing low cost to paying more attention to product quality and 
innovation. Average R&D investment increased significantly since the structuring (See 
Table 3.13 in Section 3.6.3.3 in Chapter 3). 
Table 5.1 shows the number of silicon-based and thin film solar PV producers 
over a five-year period. The rapid growth in number of players stopped in 2012. 
Approximately one third of the companies went out of business in 2013. Today, PV 
production capacity in China is highly concentrated among top tier players. In the silicon 
processing sector, top 10 Chinese producers accounted for 92% of the country’s total 
output in 2014; the top 5 accounted for 78%. Top 10 Chinese wafer producers made up 
76% of China’s 2014 production; the top 5 accounted for 58%. Top 10 Chinese cell and 





Table 5.1 Size of the C-Si and Thin Film PV Manufacturing Industry 




























C-Si Cell  69 102 48% 156 53% 106 -32% 
C-Si 
Module  
349 476 36% 576 21% 385 -33% 
Thin Film  42 49 17% 47 -4% 30 -36% 
 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey 4th, 5th and Continuous Edition Analysis 
Report. The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
Note: No survey was conducted in 2011. 
 
 
The trouble with solar cell and module manufacturers unavoidably affected their 
suppliers, rendered them having to go through the same boom-and-bust cycle. Although 
MOIIT did not issue an industry standard regarding the PV material and tooling 
industries, suppliers felt the impact of the PV manufacturing industry standards vividly. 
PV manufacturers’ demand for better product quality put pressures on suppliers to 
provide higher quality materials and more advanced tooling. Suppliers that could not 
meet the demand were also forced out of the market.  
5.3. Main Characteristics of China’s Solar PV Supply Chain  
Three characteristics of the PV supply chain have shown to be essential to the 
competitiveness of the Chinese solar PV industry.  
5.3.1. The supply chain is complete. 
First and foremost, China has a complete supply chain with no missing links. This 
may sound very basic, but having a supply chain that covers every single material and 
tooling requirement is rare in today’s solar PV manufacturing world. PV producing 
countries such as Germany, Japan, Malaysia, etc., for either environmental concerns or 
technical reasons, only have partial supply chain. For example, wafer production is a 
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highly energy-intensive and polluting process. Companies located in countries like Japan 
and Germany, which that have limited energy resources and stringent environmental 
regulations, find it economically unattractive to produce wafer within their national 
border57. As a result, silicon-based solar panel producers in these countries would have to 
import wafers from mainly three overseas regions: China, the U.S., and Taiwan58. The 
heavy weight of wafer and the associated transportation cost put PV manufacturers in 
non-wafer production countries in a disadvantage position. Besides environmental 
regulations, technical barriers also prevent some countries from achieving a complete 
supply chain. Malaysia has recently become a hotspot for PV manufacturing as a few 
world’s large PV producers such as the America-based Sun Power, China-based Jinko 
Solar and JA Solar, ect. built factories there. However, for the same reason that China did 
not have polysilicon production capability in the early 2000s, Malaysia today is not able 
to produce polysilicon domestically but rather relying on imports.  
Compared to those countries, the PV supply chain in China is fully developed. 
Chinese PV manufacturers can source everything needed for a solar panel from domestic 
source. However, not every part of the supply chain is equally developed. Section 5.3.4 
and 5.3.5 will further discuss the strengths and weakness of the supply chain.  
5.3.2. The supply chain is robust. 
The supply chain in China is not only complete, but it also has a large number of 
players at each link of the chain and together they create economies of scale. Figure 5.2 
and 5.3 show a breakdown of the silicon-based solar PV supply chain in China in 2013, 
from raw material processing to balance of system components. The very first thing that 
stands out is the large numbers of suppliers at almost every step of the supply chain. The 
large number of suppliers inevitably creates market competition among themselves, 
which in theory would benefit PV manufacturers with lower cost, better product quality, 
                                                 
57 Interviewee #57 
58 Interviewee #93 
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and more options. Table D.1 in Appendix D has a detailed accounting of the number of 
suppliers of each equipment and material type used in silicon-based and thin film PV 
production in 2013.   
 
Figure 5.2 Number of Panel Assembly Tooling Suppliers 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Number of Solar Cell Tooling Supplies 
Source: ENF http://www.enfsolar.com/directory/equipment 
Note:  


























5.3.3. China’s solar supply chain is geographically concentrated  
5.3.3.1. Solar PV manufacturing in the Yangtz River Delta (YRD) area 
Global production networks (GPN) theory suggests that modern manufacturing 
benefits from having an interconnected global network that links designer, producer, 
suppliers and customers (Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002). Trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) can maximize their supply chain efficiency by embracing a web of 
global actors along the entire product life (N. M. Coe et al., 2008, 2004). Although there 
are examples of global production networks developing local production clusters due to 
external pressures, but motivations were not organic and innate (Sturgeon et al., 2008).  
However, in the era of globalization, China’s solar PV production activity is 
strikingly local. There are a large number of interconnected solar PV manufacturing firms 
and their suppliers in the YRD area, forming solar PV industrial clusters. Despite the 
powerful globalization trend, the clusters’ ability to continue to attract firms in the same 
industry is eye-opening. Today, YRD is the most vibrant region for solar PV 
manufacturing in the world. It includes part of Jiangsu and Zhejiang Province and City of 
Shanghai. It is home to more than 30 GW of solar cell manufacturing capacity and over 
36 GW of solar module manufacturing capacity, which accounts for 64% and 58% of 
China’s total manufacturing capacity in 2014. They translate into 38% and 40% of the 
global total production (CCID, 2015b). Seven out of the global top ten solar cell and 
module producers have their factories primarily located in this area, and another four of 
the global top fifteen solar cell and module producers have a presence in the region 
(Table 5.2). They concentrate in an 8,000 square miles area around the delta area near 
where the Yangtze River meets the East Sea, forming a cluster of PV manufacturing 
capacity. Figure 5.4 is a map highlighting the PV cell and module producers located in 
the YRD area as of June 2015. Green diamonds represent solar PV manufacturing plants 
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that are central to the development of the cluster. Table 5.3 summarizes their cell and 
module manufacturing capacity.  
Scholars have found industrial clusters and the agglomeration economies they 
created are crucial in explaining some regions’ economic competitiveness 
(Christopherson and Clark 2009; Gordon and McCann 2000; Munnich, Love, and Clark 
1999; Porter 1990; Porter 1998). However, scholars are split in their media of analysis. 
Business school scholars tend to see the development of industrial clusters and regional 
economy through the lens of firm strategies and their networks. Government and regional 
policies and other resource factors such as labor are exogenous to their analysis (Porter 
1998; Scott 1988). They treat the region simply as a space where business and industrial 
activities happen. In contrast, economic geographers explore both regional contextual 
factors and firm strategies and argue that place matters. It is through the interactions of 
firms and the regions they locate in that industry development and regional economic 
growth are realized (Christopherson and Clark 2009; Clark 2013; Scott and Storper 
2007). They reply on each other and mutually shape the growth trajectory of one another. 
This study shares the second camp’s view towards industrial development and argues that 
firm strategies (market) as well as national and regional policies (policy) are both part of 
an integral system. The next section analyzes how the solar PV industry and its supply 
chain in China develop at the intersection of market and policy.  In Section 5.4 of this 
chapter, the solar PV supply chain in China will be used as an example to demonstrate 
how building a domestic supply chain can tremendously benefit a nation’s industry and 




Figure 5.4 Solar PV Manufacturing Clusters in the Yangtze River Delta Region. 
Sources: BNEF solar PV manufacturing plant database; Google Maps. 
Note: The subscription to the BNEF database came through the Stanford China Project. The analysis of the 
data for the supply chain insight was done by the author as part of the Stanford China Project.  
 
Table 5.2 Solar Cell and Module Production Capacity in the Yangtze River 
Delta Area in 2014* 
 
Province Cell Capacity (MW) Module Capacity (MW) 
Jiangsu 22,500 27,700 
Zhejiang 7,800 8,675 
YRD Total 30,300 36,375 
China Total  47,000 63,000 













1 Trina 2,680 3,850 
3 Jinko 1,500 1,700 
4 Canadian Solar 940 1,688 




8 Hanwha Q 
CELLS 
1,162 900 
9 Zhongli Talesun 900 1,000 
11 Risen Energy 800 1,500 
12 Renesola 265 1,150 
13 China Sunergy 396 735 
14 ZNShine 300 900 
 
Source: BNEF company level factory capacity data  
Note: The subscription to the BNEF database came through the Stanford China Project. The analysis of the 
data for the supply chain insight was done by the author as part of the Stanford China Project.  
 
5.3.3.2. Solar PV Supply Chain in YRD, Where Market and Policy Meet  
The industrial cluster of PV cell and module manufacturing is clearly shown in 
Figure 5.4. Besides, majority of the suppliers also locate in the YRD area, near their 
customers. They mutually depend on each other because market force requires them to do 
so. By locating close to a group of customers, the suppliers are able to reduce the risk of 
individual bad contract and be more attainable and flexible towards their customers’ 
needs. From PV manufacturers’ perspective, having a group of suppliers in close 
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proximity give them more stable supplies, shorter deliver time, more product options, and 
more business certainties. They need each other to survive and thrive in the business.  
However, market force does not work in isolation; it frequently interacts with 
policy and government planning. Take the city of Wuxi for an example. Wuxi is the 
home of Suntech Power, the former world’s largest solar PV manufacturing company. 
Although Suntech went through a debt crisis in 2013 and was restructured by an outside 
investor, it was China’s flagship PV manufacturer for nearly a decade. Nicknamed the 
West Point of Chinese Solar PV industry, Suntech cultivated a large number of scientists 
and PV professionals who went on to have a large footprint in the PV industry. Spurred 
by Suntech’s early success, the municipal government decided to develop Wuxi as a PV 
manufacturing hub. As of November 2014, Wuxi had 4.6 GW solar cell manufacturing 
capacity and 8.4 GW of module manufacturing capacity, accounts for approximately 10% 
and 20% of China’s total capacity (Municipal Government of Wuxi, 2014). There were 
45 PV manufacturing companies and suppliers located in Wuxi, among which 30 
companies occupied niches in the main value chain, and 16 of them meet the competitive 
criteria outlined by the industry standards rolled out by MOIIT in 2013 (Municipal 
Government of Wuxi, 2014). Building on the infrastructure surrounding Suntech, a 
government-sponsored solar PV-specific industrial park broke ground in Wuxi in 2011, 
marking a clear policy intention to geographically consolidate the existing yet dispersed 
(in China’s standard) solar PV manufacturing capacity in the city59. The industrial park 
brought 90% of the Wuxi’s PV manufacturing capacity along with local PV suppliers in 
into the park, created a compact PV manufacturing ecosystem (Municipal Government of 
Wuxi, 2014). The industry park today does not only encompasses the entire traditional 
PV manufacturing value chain, the same government policy that created it also intended 
to attract more innovative organizations to the park by offering administrative incentives 
such as expedited permitting process. As of early 2015, a few PV cell and panel testing 
                                                 
59 Interviewee #92 
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centers and research labs had moved into the industrial park. Similar solar-centric 
industrial parks can also be found in City of Changzhou60, home of current world’s 
largest solar PV producer, and in City of Suzhou near Canadian Solar61.  
Natural market forces and intentional industrial planning led to the growth of a 
dense solar PV manufacturing cluster in the YRD area. Figure 5.5 is a map showing top 
10 ranked Chinese cell and module manufacturers and their global material and tooling 
providers in 9 key categories:  flash-testing, Stringing machine, sliver paste, laminate 
machine, junction box, glass, ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA), etching machine, and back 
sheet. Noticeably, majority of the suppliers are located in China and a disproportionally 
large number of suppliers concentrate in the YRD area, with a few others locating along 
China’s east coast in Guangdong, Hebei, and Liaoning Province. The rest are located in 
Western Europe and the U.S. The suppliers located in YRD area have close access to a 
large number of cell and module manufacturers. Figure D.1 to D.9 in Appendix D show 
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Figure 5.5 Top 10 Chinese PV Manufacturers and Their Suppliers 
 
Data source: ENF 2013Top 10 Suppliers list.  
Note: Map produced as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this study, Jingfan Wang and 
Cait Pollock, all are members of the Stanford China Project team.  
5.3.4. Strengths and Weakness of China’s Solar PV Supply Chain  
5.3.4.1. Strengths of the Supply Chain 
In general, the supply chain in China is strong in producing bulk materials like 
wafer, aluminum frame, and panel accessories such as glass, junction box, connectors, 
cables as well as most of module manufacturing equipment. The processes to produce 
these components usually require labor and small to medium capital investment but not 
advanced knowledge and technological skills. Therefore, they fall into China’s 
manufacturing comfort zone.  
5.3.4.2. Weaknesses in the Ability to Manufacture Certain Supplies  
However, China’s supply chain is relatively weak in the following areas: silver 
paste, backsheet, and wafer and cell manufacturing equipment such as wire saw, 
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automatic welding machine, automatic screen printing machines, Plasma-enhanced 
chemical vapor deposition (PECVD) machine, and flash testing and IV test (current-
voltage) equipment. Chinese cell and module manufacturers who strive to produce high 
quality products often import these materials and equipment rather than buy from 
domestic suppliers.  
The reason that China’s supply chain lags in these areas has to do with its 
innovation capacity. Research has shown that an industry, a region, and even a nation’s 
competitiveness depends on its innovation and its ability to combine innovation with 
production to generate competitive advantage (Bryson et al., 2015; Clark, 2013). 
Innovation is not a concept that exists only in labs. It permeates the entire manufacturing 
process and along the whole supply chain. The limitations faced by China’s solar PV 
supply chain stem from its weak innovation capacity. For instance, to make an automated 
version of a welding and screen printing machine, it requires a combination of physics, 
electrical and mechanical engineering, and computer science knowledge. Flash testing 
machine requires a light source that imitates the natural sunlight, and to produce the 
artificial sunlight, advanced optical physics knowledge and high precision manufacturing 
capability are needed. I-V test equipment requires physics and electrical engineering 
knowledge as well as high precision manufacturing capacity. As for silver paste, the ideal 
product should be able to be applied thin and tall at the same time in order to reduce the 
surface area on a solar panel it covers while at the same time increase its electric 
conductivity. Lots of chemistry and chemical engineering work goes into creating those 
two properties. Similarly, chemistry, chemical engineering, and physics knowledge are 
necessary to produce good back sheet that can sustain long hours of ultraviolet radiation 
and chemical erosions. China’s weak foundation in basic science and advanced 
engineering research makes it difficult for its solar supply chain to develop strength in 
areas that requires advanced scientific and technological knowledge. 
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Blocking mechanism 5.1: Weak science and engineering foundation made it 
difficult for the Chinese solar supply chain to develop strength in areas that requires 
advance knowledge and manufacturing skills.  
Nevertheless, as China makes inroads in solar PV science and technology 
innovation (documented in Chapter 3), its solar PV supply chain also evolves. In recent 
years, a number of Chinese companies have mastered the technologies and know-hows in 
a few areas. For example: wire saws produced by the Zhejiang-based Jinggong Science 
and Technology are now widely used by Chinese wafer producers. Changzhou SVECK 
Photovoltaic New Materials emerged as a competitor in EVA area. The 48th Research 
Institute has strong capacity in manufacturing diffusion furnaces. Despite the 
improvement, there are still bottleneck issues waiting to be broken, the prominent among 
which are silver paste, automatic welding machine, and flash test equipment62.  
Figure 5.6 illustrates the relative strengths and weaknesses of the solar PV supply 
chain in China and how they progress over time. 
 
Figure 5.6 Strengths and Weakness of China’s Solar PV Supply Chain 
                                                 
62 Based on interviews with interviewee #46, #71, #88, #97, #99, #102, #104 
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5.3.4.3. Weakness in Supply Quality 
5.3.4.3.1.     Observing the quality gap between Chinese and Western supplies 
Weakness of the supply chain can manifest in multiple ways and the lack of 
manufacturing capacity is only one of them. When one supply chain link is considered 
weak, it does not necessarily mean that there is a vacuum of domestic suppliers. In fact, 
as Table 5.2 demonstrates, even in areas that are considered as stagnantly weak such as 
silver paste, flash testing, and automatic welding, there are numbers of active Chinese 
suppliers, indicating some capacity to produce those components. However, the key 
difference here is the quality. For example, silver paste produced by Chinese suppliers 
does not demonstrate as good conductivity as products made by overseas producers like 
DuPont. In cases like automatic welding machine and flash test equipment, the precision 
of Chinese-made equipment is lower than popular German brands. Lower-quality 
Chinese products in these areas may exist to satisfy lower tier Chinese cell and module 
producers because they are cheap, but for the top tier Chinese producers, they would not 
risk the quality of their final products by choosing domestic brands in areas where the 
supply chain has not proven its strength yet63.  
The quality gap between Chinese and foreign supplies is more pronounced in the 
cell manufacturing stage than the module stage. During the visits to seven PV 
manufacturing facilities located in China64, it is noticeable that almost all equipment used 
in solar module assembly is provided by Chinese suppliers. However, the percentage is 
much lower among solar cell manufacturers. Chinese PV manufacturers have revealed 
strong confidence in the precision and quality of Chinese-made module-manufacturing 
machinery but low confidence in that of Chinese-made cell-manufacturing machinery.  
                                                 
63 Interviewee #57, #69 
64 Site visits #3, #10, #12, #22, #24, #26 
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As the R&D director of Canadian Solar65 once said, “Although all equipment 
experience downtime, it happens to Chinese equipment more often than it is to German 
equipment.” If one piece of equipment breaks down, it will halt the production of the 
entire cell production line. The productivity will suffer as a result. However, the worry 
for equipment reliability is a lesser problem to Chinese cell manufacturers compared to 
the concern for cell efficiency loss.  
5.3.4.3.2.     Quality gap explained  
Interviews with executives of Chinese companies revealed that the average 
efficiency of solar cells produced using all made-in-China materials and equipment is 
marginally lower compared to cells made using all western-made supplies. Part of the 
reason is highlighted in the silver paste example: lower quality parts lead to lower quality 
final products. But an even more important reason has to do with tooling stability. 
Stability refers to the ability of the production line to consistently produce high quality 
products. The director of the 48th Research Institute breaks down the significance of 
tooling stability in the following way. Imagine two production lines, Line A and Line B. 
They are both designed to produce 19%-efficient solar cells except that Line A has higher 
stability than Line B. As a result, even though the best cells produced by both lines are 
the same, i.e. 19%, Line A is able to produce 19%-efficient solar cells 90% of the time 
whereas Line B is only able to do so 80% of time. Simply put, 90% of the products 
produced by Line A are at 19% efficiency (with acceptable deviation, a.k.a ±3σ), but only 
80% of the products made by Line B are of that caliber. Figure 5.7 demonstrates the 
distributions of the two production lines.  
                                                 




Figure 5.7 Product Quality Distributions of Two Production Lines with the 
Same Average Efficiency 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5.7 the average efficiency of all the products produced by 
Line A is higher than that of Line B. If a company plans to sell only the 19%-efficient 
solar cells, not lower, it will incur 10% (90% minus 80%) more loss if they use Line B 
compared to using Line A. In reality, China made tooling is like Line B, whereas leading 
foreign tooling is like Line A66. As important as reliability is, equipment breakdowns are 
one-off events, they do not happen every day. Yet, stability is a systemic factor that has 
persistent effect on the performance of a production line and its final products. Chinese 
made equipment is often subject to such shortcomings. Even though they may come with 
a lower price tag, as today’s Chinese solar cell manufacturers pay increasing attention to 
the performance of their product, many of them prioritize tooling quality over price. One 
can have a vivid sense of the dominance of imported cell-manufacturing equipment by 
taking a walk in production facilities of top tier Chinese solar cell producers.  
5.3.4.3.3.     Causes of the quality gap 
                                                 











Chinese tooling is not as strong as its foreign competitors in reliability and 
stability, and once again, weak science, technology and engineering foundation are the 
underlying cause of the problem.  
First, parts made by Chinese are of lower quality than the parts made by the west. 
Just like China is not particularly strong in make key components of solar cells such as 
silver paste, it is also weak in making key parts for cell manufacturing equipment such as 
shafts, motors, etc. Second, when it comes to equipment design, China also lags behind. 
It all boils down to less rigorous science training and the lack of deep understanding of 
the fundamental science and engineering theories behind equipment design67.   
As a result of the above-mentioned factors, Chinese solar cell companies, for a 
long time, relied primarily on imported equipment for key cell-production processes such 
as diffusion, etching, stringing, screen printing, and flash testing. Module production is 
different. Because it is mostly a process of assembling parts together, it has a much lower 
requirement for precision and efficiency, so most Chinese producers use domestic 
equipment.  
5.3.4.3.4.     Closing the gap 
Recent trends suggest that Chinese-made tooling has made progress over time, 
and many Chinese PV manufacturers have shown their interest in shifting from importing 
equipment to using domestic equipment. An analysis using ENF’s 2013 Chinese PV 
Industry Survey data shows that Chinese tooling companies made inroads in a few cell 
producing equipment areas. As shown in Table 5.4, only two types of equipment, screen 
printer and firing furnace, completely rely on imports. For other cell-manufacturing 
equipment, i.e. cleaning, diffusion, PECVD, etching machines, and cell tester and sorter, 
a majority of the Tier 1 companies used either 100% domestically made equipment or a 
mix of Chinese and foreign equipment.  
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Innovative SMEs are instrumental in the uptake of Chinese-made solar cell 
manufacturing equipment. Using the same ENF data, this study pinpoints a number of 
rising Chinese equipment suppliers. Beijing-based Sevenstar Electronics, Wuxi-based 
Rusitec Science & Technology, Shenzhen-based Exact S.C, and Taiyuan-based The 
Second Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corp are active 
suppliers of cleaning machines. The 48th Research Institute of China Electronics 
Technology Group Corp is the main domestic diffusion furnace and etching equipment 
supplier. In the cell tester/sorter category, Chinese equipment manufacturers also made 
progress. Four out of the six Tier 1 Chinese cell manufacturers used either all-Chinese 
equipment or a mix of Chinese and foreign equipment. Xi’an-based GSolar and 
Shanghai-based HSPV Corporation are the major cell tester and sorter suppliers. Screen 
printer and firing furnace remained dominated by Western equipment suppliers by 2013. 
However, recent interviews68 and factory69 visits conducted by the author in the second 
half of 2014 and first half of 2015 showed that the 48th Research Institute had 
successfully penetrated the firing furnace market by sealing a deal with one of the top tier 
Chinese cell producers.  
Table 5.4 Source of Solar Cell Manufacturing Equipment of Tier 1 Chinese PV 
Producers in 2013 
 
Company/Process Trina Yingli Suntech JA Solar Renesola Hanwha 
Cleaning   China China Foreign China Mixed China 
Diffusion Furnace  Foreign N.A. China China Mixed China 
Etching N.A. Foreign Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed 
PECVD N.A. Foreign Foreign Foreign Mixed Foreign 
Screen Printer Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign 
Firing Furnace  N.A. N.A. Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign 
Cell Tester/Sorter China China China Mixed Foreign Foreign 
 
Source: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey Continuous Edition, 2013.  
Note:  
Data on Jinko and Canadian Solar are not available.  
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project.  
                                                 
68 Interviewee #14, #59, #63,  #65  #89, #103, #104 
69 Site visit #24, #26 
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The rising level of domestically made solar cell manufacturing equipment reflects 
the improving quality of Chinese machinery, and it has a significant impact on production 
cost. The next section will explore the relationship in details.  
5.4. Advantages with A Robust Domestic Supply Chain 
5.4.1. Driving mechanism 5.2: Domestic supply chain provides Chinese PV 
manufacturers with cheaper alternative tooling and material options, which 
directly reduces the production cost.  
Interviews conducted by this study show that for the same piece of manufacturing 
equipment, Chinese suppliers on average sell for only 1/3 to half of the price asked by 
western suppliers70. For instance, during the rapid industry expansion period, the 48th 
Research Institute conducted over 100 Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) 
projects to install 25MW PV production line for Chinese producers, most of which were 
SMEs. Using 100% self-design and self-produced equipment, the 48th Institute was able 
to complete a project for about ¥ 60 million, or a little less than $10 million, whereas it 
costed about ¥100 million (approximately $16 million) to buy a similar production line 
from overseas suppliers71. Another example from Hangzhou-based thin film solar cell 
producer Advanced Solar Power (ASP) depicts a scenario of how in-house tooling design 
and manufacturing can save PV producers a great deal of money. ASP’s self-designed 
and domestically manufactured automatic scribing machine costs only 1/10 of imported 
equipment of the same kind. Admittedly, there is a quality difference between equipment 
made in China and those made in the West, the sizable saving with domestically 
produced equipment gives Chinese PV manufacturers a significant cost advantage over 
their foreign competitors who pay the cost premiums for Western made equipment.  
                                                 
70 Interviewee #97, #103, #104,  
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5.4.2. Driving mechanism 5.3: Cheaper, domestically produced tooling and 
materials gave Chinese PV manufacturers bargaining power in negotiating 
with foreign suppliers, which indirectly reduce their production cost.    
Even in areas where quality is a greater concern than cost, Chinese PV 
manufacturers were able to achieve a good amount of cost reduction by threating to 
switch to domestic suppliers when negotiate with their foreign suppliers. They can 
leverage the fact that there exist Chinese domestic materials and tooling suppliers who 
can satisfy their demand by using domestically produced materials and tooling as their 
bargaining chips, Chinese PV manufacturers can negotiate for a lower price even if they 
still ended up buying from foreign suppliers. An anecdote from the 48th Research 
Institute suggests that after it mastered the techniques to produce good quality wire saw 
(a machine used in slicing ingot into thin wafer layers), It priced the equipment at  
¥1.5million (approximately $250,000). It forced the incumbent western wire saw 
producers to reduce their price from ¥ 5million (approximately $800,000) to ¥ 2.5million 
(approximately $400,000) in order to retain the Chinese customers. From Chinese PV 
manufacturers’ perspective, they could either save  ¥3.5 million (70%) by switching from 
foreign equipment to Chinese equipment or save  ¥ 2.5 million (50%) by staying with the 
same foreign supplier but using the 48th Research Institute as their bargaining chip. It is 
ultimately up to the PV manufacturers to decide which one they value more, cost saving 
or equipment quality, but in either case, the presence of domestic equipment suppliers 
gives them a significant cost advantage.  
The quote from the deputy director of the 48th Research Institute captures the gist 
of domestic chain’s contribution to the cost competitiveness of the Chinese solar PV 
industry.  
“The ability to produce tooling domestically is the most important reason why 




Figure 5.8. Two Pathways of Cost Reduction with Domestic Suppliers 
 
5.4.3. Driving mechanism 5.4: Chinese suppliers disrupted the industry status quo 
and unleashed significant cost reduction potentials for Chinese and foreign PV 
producers alike.  
Besides the improvement in domestic tooling supply, the maturation of PV 
material supply chain, especially the emergence of a few large silicon and wafer 
suppliers, has also contributed to cost reduction. In 2005, only 10% of China’s 
polysilicon demand was met domestically. Since then, a number of silicon producers like 
GCL Poly, TBEA, Daqo New Energy, China Silicon Corporate, etc emerged in China 
and grew quickly in terms of production capacity and product offerings. As a result, 
domestically produced poly-silicon met 50% and 60% of the totally demand in China in 
2010 and 2014, respectively (CCID, 2015a; NDRC, 2011).  
Wafer supply chain is even stronger in China. Started at a miniscule scale in the 
early 2000s, within 10 years, the wafer supply chain in China has developed so much that 
by 2014 it is not only self-sufficient, it produced over 38 GW, which accounted for 76% 
of the global wafer production, and exported 9.27 GW. The fast capacity expansion in 
silicon and wafer industry in China triggered a rapid price decline, which brought a 
disruptive change to the PV industry. Interviews with polysilicon executives revealed that 
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polysilicon production cost followed a steep downward trajectory72. Global commodity 
polysilicon was traded at around $200 in the late 2000s. (Bloomberg Finance L.P., 
2014a). However, cost decline started as companies like GCL Poly grew. Between 2010 
and 2014, the cost of polysilcon made by leading Chinese producers declined by 80%, 
from $60 (2010) → $20 (2011) → $18 (2012) → $16 (2013) → $12 (2014). During the 
same time, prices at a major Germany polysilicon producer declined only 20%. Note that 
polysilicon and wafer together account for over 40% of the final PV module cost (BNEF, 
2014b), the low cost products provided by Chinese suppliers in these two categories have 
unleashed great cost reduction potentials for Chinese and foreign PV manufacturers alike. 
With additional saving on transportation cost, Chinese companies benefits more from the 
thriving domestic polysilicon and wafer suppliers.  
5.4.4. Driving mechanism 5.5: Domestic supply chain locks the cost and logistic 
advantages in China. 
The advantage with domestic Chinese supply chain also manifests in Chinese 
companies’ decision to expand their business overseas. Since 2013, many Tier 1 Chinese 
PV manufacturers started to build overseas factories, mainly for the purpose of 
circumventing the import duties imposed by the U.S. Interviews with two companies that 
have built cell production facilities in Southeast Asian countries showed that although 
labor cost is cheaper in those countries, the overall production cost is 10% higher due to 
the weak local supply chain.73 Local suppliers can meet the demand for low-key 
components such as screen, aluminum paste, etc, but Chinese companies’ overseas 
facilities still have to import key components like wafer and sometimes even equipment 
such as diffusion furnace from China, in addition to the materials and equipment that they 
usually purchase from foreign suppliers, things like silver paste, stringing machine, etc. 
                                                 
72 Interviewee #57, #63 
73 Interviewee ID #53, #96 
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The higher costs associated with wafer and equipment importation offset the lower labor 
cost offered by those Southeast Asian countries. If it were not for the tariff circumvention 
purpose, Chinese companies cannot justify the decision to open an overseas cell 
production facility based on the economics74.  In other word, the cost advantage as a 
result of domestic supply chain is difficult to duplicate outside of China. Even for 
Chinese PV manufacturers, their greatest cost advantage comes from operating inside 
China with their domestic suppliers.  
5.4.5. Driving mechanism 5.6: Domestic supply chain enables Chinese PV 
manufacturers to be agile and flexible. 
In the earlier example about ASP, their self-designed equipment does not only 
reduces production cost, but also optimizes its production efficiency because the 
equipment was tailored to meet the specific demand of its own production lines. This 
highlights another key mechanism through which having a domestic supply chain is 
advantageous, that is it is flexible and agile (Chan & Chan, 2010; Fohrholz & Gronau, 
2011) (See Chapter 4 Section 4.3.2.1). The flexibility and agility stem from spatial 
proximity and localized learning.  
Research has found that the creation and diffusion of knowledge, especially tacit 
knowledge, is difficult to transfer across large geographical space. Face-to-face 
interaction and local learning are more suitable forms (Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell, 
2004; Malmberg & Maskell, 2006). In the ASP case, all but one encapsulation equipment 
are self-designed and made in China. The ability to do so allows ASP to easily 
manipulate their equipment to meet the requirement of new products. For instance, ASP 
used to use parallel circuits in their early products, but when new product that requires 
series circuits was set for production, ASP was able to modify its equipment to 
accommodate the new product design. Interviews with ASP chairman indicated that this 
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would not be possible if they were to use imported equipment. The communication 
barriers with foreign designers and manufacturers, which include issues with language, 
time difference, geographic distance, are very high. Therefore, it would take a much 
longer period and require more manpower from ASP to tweak the production line with 
foreign suppliers. In contrast, the self-designed, domestically produced equipment 
allowed ASP the agility in bringing new product to market. They can easily and quickly 
modify their production line and speed up the “technology to market” cycle.  
In addition to being agile, the presence of a domestic supply chain also makes the 
Chinese PV manufacturers more flexible in their production process. It is often the case 
that large PV manufacturers co-design equipment with their tooling suppliers. PV 
producers would self-design a few key pieces of equipment and then send the design 
blueprints to tooling suppliers of their choice. When working with domestic tooling 
suppliers, Chinese PV manufacturers can either send their design technicians to the 
suppliers or invite the suppliers’ technicians to come to them. The idea is to have both the 
equipment buyer and producer work together under the same roof at every major step of 
the equipment design and production process in order to make sure the functions 
demanded by the former are truly incorporated into the equipment. This joint-
development process is not a one-shot effort. Instead, it involves a lot of experimenting, 
trail-and-error, fine-tuning and troubleshooting, which are all made easy when both 
parties are in the same geographical space. By working closely with domestic tooling 
suppliers throughout the design and production process, Chinese PV manufacturers can 
also internalize the knowledge associated with the equipment and be confident in 
operating, and more importantly, experimenting with the equipment and be able tweak 
them when needed.  
An example from a factory tour of a medium size solar cell producer based in 
Changsha best highlights this point.  
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The cell manufacturer is an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of multiple 
large Chinese PV producers. The exact product they produce depends on the orders they 
receive from their customers. Unless the factory runs on full capacity, only two or three 
out of the four firing furnaces are in active mode. Among the four firing furnaces, three 
of them are jointly developed by this very OEM and the 48th Research Institute; the 
fourth one is a German brand. The operating order in this factory is that it would max out 
the capacity of the domestically made fire furnaces before they turn on the German 
furnace. The reason given by the factory manager is that workers find it is easy to 
experiment new things with the Chinese equipment. They can modify the furnaces by 
changing or adding parts to give the furnaces new functions. As a result, the furnaces 
became more versatile than they originally intended to be, which in turn allowed a lot 
more flexibility in production. Flexibility is essential to OEMs like this factory, as they 
often need to adjust their production process to meet specific demands from their buyers.  
In contrast, the German furnace, albeit from a world top supplier, does not adjust 
to new production conditions easily. The complaints about the German equipment were 
not about the quality of the furnace itself but about its ability to fit into the particular 
demand of this production line. First of all, the equipment manual and control panels are 
all in English; few production line workers have the language capability to operate the 
equipment. Even if a few have learned the basics in order to run the machine, the chances 
that they can experiment with it and make it versatile are close to zero. In addition, 
technicians who work on the machine also express cultural shocks in some basic aspects 
such as the use of symbols and colors, and the arrangement of the buttons on the control 
panels. For example, Chinese workers are used to seeing green signal lights as an 
indication of the machine is in operation. However, the German furnace uses a red light 
for the same purpose. It came across as counter-intuitive to Chinese workers. Small 
things like that confused Chinese workers and make them declare that the German 
furnace is difficult to use.  
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This example with the OEM factory contextualizes how a domestic tooling supply 
chain can enable PV manufacturers to be agile and flexible. The reasons can be boiled 
down to two points. First, the geographic proximity allows PV manufacturers and their 
suppliers to collaborate closely on equipment design and manufacturing. It gives the PV 
manufacturers first-hand information about the equipment and opens up the possibility of 
customized modification. Second, the communication barrier is low between parties from 
the same country, whereas the differences in language, custom, and working cultural 
between parties from different countries, no matter how trivial they are, prevent 
information from flowing freely and hurt the manufacturing performance. 
5.4.6. Driving mechanism 5.7: Domestic supply chain improves Chinese PV 
manufacturers’ productivity, indirectly reducing production costs.  
Domestic suppliers’ contributions to the low PV production cost in China are not 
limited to providing cheaper tooling and materials. They also enabled productivity 
improvements in Chinese factories through the following two means.  
First, the ability to produce equipment, materials and parts domestically opens a 
door to all kinds of process innovation that can increase productivity. In the innovation 
chapter, we gave an example from Jinko’s solar cell production line. An additional 
mechanical arm, made by a local machinery manufacturer, was added to a cell testing 
machine to ensure that in situations where the cell transportation belt is halted, this 
additional mechanical arm can still bring cells from elsewhere to keep the testing 
machine occupied. If it were not for the additional mechanical arm, the testing machine 
would have to be paused completely when the transportation belt ceases to work. With 
the additional arm, the downtime is avoided or at least reduced and the productivity of the 
production line is higher than it would otherwise be. Although the mechanical arm may 
marginally increase the total investment cost of that production line, over the long run, 
the higher productivity can lower the average production cost of the line. Similarly, the 
 236 
examples about ASP and the OEM from previous section also give illustrate domestic 
supply chain’s enabling role for productivity-enhancing process innovations.  
Secondly, domestically made equipment is easier and cheaper to maintain. If a 
Chinese-made equipment breaks down in a Chinese factory, the repair time is shorter 
compared to that of imported equipment because of the geographic proximity between 
domestic suppliers and the PV manufacturers. During a visit to Sunergy’s PERC 
production facility, the production line was on pause because the atomic laser deposition 
machine made by a Danish company had been broken for three weeks at that point75. It 
was not clear to the R&D director when Danish engineers would arrive to fix the 
problem, but one thing was clear: until the Danish repair the equipment, the entire PERC 
cell production at this facility would remain on hold. Given the fact that PERC cell is 
Sunergy’s flagship product, the frustration was obvious among its employees. This 
example demonstrates the downside of relying on foreign equipment and material 
supplies. The long wait time for repair and troubleshooting hurts productivity, which 
unavoidably leads to lower output and eventually loss in revenue for the firm. 
Furthermore, given the same fixed cost, lower output means higher average production 
cost. It jeopardizes the firm’s competitiveness in the market.  
5.5. A Case Study of the 48th Research Institute 
By far, this study has explored the development path of the solar PV industry in 
China, its current characteristics, its strengths and weaknesses as well as its contribution 
to the competitiveness of the industry. The interaction between firms’ strategies in 
response to changing market conditions and the government’s industrial and innovation 
policies are two major driving forces of the supply chain development.  
This section use a case study of the 48th Research Institute, one of the most 
successful Chinese solar PV manufacturing equipment suppliers, as an example to 
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illustrate how innovation at the firm level enables the growth of the supply chain, which 
in turn lends competiveness to the PV manufacturing industry.  
5.5.1. History of the 48th Research Institute  
One cannot avoid talking about the 48th Research Institute when studying the 
development of China’s domestic tooling supply chain. Its name came up again and again 
in the author’s conversations with professionals from the industry in China. Officially 
named the Forty-eighth Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group 
Corporation (CETC), the 48th Research Institute is one of the 58 research institutes 
affiliated with China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, a state-owned large 
conglomerate with a tie to the defense industry.  
Back in its defense lab age, the 48th Research Institute specialized in areas 
including thermal engineering, electronic engineering, and semiconductor devices. When 
the solar PV industry began to emerge in the early 2000s, the 48th Institute found it had 
just the right skillset for the industry: solar cell is essentially a semiconductor device that 
turns photons into electrons, and the production of solar cells requires a suite of thermal 
devices such as diffusion furnace and firing furnace, as well as electronic equipment like 
the plasma-enhanced chemical vapor deposition (PECVD) equipment. Convinced that the 
solar industry was going to gain traction, the 48th Institute began to design equipment that 
can be used for PV production. By 2002, orders from domestic solar cell producers for 
diffusion furnace, etching machine, and fire furnace started to come to the institute. By 
2004, PECVD equipment produced by the instituted was used in Chinese solar cell 
production lines, including the ones at Suntech. In 2005, the 48th Institute rolled out the 
second-generation diffusion furnace, firing furnace, plasma etching machine and PECVD 
equipment, followed by the release of the third generation products in 2006. While the 
Institute mastered equipment design and production for solar cell manufacturing, it also 
made progress in the silicon realm. In 2007, it self-designed and produced equipment 
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used in mono-silicon production and ingot casting. To further strengthen its capacity as a 
solar PV tooling supplier, the 48th Institute debuted its turnkey solar panel production 
system in 2008, which automate the entire panel production process including silicon 
growing, ingot casting, wafer slicing, solar cell production, and module encapsulation76.  
With this newly gained capacity to provide turnkey systems, the Institute began to 
see an increasing number of orders from Chinese PV manufacturers. The rapid 
manufacturing capacity expansion fueled by generous overseas Feed-in Tariffs in the 
mid- to late-2000s created an unprecedented demand for equipment made by the 48th 
Institute. Since 2006, it has built over 100 25MW level solar cell or panel production 
lines, mostly for SMEs in China.  
The global financial crisis in 2008 turned out to be not as much a challenge as an 
opportunity for the Institute. The stimulus package in the U.S., E.U. and China all made 
the clean energy industry a priority area for government stimulus fund, which further 
energized the solar deployment market and created an even bigger market for Chinese PV 
producers and tooling suppliers like the 48th Institute. As a tooling supplier to the Chinese 
PV manufacturing industry Institute, the Institute shares the same pulse with the industry. 
So when the trade dispute with E.U. and the U.S. hit the industry hard, they also made it 
challenging for the 48th Institute. Nevertheless, as surviving Chinese PV manufacturers 
turned to innovation for their next source of competitiveness and began to produce 
higher-efficient products, the 48th Institute anticipates renewed opportunities to make new 
equipment that can be used to produce high efficiency solar cells like PERC, HIT, etc.  
5.5.2. The 48th Research Institute’s Impact on the Localization of Tooling Supply 
5.5.2.1. Achieve Self-sufficiency in PV Manufacturing Equipment Production  
                                                 
76 48th Research Institute: http://www.cs48.com/html/48s/fzlc/  
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The importance of the 48th Institute’s ability to make turnkey systems with a 
complete set of silicon, solar cell and module manufacturing equipment cannot be 
overstated. It marks the achievement of the 100% localization of tooling production. As 
discussed in the previous section, a whole suite of benefits comes with using domestically 
produced equipment. They are cheaper, easier to use, adaptive to new production 
requirements, can be repaired relatively quickly.  
The 48th Institute’s motivation to develop the ability to produce the entire set of 
PV manufacturing equipment stems from both market opportunity and its tie to the 
central government.  
The booming PV manufacturing market and the rapid capacity expansion 
associated with it created a large demand for equipment made by the 48th Institute 
(market creation).  It seized the market opportunity and developed the ability to supply 
tooling needed for the domestic industry (knowledge development and diffusion).  
Nevertheless, the 48th Institute could have chosen to play within its strong suit and 
become the suppliers of a selection of the production equipment. It is arguably a more 
economically efficient decision. But it was not the path that the Institute pursued. The 
decision to become a one-stop PV tooling supplier was driven by the 48th Institute’s role 
as a State-owned Enterprise (SOE). Literatures often depict SOEs as bureaucratic, less 
efficient, slow in response to market trends, and prone to government influence (Ding, 
Zhang, & Zhang, 2007; Li et al., 2006; Montinola, Qian, Weingast, & Introduction, 
1996). The case with the 48th Institute shed some new light on the theory.  
It is true that SOEs are prone to government influence, but it is not necessarily a 
bad thing. In the 48th Institute’s case, government policy influenced its direction of 
search and led to a leap forward in mastering PV tooling manufacturing capabilities.  
When the Chinese government sent clear and strong signals in its 11th and 12th 
FYP about developing the solar industry, the Institute saw both a market opportunity and 
a social responsibility as an SOE to improve the domestic PV tooling manufacturing 
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capacity. The 11th FYP for Renewable Energy Development, the 12th FYP Special Plan 
for Solar Electricity Generation Technology Development, and the 12th FYP Special Plan 
for Solar PV Industry Development all listed the equipment manufacturing as a key area 
of development. The typical mindset of an SOE is to do “what the economy needs”, and 
since the FYPs clearly pointed out that the need is to become more capable of making PV 
tooling domestically, the 48th Institute naturally took on the task as its calling. It did not 
make the most economically rational calculation in deciding what equipment choice 
would yield the highest economic return. Rather, it decided that the social mission, which 
was to make the PV industry in China self-sufficient of PV tooling supply, is more 
important. In an interview with the deputy director of the Institute, he stated,  
“ The commanding goal of the Institute is to conduct tooling-related R&D for the 
entire solar PV value chain in China. This is a responsibility we have as an SOE. ” 
They see the role they play in producing tooling for the entire Chinese PV 
manufacturing industry, without leaving a single gap, as their social responsibility. By 
fulfilling the responsibility, they do their share to contribute to the greater economic 
development of the nation. To an SOE, its social responsibility often trumps economic 
calculations.  
In order to best fulfill its social mission, the 48th Institute decided to become fully 
integrated so that they can be the first user and experimenter of their own equipment 
(influence on direction of search). Starting from 2011, the Institute became a solar cell 
producer, fully equipped with tooling produced in-house so that they can collect first-
hand information about their own equipment and conduct trial-and-error to improve their 
performance. By the second quarter of 2015, they had a cell manufacturing capacity of 
500MW. It also produces wafer and ingot and assembles PV modules. The in-house 
commercial production capacity allows timely feedback on equipment performance 
between producer and user, which are the same party in this case. 
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It is clear that the policy signal to develop domestic PV supply chain and the tie 
between the 48th Institute and Chinese government influenced its research agenda and 
business decision. A private company with the same technical credential is unlikely to 
make the same decision to become a one-stop tooling supplier because it is technically 
demanding and economically suboptimal. Nevertheless, the 48th Institute’s social mission 
influences its firm strategy and leads it to consider beyond its institute-level economic 
wellbeing and optimize from the industry’s perspective.   
5.5.2.2. Enhance the Penetration of Domestically Produced PV Manufacturing 
Equipment through Quality Improvement 
For a long time, Tier 1 Chinese PV producers preferred Western equipment 
because of the high quality they offer. Even though domestic tooling suppliers can be 
used as a bargaining chip in price negotiation, the benefit of agility, flexibility and short 
repair wait time cannot be realized without actually using domestic tooling. In other 
word, unless the quality of Chinese made equipment improves, Chinese PV producers are 
not able to take the full advantage of the domestic tooling supply chain. The interview 
with the deputy director of the 48th Institute revealed an interesting history between the 
Institute and large Chinese Tier 1 PV producers that were there from the inception of the 
industry. Before these companies became world famous, many of them bought equipment 
from the 48th Institute. However, after they became publicly listed companies and went 
on to receive large orders from overseas customers, companies stopped using Chinese 
equipment and turned to foreign suppliers for better equipment instead. Losing customers 
made the 48th institute motivated to improve the performance of their own products.  
Better equipment design, expanded equipment capacity, and higher degree of 
automation are three major ways to improve equipment performance. Equipment 
performance is predicated on its design. Design is the soul of a machine. The actual 
equipment is nothing more than the design being materialized. Issues with stability and 
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reliability (Section 5.3.4.3.2) mostly stem from design imperfections. They can be 
improved upon with incremental fixes to the existing design or with a new design. The 
former is done usually in an experimental way through trial-and-errors. The fact that the 
48th Institute has in-house production line fully equipped with its self-designed equipment 
allows them to experiment with incremental improvements. When incremental 
improvements can no longer deliver the desired quality, new technological pathways, i.e. 
hardcore innovations, are needed. The 48th Institute is arguably in the best position to 
innovate because of its history as a public research institute. By default, its primary 
mission is to innovation. In fact, it has developed a track record of coming up with 
equipment with new designs. Take diffusion furnace for an example, over the course of 
five years, four types of diffusion furnace were designed and produced in order to meet 
the evolving production requirement by the PV manufacturers (knowledge development).  
In addition to newer designs, the 48th Institute also produces bigger-size 
equipment in order to satisfy the capacity expansion in China. As the overall capacity 
increases, the size of a single production line also becomes bigger and bigger to keep up 
with the ever growth PV manufacturing capacity in China. A typical capacity of one 
production line in 2013 was 25 MW, but in 2015, large production facility prefers 30 to 
35MW. Bigger production line capacity requires larger parts such as solid shafts. The 48th 
Institute spent 2 years in R&D and eventually mastered the method to produce and 
integrate larger solid shafts to existing equipment in order to deliver greater power. This 
timely development made its equipment popular among Chinese buyers who seek greater 
production capacity. 
Last but not least, the 48th Institute also took equipment automation seriously. 
Acknowledging the fact that the PV manufacturing processes are becoming increasing 
automated, Chinese PV producers ramped up their deployment of automated machines 
every time they build a new facility (see Section 4.3.1.1 in Chapter 4 for an example of 
production automation in China). Automation is a weakness of Chinese tooling 
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manufacturers comparing to historical heavy machinery manufacturing powerhouses like 
Germany. Realizing that equipment automation is an unavoidable future, the 48th Institute 
prioritized the R&D of automated machines, most noticeably automated diffusion 
furnace, automated etching equipment, automated PECVD, etc., in their research agenda. 
According to its manufacturing manager77, a 25MW cell production line with 100% the 
latest 48th Institute-designed equipment requires 60 people to operate, that is down from 
150 people required by its first generation production line and 120 people required by the 
second generation production line. This labor requirement is still higher than the best-
automated production line made by western supplier, but stand-alone automated 
equipment such as diffusion furnace, etching and PECVD equipment have started to be 
adopted by Chinese PV producers.  
In summary, building on its historical research capacity in thermal engineering, 
electronic engineering, and semiconductor devices, the 48th Institute expanded its product 
family of diffusion and firing furnace, etching machine, and PECVD equipment with 
newer versions that have more functions and greater power. This effort paid off. Tier 1 
Chinese companies started to use equipment provided by the 48th Institute since 2010, 
and by 2013 half of the Chinese Tier 1 companies use diffusion and etching equipment 
made by it and at least 1 company uses PECVD equipment made by the 
Institute. 78Associated with the adoption of domestically made tooling was reductions in 
PV production cost.  
5.5.2.3. Sprout Knowledge Diffusion and Expansion of the PV Tooling Industry  
As the first mover in the PV equipment manufacturing area, the 48th Institute does 
not only become a leading domestic supplier, it has also spun off a number of domestic 
tooling suppliers. In the process of developing tooling design and production knowledge, 
                                                 
77 Interviewee #103 
78 Data source: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey Continuous Edition, 2013. Analysis 
results are summarized and turned into Table 5.4.  
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the Institute fostered a large number of R&D experts and skilled workers along the way, 
many of them later became entrepreneurs and started their own business in the tooling 
production realm. For example, Exact S.C., a leading Chinese PECVD equipment and 
diffusion furnace provider is founded by a group of the former 48th Institute employees. 
Shenzhen Fullshare Equipment (former Han’s PV), headed by a former deputy director of 
the 48th Institute, is now a serious contender in the diffusion furnace and PECVD field. 
Qingdao-based Wuzhuan Equipment has also made inroad to the firing and diffusion 
furnace market after a former 48th Institute senior researcher came on board.  
Companies spun off from the 48th Institutes increased the number of players in the 
equipment production segment of the solar PV industry in China. They created positive 
externalities by introducing market competition to the incumbent players, including the 
48th Institute. Like what market competition always do, they expanded product diversity, 
increased product quality, further lowered the price, and pushed for all parties to innovate 
and offer newer and better products.  
To summarize, the example of the 48th Research Institute provides vivid examples 
about how firm level innovation drives the development and maturation of the solar PV 
supply chain development in China and enables Chinese PV manufacturers to upgrade 
their products and production processes in order to stay competitive in the market.  
5.6. Summary and Policy Implications  
Chapter 4 of this dissertation found that a robust and regionally clustered supply 
chain is a unique feature of the solar PV industry in China. This chapter studies the 
history of the solar PV supply chain and its role in building the competitive strength of its 
domestic PV manufacturing industry. It is discovered that the supply chain in China is 
complete, robust, and geographically concentrated. Its inception was due to market 
opportunity, but its growth was facilitated by both market force and government policy 
and planning. Rapid PV manufacturing capacity expansion in response to foreign demand 
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in the mid- to late-2000s gave the supply chain an initial development momentum. 
Industrialization strategy (see Chapter 4 Section 4.3.5.1) and planning at both the central 
and local government level gave the supply chain a sustained power to grow. On the 
central government level, multiple FYPs set a clear vision of building a fully-
development self-sufficient domestic supply chain. Research and development funding 
were allocated by MOIIT and MOST to executive the vision. At the same time, local and 
municipal governments’ industrial planning centered around creating manufacturing 
clusters supported by spatially compact supply chain.  
However, industrialization of the PV supply chain is only half of the supply chain 
development story in China, and it is predicated on knowing how to produce the tooling 
and materials required by PV producers. In other word, supply chain development is as 
much a process of innovation as industrialization. The supply chain in China became 
more and more complete over time because innovation conducted by players in this 
industry produced science and technology advancement, which allowed them to master 
knowledge required in producing equipment such as diffusion furnace, PECVC, etc., and 
materials like EVA. Nevertheless, China’s weak foundation in scientific and 
technological innovation remains a weak link in its quest to build a fully-development 
self-sufficient supply chain.  
On-the-ground research conducted by this dissertation found that benefits 
associated with a domestic supply chain are multi-fold. It either directly or indirectly 
lowers PV production cost by providing cheaper tooling and material alternatives. It 
locks in the cost competitiveness for local PV producers, making it difficult and 
uneconomical for producers from elsewhere to duplicate the practice.  A domestic supply 
chain also allows PV producers to stay flexible and agile by enabling producers and their 
suppliers to engage in joint R&D at a low transaction cost. Furthermore, flexibility and 
agility often lead to higher productivity, which indirectly reduce PV production cost and 
enhance the producer’s competitiveness.  
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Given the fact that the geographically compact solar PV supply chain is central to 
the competiveness of the Chinese solar PV industry, the questions for policymakers from 
around the world are two. First, is building a fully developed self-sufficient domestic 
supply chain a suitable strategy given the state of their national economies? Second, if 
yes, then how to do so?  
There is no standard answer to the first question. Although the supply chain in 
China has enabled its domestic PV companies to gain a large cost advantage, supply 
chain is not for every country.  
First of all, China’s supply chain is hard to be duplicated elsewhere because it is 
part of the greater China industrial enterprise. Not everything in the PV supply chain is 
specifically built for the solar industry; many of them are (e.g. silicon, ingot and wafer, 
etc), but a good number of them are just another application of China’s massive 
manufacturing industries. For commodities like glasses, electric wires, aluminum frames, 
Chinese PV producers can take the advantage of the already-exist suppliers. For countries 
that do not have a solid infrastructure for manufacturing, building a full supply chain 
from scratch can be costly and inefficient.  
Second, even with good pre-existing manufacturing infrastructure, a country’s 
solar PV supply chain is only as good as its innovation capacity. Southeast Asian 
countries are living testimony of this point. Even with low labor cost and rapidly 
developing infrastructure, countries like Vietnam and Malaysia still have a supply chain 
disadvantage to China because of their incapability to master the production method of a 
few technologically demanding materials and equipment. Although the decision to pursue 
a full supply chain may as well provide a strategy that countries can use to develop their 
science and technology strength, it is a long-term project and requires even more 
investment in R&D infrastructure and education than building the manufacturing 
capacity. However, countries with strong foundation in science and engineering such as 
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Japan, many western and northern European countries and the U.S. are well positioned to 
be strong competitors in manufacturing certain advanced equipment and materials.  
Although there is no standard prescription for building an effective supply chain, 
a few lessons learned from the China’s example can shed some light on how to make the 
endeavor successful.  
Firstly, the government has to play a role in supply chain development. As seen 
from China, market force alone did not create the supply chain. A national vision for a 
supply chain development is necessary because it sends an assuring signal to the market. 
By legitimizing the idea of supply chain, it mobilizes human, financial and technical 
resources to take part in supply chain development. Granted, a supply chain can be 
developed without a national vision, it is just that an organic supply chain development is 
likely to be slower and imbalanced in terms of the strength of each link. The role of a 
national vision is to provide confidence to market players and local policymakers in order 
to stimulate a speedy and concerted effort.  
Secondly, the spatial configuration of the supply chain is as important as its 
completeness. For a product like solar PV, which has a short production process, a 
regionally clustered supply chain built around major manufacturers is most effective. 
Shorter spatial distance between manufacturers and their suppliers creates agglomeration 
economies that allow players to share infrastructures and common labor pool. They 
reduce logistics cost and transaction cost related to communication; they spur knowledge 
diffusion and improve flexibility and agility of both the manufactures and their suppliers.  
Thirdly, supply chain development is as much a science and technology matter as 
an industrial one because modern manufacturing requires advanced equipment and 
materials (Clark, 2013). Any advancement made in research labs has to be implemented 
through improvements in production process, which are made possible only through new 
materials and upgraded equipment. At the end of the day, scientific and technological 
knowledge is the ultimate enabler of supply chain development. Policies that eye towards 
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building a strong supply chain should also emphasize science and technology education, 
public R&D, and firm level innovation.  
It needs to acknowledge that there are risks related to building a supply chain for 
a specific industry. An industry-specific supply chain may suffer from “lock-in” or “path 
dependence” problem (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995; Martin & Sunley, 2006; Unruh, 
2000), where positive feed back loops are formed to reinforce the status quo, making it is 
difficult for the system to adopt new technologies and to adapt to changes. There are 
upsides and downsides of path dependence.  
On the upside, once an organization (could be a company, an industry, or even a 
country) has a head start, even by chance, it tends to stay ahead. The rate of return 
increases rather than decreases (Arthur, 1989, 1990). In the solar PV industry’s context, 
the fully developed local supply chain cluster first formed in the YRD area, making it an 
attractive place for solar panel manufacturing. It grew more sophisticated with time and 
continues to attract more manufacturing capacity. Its sustained attractiveness rooted in 
agglomeration economies rendered few Chinese and foreign region able to compete.  
However, the downside of path dependence is more worrisome. By reinforcing its 
current position, an organization develops attachment to its technology and sees vested 
interests rise around the predominant organization structure. It becomes fossilized and 
resistant to change. These characteristics render the organization vulnerable to new and 
disruptive technologies. This is an alarming tale to the Chinese solar PV industry and its 
supply chain. Fortunately, a supply chain can be built flexible to mitigate the negative 
effects by leveraging a wide variety of suppliers, including both industry-specific 
suppliers and general suppliers that it shares with other industries. This is harder for 
technology-specific supplies, such as silicon and wafer in the solar PV industry's case. 
But it is possible for generic supplies, like glass, aluminum frame, cable, scrubbers, etc. 
By effectively sharing suppliers, the newly built supply chain can take advantage of 
suppliers that are flexible enough to supply to multiple industries. The Chinese solar PV 
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supply chain started in exactly this way. Suppliers who had the capability to provide 
products to multiple industries have endogenous flexibility, which prepares them for 
future changes that may happen to the industry. By including suppliers like this, a 
manufacturing industry can build resilience and adaptability to protect itself from 
disruptive changes. It is also fair to say that the broader a country’s industrial base, the 
more likely that its supply chains are flexible, adaptable and resilient because they have a 




CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1. Summary of Findings and Conclusions  
This study examines the solar PV innovation and manufacturing system in China. 
By studying their history and development mechanisms, this study concludes the 
following.  
Using solar cell lab efficiency, the quality and quantity of solar PV patents, and 
publications as three innovation indicators, this study finds that in general, China is 
closing the innovation gap between itself and the world’s leading innovators. Unlike what 
conventional wisdom assumes, this study shows that the Chinese PV R&D community 
has been actively engaging in basic science research and has produced noticeable 
outcome in certain technology areas. This finding debunks the myth that China does not 
conduct any hardcore scientific and technological innovation. However, the progress is 
uneven across PV technology spectrum. Depending on the choice of innovation indicator, 
the progress is more pronounced in certain technology areas than in others.  
Using solar cell efficiency as an indicator, the gaps between world-record 
efficiencies and leading Chinese efficiencies have been narrowed significantly in 
technology areas such as HIT, CIGS, pervoskite and organic solar cell. However, in 
technologies like CdTe, the gap between China and the developed world is persistent.  
Using the number of invention patents granted in China as an alternative 
indicator, this study finds that the number of solar PV related patents granted to Chinese 
entities has increased significantly since 2007 and it outpaced the increase of foreign 
patents.  Further examination of patent quality shows that patents granted to Chinese 
entities tend to have higher lapse rates than their foreign counterparts in six types of 
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technologies, indicating a lower patent quality among the former group. The trend is 
reversed in eight other types of solar PV technologies. It is found that lower Chinese 
patent quality tends to correlate with the academic patent holders. Government policies 
that subsidize patent application and incentive structures within academic are found to be 
two main reasons responsible for lower patent quality among academic players. 
Furthermore, a close look at individual technologies, once again, shows an uneven 
distribution of progress across the technology spectrum. Technologies like HIT, CIGS, 
OPV, pervoskite, etc. have seen significant increases in patent quantity, whereas little 
progress has been made for IBC.  
A literature review of bibliometric studies about solar technology reveals that 
Chinese researchers are catching up from behind in terms of publication growth rate, 
although the absolute number of publications, especially in English language, is still 
small, indicating a smaller influence of their work.  
The reasons behind the increasingly active solar innovation in China are threefold. 
First, Chinese government has a strategic vision for its solar PV industry, which is to 
achieve both technological advancement and industrialization along the entire solar PV 
value chain. It carries out this vision through increasingly nuanced R&D and 
industrialization planning over multiple Five Year Plan (FYP) cycles. The FYP visions 
are then implemented by a suite of science, technology and innovation (STI) programs 
administered by MOST.  This suite of STI programs is designed to cover the entire 
RDD&D cycle of solar PV technologies.   
In addition to the national vision and implementation strategy, growing public 
finance support from the central and local governments coupled with corporate R&D 
investment from major Chinese solar panel manufacturers fuel the innovation activities in 
both academia and the industry. Between 2000 and 2015, NSFC invested $26 million to 
solar PV related basic research at the same time the 973 and 863 Program, two flagship 
STI programs, poured at least $48 million to large-scale PV specific basic and applied 
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research projects. While the public finance’s support to solar PV innovation in China is 
evident, leading Chinese solar PV manufacturing companies have also established a 
record of R&D investment. More importantly, in recent years, they have become the 
heavyweight players in solar innovation as their R&D expenditures dwarf the 
government spending. However, even with the uptake in both public and private R&D 
investment, the financial resources they spent are still much smaller than those of their 
American counterparts. Even though money stretches further in China, the fact that 
government spending on solar PV innovation in China is less than one-tenth of that of the 
U.S. and leading Chinese PV manufacturing companies spend less than half of what their 
American competitors spend on R&D suggests that China is still a good distance behind 
the world’s leading innovators like the U.S. Despite the growing amount of R&D 
spending, there is a large room for China’s to increase its input to the solar PV innovation 
system.  
The third reason for innovation improvement is that solar PV R&D in China 
benefited from innovation networks that involve both public and private innovation 
players and connect domestic and international research capacity. Both policy and the 
market played a role in forming the innovation ecosystem at the macro-level and the 
technology-specific innovation networks at the micro-level.  
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of China orchestrates a 
national innovation ecosystem. It uses a set of STI programs as intermediaries to connect 
the national PV innovation visions and public finance resources with the actually 
innovation players on the ground. The breadth of the STI programs equals to the entire 
RDD&D cycle. They purposefully connect academic innovation players with industry 
players through incentive structures (or even de factor requirements for public-private 
partnership) in order to cover the full lab-to-market cycle. Driven by the shrinking space 
for cost competition and the markets’ growing taste for high performance solar panels, 
Chinese companies also increasingly seek to expand their innovation capacity through 
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collaborating with domestic and international academic researchers, forming the 
foundation of technology-specific innovation networks. This emergence of innovation 
networks was further solidified by the government’s global effort to recruit science and 
technology experts to come to work in China. A good number of oversea-trained Chinese 
and foreign national solar PV researchers were recruited by government-led programs 
such as the Thousand-Talent Program to work in China. They introduced world’s leading 
research methods and cutting-edge scientific concepts to China and significantly 
narrowed the knowledge gap between China and the West. These recruited PV 
researchers along with their connections at overseas PV R&D hotspots became an 
integral part of China’s innovation networks. These networks are found by this study to 
be quintessential to the improvement of China’s solar PV innovation capacity and the 
narrowing of innovation gaps between China and the world-class for a good number of 
technologies.  
In contrast to its increasingly global innovation network, solar PV manufacturing 
in China thrives on a fully development domestic supply chain.  
Similar to innovation, PV manufacturing in China benefited from having a 
national vision and an industrialization strategy, which centered on building economies of 
scale and developing domestic supply chain. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence 
suggests that economies of scale have contributed significantly to Chinese solar PV 
manufacturers’ cost advantage, which led to their global market dominance.  Economies 
of scale was first created and then sustained by a suit of pro-solar deployment policies in 
Europe, the U.S., China, etc. Growing market demand led to continuous capacity 
expansion (with an interruption between 2012 and 2014 due to trade wars), allowing 
Chinese manufacturers to create economies of scale, during which process they kept 
upgrading their production equipment and materials, which led to higher productivity and 
lower production cost. In addition, vertical integration allowed manufacturers to 
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internalize outside suppliers to create vertical scale along the value chain. It in turn 
lowered the transaction cost and eventually lowered the overall production cost.  
Speaking of low cost, the quantitative analysis done in this study shows that 
besides economies of scale through capacity expansion and vertical integration, 
government financial assistance on access to debt and equity are also casual factors that 
led to lower PV production cost among large Chinese manufacturers. Unlike what theory 
suggests, tax breaks and higher levels of R&D investment are not found to be causally 
link to low cost PV production in China. Nevertheless, one factor that the quantitative 
analysis was not able to characterize but was fully explored using qualitative data is the 
development of the Chinese domestic supply chain. 
In the era of globalization, the Chinese solar PV supply chain is strikingly local. 
When the supply chain was first formed, it was mainly made of non-solar-specific 
suppliers. However, the booming solar PV manufacturing industry created market 
opportunities that did not only attracted generic suppliers but also spurred the birth and 
growth of many solar-specific suppliers, many of which developed specialties that filled 
holes existed previously in the supply chain. Contemporary to the market force was the 
government policies’ repeated calling to build a fully developed domestic supply chain. 
Research projects that target the technical barriers to domestic production of PV 
manufacturing tooling and materials were funded by the central government through STI 
programs. The ultimate goal of these research projects is to master the technical 
knowledge embedded in the entire solar PV supply chain in order to achieve self-
sufficiency.  
In a sense, the history of the solar PV supply chain development is a familiar tale. 
Firms collocate in specific regions to first take advantage of pre-existing suppliers and 
then co-develop with them. In so doing, they create agglomeration economies that offer 
benefits ranging from sharing suppliers, diffusing knowledge, to building and utilizing 
common labor pool and infrastructure (Christopherson and Clark 2009; Florida 2013; 
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Krugman 1991; Porter and Stern 2001). Found by many previous industry and region-
based case studies, agglomeration economies do not only facilitate the development of an 
industry, it is central to the competitive advantage of the industry and the region it based 
in (Christopherson and Storper 1986; Gray, Golob, and Markusen 1996; Markusen 1991; 
Scott and Storper 2007). However, such findings have not been confirmed in renewable 
technology manufacturing industries, partly because of the young age of these industries. 
Previous studies about the wind and solar industry approached the issue either from 
individual firms’ perspective (Nahm & Steinfeld, 2014a) or from a pure national policy’s 
perspective (Zhao, Zhang, Hubbard, & Yao, 2013b) rather than from the industry and 
region’s perspective, and many of them paint a rather global picture (Dunford, Lee, Liu, 
& Yeung, 2012; Lewis, 2013).   
The regional study approach is good at teasing out the dynamics between firm 
strategies and local or regional institutions. However, for the solar PV industry in China, 
its development is affected surely but not only by local and regional institutions, but also 
by national institutions given China’s long history in central-planned economy, and by 
international institutions such as global trade and foreign solar deployment policies. What 
makes this study unique is that it seeks, examines, and adjudicates explanations for the 
PV industry development at multiple scales.  
It is discovered that central government policies are mainly responsible for 
knowledge development related to the entire solar PV value chain, that is from labs to 
production lines and eventually to the supply chain.  
Regional institutions are weak in the Chinese solar PV innovation system. Most 
local governments prioritize industrialization before innovation. They repeat the rhetoric 
about innovation set by the central government and try to mirror some of the STI 
programs run by MOST, but the intensity of the R&D support is low and not impactful. 
Nevertheless, there are some encouraging signs. Some farsighted locales such as the City 
of Suzhou in Jiansu Province and the City of Jiaxing in Zhejiang Province are leveraging 
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innovation as one of the driving forces for their industrial upgrades, although the 
approaches they use, like setting thresholds for minimum corporate R&D investment and 
capital intensity, still have a flavor of command-and-control style policymaking.   
Universities are found to be participants but not “engines” of solar PV innovation 
(Fritsch & Slavtchev, 2007; Gunasekara, 2006). They are either incentivized by 
government policies to work with industry players or approached by them, but this study 
discovers no evidence showing that universities and other research institutes have either 
the vision or ambition to define, shape or drive the regional innovation effort.  
In contrast to local institutions’ less than prominent role in driving innovation, 
they are front and center in creating the agglomeration economies of PV production. The 
initial market momentum to collocate the PV producers with suppliers was later solidified 
by the establishment of a number of solar-centric industrial parks sponsored by local 
governments. These industrials parks facilitated the formation of spatially compact 
industrial clusters around major solar PV manufacturers. These industrial clusters are 
crucial in explaining Chinese PV manufacturers’ cost competitiveness. As a result of 
market forces and government policies, the PV supply chain in China grew more 
complete and robust over time.  
The benefits of having a fully developed domestic supply chain are multiple folds.  
First of all, a domestic supply chain provides Chinese PV manufacturers with cheaper 
alternative tooling and material options that directly reduce their production costs. Even 
in cases where Chinese PV producers did not directly buy from domestic suppliers, just 
the threat to switch forced foreign suppliers to reduce the price of their products, which 
indirectly reduces PV production cost in China. Secondly, domestic supply chain lowers 
the transaction cost associated with communication (P. Krugman, 1991a; Williamson, 
1999) between suppliers and PV producers and allows the latter to customize their 
production equipment with the support form the former. Chinese PV manufacturers 
become more agile, flexible and productive because of this collaborative local learning. 
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Lastly but importantly, the vertically disintegrated agglomeration economies created by 
the domestic supply chain lock the cost and logistic advantage within China and gives the 
country unique infrastructure, business, and knowledge advantages that are difficult to 
duplicate elsewhere.  
Economies of scale and supply chain development are two of the many factors 
that this study examined in searching for sources of market competitiveness among 
Chinese PV manufacturers. Five categories of factors were identified to have significant 
impacts on competitiveness. For example, the previously discussed economies of scale 
and supply chain development as well as innovation belong to the agglomeration 
economies category. They are not simply a reflection of individual company’s behavior 
but the characteristics of the structure of the whole industry. In contrast, firm strategy 
factors like flexibility, process innovation, and management show that despite the 
structural factors, individual companies have a good amount of leeway in creating 
competitiveness through their own operation practices. In addition, factors like work 
ethic, the pragmatic attitude, and the manufacturers’ unabashed desire for lower cost all 
provide important cultural context to understand solar PV manufacturing in China. 
Besides, macro factors such as access to labor, infrastructure and capital as well as 
industrial policies, deployment policies, labor and environmental regulations, and 
government subsidies and incentives all play a role in building the manufacturing 
strength of the solar PV industry in China.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese solar PV industry still has a lot of stubborn weaknesses 
and faces many challenges. Solar PV R&D in China focuses on short-term commercial 
success at the cost of long-term scientific innovation. It is largely comfortable with 
playing a “catch-up” game and has achieved very few scientific and technological 
breakthroughs. MOST’s utilization of the science, technology and innovation programs 
were inefficient and ineffective because of its lack of policy consistency and continuity, 
its own less-than-perfect technology forecast, and inaccurate market feasibility 
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assessment. Local institutions, including local governments and universities, have not 
developed the tenacity to building innovation strength. To make things even worse, the 
weak innovation capacity jeopardizes the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector 
and the development of the supply chain, making it difficult for them to gain strength in 
areas that requires advanced knowledge and manufacturing skills. Besides, the single-
minded pursuit of quick commercial success via the low road development strategy 
(compete for low cost) caused the industry a range of problems from low product quality 
to poor product performance. It trapped the industry in the low-end market. Last but not 
least, an overshot of the economies of scale strategy fueled by easy access to capital and 
local governments’ short-term-interest-driven economic development decisions led to 
rapid but irrational expansions of manufacturing capacity, which eventually landed the 
industry in the hot water of international trade disputes and forced it to go through a 
painful industry structuring.  
The next section will discuss the policy implications of these findings. They 
meant to be applicable not only to the solar PV industry but also to socially and 
environmentally friendly technology-oriented industry in general. The recommendations 
are crafted with both the developing and developed countries in mind.  
6.2. Policy Implications and Recommendations  
The policy implications and recommendations of this study touch on three areas. 
First, lessons about institutional building can be learned from the development course of 
the solar PV industry in China. Furthermore, policymakers need to be aware of the fact 
that the development of a new industry should be a synthesized effort across multiple 
arenas, namely technology innovation, manufacturing, deployment, and supply chain 
development. As a result, policies targeting those specific areas should be designed in 
concert with one another to maximize the efficiency of the system. Last but not least, 
depending on the type of technology, the nature of knowledge, and the development stage 
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of the country in focus, different geographical configurations of production and 
knowledge network should be considered. Figure 6.1 summarizes the key policy 
recommendations that this dissertation recommends policymakers to take.  The remaining 
part of this chapter will elaborate on them.  
 
Figure 6.1 Summary of Policy Recommendations 
6.2.1. Institution Building  
6.2.1.1. National Vision and Strategy 
When it comes to developing a new industry, it is important to have a national 
vision and follow it with a national strategy. As seen time and time again in the 
discussion of the solar PV innovation, manufacturing and supply chain development in 
China, setting a vision for technology innovation and industrialization is the beginning 
point of building an industry. National or federal government bears the responsibility of 
laying out the national vision. Having a national vision is crucial because above all 
things, it shows the government’s commitment to the technology and lends it legitimacy 
going forward. Legitimacy is important for a new and emerging industry if it wants to 
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compete with the incumbents. Once gaining the initial legitimacy, an industry can 
mobilize human, financial and technical resources to create markets and build 
acceptance.  
An industry can certainly develop in an organic way without having the 
endorsement from the national or federal government, but an organic development is 
slower and riskier, and may face many resource constraints. The longer it takes for an 
industry to garner resources to grow its size and strength, the slower it becomes 
competitive in the marketplace. The role of a national vision is to provide policy 
certainties and give confidence to the market in order to stimulate a concerted and speedy 
effort among as many stakeholders as possible to develop the industry. 
Although national visions are more commonly seen in planned-economies like 
China’s, the concept is not alien to a Western audience. The success of the U.S. space 
program since the 1960s is a good example of what a national vision can accomplish 
(Cornelius, 2005).    
A national vision is meant to be aspirational. In terms of substantive 
implementation of the vision, a national strategy is recommended. Depending on the 
technology, different types of strategy should be leveraged. For technologies that are still 
early in their research stages, a strategy that focuses on technology innovation is suitable. 
For market-ready technologies, strategies such as building economies of scale, supply 
chain development, and demand stimulation (i.e. deployment policies such as FITs and 
investment tax credit for solar) are preferable.   
Policy recommendation 1: Create a national vision for technology 
development and commercialization and follow it with concrete strategies.  
6.2.1.2. Local Institution Building   
One lesson learned from studying the solar PV industry in China is that a 
mismatch between national and local institutions can prohibit the innovation and 
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industrial progress. Policies and programs set at the national level are interconnected with 
local regulatory, innovation and economic development capacities. It is true for federal 
and centralized systems alike that the local implementation of national policies as well as 
localities’ own “laboratory of democracy” type of experiments are just as important as 
what happens at the national level (Norton, 2005; Ostrom, 2005). An effective national 
policy achieves its goal not by micro-managing but through mobilizing resources to the 
greatest extent possible.  Local institutions such as local governments, universities, and 
regional industry consortiums can at least be the amplifier of national policies. What is 
more, they can and should be the engine of the regional innovation and economic 
development machine.  
Local governments in the Yangtze River Delta region played a key facilitating 
role by creating physical spaces and a welcoming policy environment for the solar PV 
manufacturing clusters in the region. The spatial collocation of suppliers and PV 
manufacturers was accentuated with the existence of solar-oriented industrial parks, 
which formed the foundation of an agglomeration economy.  
However, the co-location has focused predominantly on the manufacturers and 
their suppliers, and it has less an emphasis on incorporating innovation players such as 
universities, research institutes, or high-tech start-ups in the region. On the one hand, 
local governments were slow in realizing the importance of innovation players. But on 
the other hand, majority of the universities and research institutes in the region have not 
demonstrated strong endogenous motivations to take part in the regional agglomeration 
economy. As a result, the region’s rapidly growing manufacturing capacity outpaced its 
innovative capacity. This does not mean that industries would necessarily face a set back 
when they are not sufficiently supported by the embedding regional innovation systems. 
The Chinese solar PV industry’s example shows that in the era of globalization, firms and 
industries can escape unfavorable conditions by reaching beyond their physical 
boundaries to other domestic regions or even overseas for innovation capacity and be 
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successful. However, that strategy does mean that the regions where firms and industries 
locate miss a big opportunity to build, strengthen, and upgrade their own regional 
innovation systems and support innovation players in their territories. Given the fact that 
SME suppliers, unlike the big manufacturers they supply to, are less likely to have 
national or international research networks, the absence of local innovation capacity puts 
a constraint on their ability to advance technologically, which would eventually impact 
the entire region’s competitiveness.  
With that being said, local governments should be proactive in creating physical 
space to incentivize manufacturing firms to collocate with their peers and suppliers. 
Agglomeration economies created by such approach are center to the competitive 
advantage of an industry and the region it locates in. More importantly, technology 
providers, innovation players, and high tech suppliers should also be in the mix, in order 
to create long-term competitiveness for the industry and allow the region to share the full 
benefit for having supported the industry. On the flip side, innovation players like 
universities and research institute should actively seek opportunities to participate in the 
physical agglomeration economies of production and the virtual value flow that includes 
knowledge development and diffusion. They can do so by establishing scholarly or 
internship programs with local firms (Yingli Solar has such programs with local 
universities), forming research partnerships (such as multiple CAS institutes’ 
collaborating relationships with leading Chinese PV manufacturers), or even building 
incubators in local industrial parks to transfer products developed in research labs to 
production lines, which has been seen in industries like IT and biotech but not yet in solar 
PV.  
Policy recommendation 2: Utilize local governments’ facilitating role to 
develop agglomeration economies of production through physically and virtually 
connecting manufacturing and innovation players. 
 263 
Another area for local institutions to improve upon is how political dynamics 
between firms and local governments are handled.  One big lesson learned from the 
development of the PV manufacturing sector is that local governments, in pursing 
economic development in their territories, sometimes bent over to firms they deemed as 
important and extended sizable incentive packages that compromised the financial 
healthiness of their jurisdictions and locked themselves into a vested interest with the 
firms, which only became more entrenched over time. Industrial development is as much 
a political activity as an economic one. Firms and their local governors engage in 
constant bargaining over how to distribute the cost and risk as well as the profit and 
benefit of the economic activities (Christopherson and Clark 2009). The swing of 
political power can go both ways and local governments could be vulnerable politically 
in their relationships with firms. It all depends on which party has more of the resources 
that the other party wants. For localities that yearn for more economic development and 
jobs, they are susceptible to firms' lobbying power. They become captive to two things: 
the ideal scenario that they long for and the firms that they thought are going to bring the 
ideal to reality.  
Local governments need data-driven rational decision-making to break this 
psychology. They should make decisions based on what is likely to happen, supported by 
empirical evidence and sound policy analysis, instead of on what they hope will happen. 
They need evidence-based policy to decide whether using the collective resources to 
support a particular firm, an industry or even an innovation system will actually benefit 
the majority of their constituencies. A good example of such policymaking practice can 
be found in cities such as Jiaxing. The municipal government of Jiaxing bases the amount 
of tax incentives firms will receive on their actual performance, usually measured in tax 
revenue contributed, number of jobs created, etc. Measures like this could enable a 
prudent and effective use of public finance.  
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Policy Recommendation 3: Use rational, data-driven policy analysis to 
strengthen local governments’ decision-making capacity.  
6.2.1.3. Information Collection and Management  
A good data collection and management system is the foundation of evidence-
based policymaking. Without good information on how resources are allocated and what 
outcomes they yield, past lessons and experience cannot shed light on future decision-
making. It could lead to huge waste of public and private resources.  
This study highly recommends that countries develop and perfect their public data 
collection and management system and make it capable of providing nuanced 
information for program evaluators to study the effectiveness and efficiency of various 
policy programs. In addition, this study wants to make a plea to countries, especially 
developing countries, to allow more transparency in their information system and make it 
easy and free for the public to access. Good governance and sound policy-making can 
only be achieved through accountability, and having transparency is the necessary first 
step towards these goals.   
Policy recommendation 4: Establish an accurate, comprehensive, and 
transparent public information collection and management system, with open access 
to the system.  
6.2.2. Linkages between innovation, manufacturing, and deployment  
6.2.2.1. Innovation as A Crosscutting Strategy  
The discussion of strategies to develop a socially and environmentally friendly 
technology-based industry highlights the connection among innovation, industrial and 
deployment policies. Rather than treating them as stand-alone policy arenas, 
policymakers should carefully consider the synergistic effect embedded among the three.   
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The example of the Chinese PV industry highlights the problem often faced by 
developing countries, which is that, in the long term, their manufacturing capability is 
only as strong as their innovation capacity. Gaps in scientific and technical knowledge 
result in weak links or even holes in the domestic supply chain, preventing the industry 
from achieving its full competitive potential. Developed countries face a different 
problem. Often, they have the innovation capacity in both the technology R&D and 
manufacturing stage but experience difficulties scaling up their technologies in an 
economical way.  
The problems faced by developing and developed countries are essentially two 
sides of the same coin. They both reflect a mismatch of innovation and manufacturing 
capacity. For developing countries, they usually make market-ready technologies, but 
their weak science and technology foundation constrains their manufacturing capabilities. 
On the other hand, although developed countries' manufacturing sectors are usually 
sophisticated enough, the technologies they produce sometimes are too nascent or too 
technically complex to be commercially viable. The case with American thin-film solar 
PV producer Solyndra is an example of it (Kao, 2012). Then the question for them 
becomes how to gauge technology innovation to the market.  
Challenges faced by both worlds point out the importance for policymakers to not 
treat technology innovation, manufacturing, and deployment in isolation. Rather, they 
should strategize how to integrate them in order to push innovation down the supply 
chain and at the same time allow market feedback to inform innovation.  
For developing countries, innovation is the connective tissue of many policy areas 
and therefore, promoting innovation should be a crosscutting strategy. Developing 
countries can increase their manufacturing capability by funding R&D projects to target 
technical issues that constrain the manufacturing and supply chain development. 
Knowledge developed along the way can in turn strengthen the overall innovation 
capacity and enable more scientific and technological advancement. In addition, local 
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governments should be proactive in fostering close ties between industry players and 
academics in their territories, to engage them in R&D partnerships, and to make them 
attentive to each other’s resources and demands.  
Policy recommendation 5: Use innovation as a crosscutting strategy at both 
the national and local level to build strength across the entire chain of technology 
R&D, manufacturing, and supply chain development.   
6.2.2.2. Innovation in Technology and Supply Chain   
For developed countries, there is a dilemma. On the one hand, as the inventors of 
advanced technologies, they should not lower the quality of their technologies simply to 
make them more affordable in the marketplace. But on the other hand, technical 
complexity and high cost can lock the providers of advanced technologies out of the 
market. The solution to this dilemma lies in the integration of technology innovation and 
supply chain innovation. First and foremost, a country’s innovation system should always 
be forward-looking; but when it comes to transferring a technology from lab to 
production line, the manufacturers have to be sensitive to cost. Fortunately, as the 
Chinese example shows, the manufacturers do not have to (and cannot) do it alone. 
Instead, it should be a concerted effort between technology manufacturers and their 
suppliers because much of the technology advancement on paper is actually realized 
through new tooling and materials. They make it possible to incorporate new functions 
and features into the products and are responsible for delivering the innovative content. 
With the same ingenuity, tooling and material suppliers can also discover ways to reduce 
cost without compromising product quality. At the end of the day, the delivery of a 
marketable new product is a joint venture between manufacturers and suppliers. Often 
time, discussions are built around the role of the former, but from a systematic 
perspective, it is equally important to support the building of innovation and 
manufacturing capacity of the latter.  
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Suppliers are often small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Because of their size, 
they frequently find themselves in disadvantaged positions vis-à-vis large firms. This 
market-power inequity is partially responsible for them being exploited and squeezed by 
large firms (Christopherson and Clark 2009; Rutherford and Holmes 2007). In order to 
improve the innovation and manufacturing strength of SME suppliers, the market power 
inequity needs to be corrected, or at least alleviated. One possible way to do so is to treat 
SMEs as large firms, to allow them to form their own networks in order to gain power to 
influence policies, to obtain access to innovation resources within and beyond their own 
regions, and to effectively share or pool resources as a group to overcome the 
disadvantages associated with their relatively small individual size.   
Policy recommendation 6: Integrate technology innovation with supply chain 
innovation. Build innovative strength among suppliers that allows them to help 
commercialize technology advancements achieved by manufacturers.  
6.2.2.3. Demand-Pull and Supply-Push Virtuous Cycle 
Besides the linkage between innovation and manufacturing policies, there is also a 
synergistic effect between them and deployment policies. In the case of Chinese PV 
industry, deployment policies in Europe and the U.S. were partially responsible for 
creating the initial market, and the ramp up of FITs in China in the wake of the trade wars 
helped absorb the excess capacities and bailed the industry out from an implosion. 
Policymakers can learn a lesson from the Chinese example to proactively design a set of 
synergistic policies that foster both the production and consumption of a new technology 
to create a “demand-pull and supply-push” virtuous cycle (Brown et al., 2007). Policies 
that tackle just one but not the other will inevitably leave the industry in a vulnerable 
position.   
Policy recommendation 7: Use innovation, industrial and deployment policies 
in synergy to create a demand-pull and supply-push virtuous cycle.  
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6.2.3. Localization vis-a-vis Globalization 
6.2.3.1. Global Networks for Codified Knowledge   
There is an interesting dynamic between localization and globalization. On the 
one hand, government policies’ push to build a domestic supply chain has proven to be 
tremendously beneficial to the solar PV industry in China and has created a spillover 
effect to technology innovation along the PV supply chain. Highly concentrated industrial 
clusters around major solar PV producers have made communication between producers 
and suppliers easier and the creation, acquisition, accumulation and utilization of 
knowledge faster. Logistical costs are also lower because of the local supplier chain. 
These advantages enabled by geographical proximity are rather sticky (Ernst, 2002; A. 
Markusen, 1996). It is fair to say that the manufacturers’ physical supply chain is 
becoming more and more localized. However, on the other hand, the virtual supply chain, 
i.e. the knowledge flow, is getting increasingly globalized. Chinese researchers and PV 
manufacturers benefit from being part of the global knowledge network. The ability to 
work with foreign scientists, research institutes and to recruit overseas trained experts to 
come and work in China has dramatically narrowed the scientific knowledge gap between 
China and the developed world.  
Evidence suggests that globalization is not the only answer to questions related to 
innovation and economic development. Depending on the type of knowledge and 
technology at hand, players should choose different geographical configurations of 
network and supply chain that best suit their pursuits.  
For codified scientific knowledge, a global network is beneficial for two reasons. 
First, scientific knowledge can be communicated through writing and teaching relatively 
easily. But more importantly, a global knowledge network breaks the path dependence of 
scientific research and creates an environment where different ideas meet. Therefore, 
from a science, technology and innovation policymakers’ standing point, innovation 
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networks that connect different knowledge development clusters should be encouraged. 
These networks should cover both a wide geography and a diverse background. 
Personnel exchange between different institutes, industries, and countries should be 
supported. Programs such as the Thousand-Talent Program are good practices in terms of 
facilitating knowledge diffusion. Other programs that exchange short-term scholarship 
are also preferable.  
Policy recommendation 8: Promote and support science and technology 
innovation networks that connect a wide range of personnel from around the globe.  
6.2.3.2. Local Industrial Clusters for Tacit Knowledge   
However, skills and know-how embedded at individual level, a.k.a. tacit 
knowledge, are difficult to transfer without in-person interactions and are lost at a fast 
rate (Argote & Darr, 2000). As a result, a virtual global network is not as suitable as a 
physical local network for their diffusion. The truth of the matter is, in an era where 
manufacturing is becoming increasing automated, what differentiates one factory from 
the next is not what machine it uses (because automation standardizes the manufacturing 
process), but how it uses the machine. In other words, the tacit knowledge embedded in 
the interaction between machines and people who designed and operated them makes a 
huge difference. This type of knowledge is extremely contextual and local because of the 
idiosyncratic nature of the knowledge development process and the personal touch that 
the knowledge developers put on it. Only people who are closely involved understand 
why the knowledge was developed in the very first place and how to use it most 
effectively (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Knowledge like this can certainly be diffused, but 
only via in person hands-on exchange; the more geographically removed the learning 
relationship is, the harder it is to master the gist of the knowledge.  
The best way to retain and diffuse local tacit knowledge is to build a local 
industrial cluster that actively engages in the development and utilization of the 
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knowledge. In this tacit knowledge network, the tooling and material suppliers should 
play a central intermediary role. In the industrial cluster setting, suppliers are likely to 
work face-to-face with multiple manufacturers to develop new equipment and material. 
The tacit knowledge they learn from the in-person interaction with one manufacturer can 
be passed on to the next manufacturer they work with. In so doing, they become the 
media of disseminating tacit knowledge, and once again, this intermediary role highlights 
the importance of SME suppliers in the development of a technology-based industry.    
Policy recommendation 9: Support the development of industrial clusters, 
and foster suppliers to be local tacit-knowledge diffusion intermediaries.  
Besides the nature of knowledge, the type of technology also matters. For a 
technology like solar PV, which entails a relatively short production process (six steps in 
solar cell production, five steps in panel assembly) but has high quality requirements, a 
local supply chain is not only feasible but also more suitable for quality and cost control 
purpose. But for technologies that are technically more complex or has a longer 
production process, a global production network may be preferred.  
6.2.4. Supply-chain resiliency and adaptability 
In the process of supply-chain development, policymakers and the industry need 
to be aware of the danger of “lock-in” and “path dependence” because they render the 
industry and its supply chain vulnerable to new disruptive technologies. Supply chain 
resiliency and flexibility are necessary conditions to avoid such situation. 
From the industry’s perspective, its supply chain can be built flexible by drawing 
from a wide variety of suppliers, including both industry-specific suppliers and general 
suppliers that it shares with other industries. By effectively sharing suppliers, the newly 
built supply chain can take advantage of suppliers that are flexible enough to supply to 
multiple industries. These suppliers have innate flexibility to begin with and often 
develop a diverse product line, which prepares them for future evolution of the economy. 
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By including suppliers like this, a manufacturing industry and its supply chain can 
become resilient and adaptable to technological change that may happen in the future.  
From technology manufacturers’ perspective, it is a good idea to develop a supply 
network instead of a linear one-to-one supplying relationship with specific suppliers. By 
diversifying the supplying relationship, manufacturers build resilience and flexibility into 
their networks. From suppliers’ perspective, they should also embrace the idea of 
diversification by exploring relationship with multiple industries. By putting eggs in 
multiple baskets, suppliers increase their chances to survive even if one industry tanks. 
The survival of suppliers means more than just the continuous existence of individual 
firms. Suppliers are the foundation of the broader manufacturing economy; their 
continuous growth preserves the industrial infrastructure, the manufacturing capability, 
and the technical know-how of multiple industries. 
To echo the point made before, given the importance of suppliers, policymakers 
should treat them not as secondary players but develop them as equals to large 
manufacturers. Suppliers should be able to develop their own R&D capacity, establish a 
diverse collection of products, have their own network of buyers and suppliers, and form 
enough political cloud to influence policymaking. In so doing, the suppliers can become 
the enablers of a resilient, flexible and adaptable supply chain.  
Policy recommendation 10: Build a resilient supply network by fostering 
innovative and versatile suppliers with networks to access innovation, business and 
political resources. 
By offering the above policy recommendations, this study hopes to contribute 
something useful and executable to the development of current and future socially and 





 SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS AND SITE VISITS 
Table A.1 Summary of Semi-structured Interviews 
Interviewee 
ID Affiliation Sector 
1 Suntech, previous employee Manufacturing 
2 Blue Sky Solar (China), chief engineer Manufacturing 
3 Nankai University, professor Technology R&D 
4 CTIG, researcher Technology R&D 
5 










China Renewable Energy Industry 
Association (CREIA), policy director 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 




Tianjin University Technology Transfer 
Office, director  Technology R&D 
10 Solar unser Deployment 
11 Tianjin EcoCity, sustainability director Deployment 
12 
Natural Elements Capital (Private equity 
firm), solar director Deployment 
13 Yingli Solar, employee  Deployment 
14 ERI,  retired senior analyst Deployment 
15 
Continental Automotive (Austria); technical 
project leader Technology R&D 
16 BNEF solar, lead solar analyst 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
17 New South Wales University, professor  Technology R&D 
18 Suntech,  employee Corporate R&D 
19 TEBD Solar,  employee Manufacturing 
20 NeoSolar (Taiwan), R&D director Manufacturing 
21 JA Solar (China),  employee Manufacturing 
22 Fengyuan Module (China),  employee Manufacturing 
23 Haitai Module (China), employee Manufacturing 
24 Jinko Solar (China),  employee Manufacturing 
25 Canadian Solar (China),  employee Corporate R&D 
26 Zhongli Talesun (China), employee Manufacturing 
27 GCL Poly (China),  employee Manufacturing 
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Table A.1 Contniued  
Interviewee 
ID Affiliation Sector 
28 Yingli Solar (China),  employee Manufacturing 
29 Hanwha Solar (China),  employee Manufacturing 
30 Suntech,  former employee  Manufacturing 
31 A medium size Chinese company, CTO  Manufacturing 
32 ZNSHINE Solar, VP Manufacturing 
33 HIS, analyst 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
34 Taiwan Analytical, analyst  
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
35 Solar Media, analyst  
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
36 Yingli Solar (China), employee  Deployment 
37 








Shanghai Solar Energy Research Center, 
director Technology R&D 
40 
Total, new energy division, technology, 
operations and projects division; technology 
cost manager Manufacturing 
41 
Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems 
(Germany), researcher Technology R&D 
42 
FHR Centrotherm Photovaltaics Group 
(Germany), researcher  Technology R&D 




Tsinghua University, Institute of Environment 




Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), 
Institute of Electrical Engineering (EEI) Technology R&D 
46 Yingli Solar, CTO 
Corporate R&D; 
Manufacturing 
47 Hanergy, senior manager Technology R&D 
48 Hanergy, senior supervisor Manufacturing; 
49 Tsinghua  University , assistant professor 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
50 State Grid, director 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
51 BNEF, analyst  
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
52 Nankai University, professor Technology R&D 
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Table A.1 Contniued  
Interviewee 
ID Affiliation Sector 
53 Trina, CTO  
Corporate R&D; 
Manufacturing 
54 Jinko, CFO Manufacturing; 
55 Jinko, investor relations director Manufacturing; 
56 Jinko, customer service director  Manufacturing; 
57 GCL Poly, vice president Manufacturing; 
58 
GCL Poly, assistant to GM of strategy and 
operation Manufacturing; 
59 
CAS, Shanghai Microsystem Institute, 
researcher  Technology R&D 
60 
China Development Bank, New Energy 
Division, deputy director  Financial Institute 









Ministry Of Industry and Information 





Chinese Academy of Science and Technology 









Shanghai New Energy Industries Association 




Ministry Of Science and Technology, New 
Energy Division, director 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
68 Peking University, professor Technology R&D 
69 State Grid, director Deployment 
70 Energy Research Institute, researcher 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
71 Trina Solar, CEO Manufacturing 
72 




73 MOST, cheif PV Scientist Technology R&D 
74 GCL Poly, VP Manufacturing 
75 China Commerce Bank, banker Deployment 
76 SUNGROW, VP Manufacturing 
77 GD Solar, VP Manufacturing 
78 Export-Import Bank of China, director 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
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Table A.1 Contniued  
Interviewee 
ID Interviewee ID Interviewee ID 
79 Yingli Solar, CFO Manufacturing 
80 Venture capitalist Financial 
81 
Zhejiang Xiuzhou Industrial Park, director of 




Zhejiang Xiuzhou municipal government, 
deputy mayor  
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
83 Flat Glass, chairman  Manufacturing 
84 Flat Glass, PV installer Deployment 
85 Sunprem Solar, chairman Manufacturing 
86 Rooftop solar project in Jiaxing, PV installer  Deployment 
87 Jinko Solar, director of process design Manufacturing 
88 Jinko Solar, R&D director Manufacturing 
89 Jinko Solar, manufacturing director Manufacturing 




Wuxi DRC Economic and Information 




Wuxi New Energy Industries Promotion 
Committee, deputy director 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
93 Nankai University, professor, Technology R&D 
94 US Department of Commerce, Representitive Manufacturing (Trade) 
95 First Solar (U.S.), representative at Beijing Manufacturing 
96 JA Solar, CFO Manufacturing 
97 JA Solar, VP of supply chain  Manufacturing 
98 Canadian Solar, CEO Manufacturing 
99 Canadian Solar, supply Chain director Manufacturing 
100 Trina, CFO Manufacturing 
101 Trina, supply chain director  Manufacturing 
102 Sunergy, business strategy director Manufacturing 
103 
The 48th Research Institute affiliated cell 
production facility, manager Manufacturing 
104 Deputy director of The 48th Research Inst. Manufacturing 
105 CREIA, director of solar policy 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
106 Thousand-Talent Association, director  
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
107 Thousand-Talent Association, deputy director 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
108 State Grid Nanjing Research Institute Deployment 
109 State Grid Nanjing Research Institute Deployment 
110 
U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 




Table A.1 Contniued  
Interviewee 
ID Affiliation Sector 
111 Patent Lawyer based in the U.S.  
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
112 Patent Lawyer based in China 
Policy/Consulting/Industry 
Association 
Note: Interview 1 - 42 were conducted by the author individually.  Interviews 43 -112 were conducted by 
the Stanford research team as part of the Stanford China Project. 
 
Table A.2: Summary of Site Visits 
Note: Site visit 1 - 7 were conducted by the author individually.  Site visit 8 -27 were conducted by the 
Stanford research team as part of the Stanford China Project. 
Tour ID Type of visit Entity 
1 Workshop tour Blue sky Solar  
2 Company presentation and tour GCL Poly 
3 
Company presentation and 
workshop tour Canadian Solar  
4 
Lab Tour and rooftop solar 
project  Shanghai solar research center 
5 
Company presentation and 
workshop tour 
Shanghai Shenzhou New Energy 
Development Co. Ltd  
6 Industrial park visit  Shanghai Nanhui Industrial Park 
7 Lab tour 18 Institute in Tianjin 
8 Lab tour CAS EEI 
9 Lab tour Yingli Solar; Baoding 
10 Workshop tour Yingli Solar; Baoding 
11 Lab tour Trina Solar, Changzhou 
12 Workshop tour Trina Solar, Changzhou 
13 Industrial park visit Trina Solar, Changzhou 
14 Workshop tour LongYan Solar (ASP)  
15 Lab tour CAS Shanghai MicrosystemInst.  
16 Lab tour Nankai University  
17 Company visit Hanergy 
18 Company visit  State Grid Control Room 
19 Industrial park visit  Xiuzhou Industrial Park  
20 Workshop tour Flat Glass (Xiuzhou)  
21 Rooftop solar project site tour Flat Glass rooftop 
22 Workshop tour Sunprem 
23 Rooftop solar project site tour Jiaxing, Zhejiang 
24 Workshop tour Jinko Solar 
25 Workshop tour  Canadian Solar Factory, Suzhou 
26 Workshop tour Sunergy factory, Nanjing 




SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS TO CHAPTER 3 
Exhibit 1: State Key Laboratory of Photovoltaic Material and Technology at Yingli* 
History:  
• Applied for SKL in 2009 
• Awarded SKL in 2010 
• Certified by MOST and assumed operation in 2013 
SKL Overview: 
• R&D team: 150 people 
• Research project span: 3-5 years  
• Research partners: 
o Chinese institutes  
 Chinese Academy of Sciences: Institute of Semiconductor 
 Chinese Academy of Sciences: Institute of Electronic Engineering  
 Chinese Academy of Sciences: Institute of Microelectronics  
 Tsinghua University Department of Material Science  
 Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 Hebei University  
o Overseas institutes 
 Energy Research Center of Netherland (ECN) 
 SINTEF of Norway  
 University of New South Wales  
 Solar Energy Research Institute of Singapore (SERIS) 
SKL Research Structure and Sample Projects:  
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• Group 1: Silicon material science research 
o Develop new approach to produce poly-silicon  
• Group 2: Ingot production technology research 
o Research method to grow and crystalize ingot in a more efficient way and 
with higher quality  
• Group 3: Wafer slicing technique research 
o Develop techniques to reduce the thinness of wafer layer from 180mm to 
150mm  
• Group 4: Solar PV cell research 
o Surface textuation  
o Iron implantation: p-n junction   
o PERC cell structure  
• Group 5: Solar PV module research 
o Improve PV module lifetime and reduce degradation rate.  
• Group 6: Solar PV System research 
o Inverter: Design smart inverter to optimize solar array to maximize 
o output voltage 
o Junction box: Design smart junction box for micro-inverter integration  
o Energy storage: Develop lying wheel energy storage technology  
• Group 7: Simulation research 
o Develop simulation software to facilitate solar cell efficiency improvement 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in this exhibit is done as part of 
the Stanford China project by the author. 
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Exhibit 2: State Key Laboratory of PV Science and Technology at Trina* 
History:  
• Applied for SKL in 2009 
• Awarded SKL in 2010 
• Certified by MOST and assumed operation in 2013 
SKL Overview:  
• R&D team: 139 engineers and 200 technicians 
• Research project span: long term  
• Research partners: 
o Chinese institutes  
 Chinese Academy of Science: Institute of Microsystem and 
Information Technology  
o Overseas institutes 
 Solar Energy Research Institute of Singapore (SERIS) 
 Australia National University  
 Universidad Politécnica de Valencia 
SKL Research Structure and Sample Projects:  
• Module Business Unit (MBU): 90% of the total budget and people goes into this 
category 
o PV material research:  
 Research method to improve the purity of silicon production  
 Develop better techniques for ingot growth   
o Solar cell: develop new cell structures and improve their efficiency in the 




 Bi-facial solar cell 
 P-type solar cell  
 N-type solar cell 
o Solar PV module:  
 Double-glass module 
o System Business Unit (SBU) 
 Micro-inverters: allow solar PV to generate AC directly, unlike 
conventional PV that has to generate DC first and then be inverted 
to AC.  
o Energy Storage Business Unit (ESBU) 
Trina only innovation  
• World record 20.8% efficient mass-produced multi-crystalline cell 
• IBC cell: 24.4% lab efficiency  
• Mass-produced P-type PERC cell 
• Big area cell: increased cell area from 125mm2 to 150 mm2 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in this exhibit is done as part of 
the Stanford China project by the author. 
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Exhibit 3. Innovation at Canadian Solar (CSI): Middle of the Road Innovator* 
Solar Cell R&D portfolio:  
1. N-type solar cell: 
• Long term project aiming at improving cell efficiency  
• 4 bus bar cells: an improvement from conventional 3 bus bar cells. It is of 
similar cost but higher efficiency. 
• CSI in 2013 became the leader of 4BB by installing a 15MW production line.  
• 5 bus bar cells are under development as of May 2015.  
2. Black silicon cell: 
• Developed its own patented black silicon technology  
• Use a low-cost chemical etching approach in commercial production 
• Currently has a 5MW black silicon production, with 0.3% efficiency gain over 
conventional C-Si cell.   
3. ELPS cell:  
• A high efficiency P-type mono-crystalline cell featured Metal Wrap Through 
(MWT) design. 
• Collaborated with ECN from the Netherlands to develop the first prototype. 
• The attempt to mass-produce ELPS failed because the production cost is too 
high.  
4. PERC:  
• Mass production of PERC cell.  
Solar Module R&D portfolio:  
1. Anti-reflective coated glasses  
2. Encapsulation:  
• Replace the back EVA layer with a functionally similar but cheaper 
encapsulation material.  
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3. Printing and stringing equipment  
• Co-developed a new printing and stringing equipment with Chinese domestic 
tooling manufacture to allow thinner and taller silver paste to be painted on its 
5 bus bar cell.  
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in this exhibit is done as part of 
the Stanford China project by the author. 
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Exhibit 4: Innovation at Sunergy: Inventor of PERC, but falling behind in 
commercialization* 
PERC History at Sunergy:  
• Dr.Zhao Jianhua invented PERC cell when working at University of New South 
Wales in Australia. He holds the world record on PERC cell efficiency. 
• In 2008, Dr. Zhao brought PERC prototype to Sunergy and became the CTO of 
the company.  
• The first two generations of PERC cells developed at Sunergy failed to achieve 
commercial production, because of high production cost.  
• In 2011, the 3rd generation PERC made a switch from using PVC to screen 
printing, which in turn lowered the cost to a competitive level.  
• In 2012, Fraunhofer certified the 3rd gen PERC cell at a 20.3% efficiency.  
• PERC production process is relatively simple compared to other high efficiency 
silicon-based cells. It only requires adding two additional equipment – an ALD 
(Automatic Layer Deposition) and a laser machine – to a conventional C-Si 
production line.  
The PERC cells produced at Sunergy  
• High efficiency: 20.5% to 20.8%  
• 5 bus bars 
• Features of the front side of the cell:  
o Patented design of unevenly applied silver paste  
o Gradient distribution of fingers  
• Features of the back side of the cell, which is the secret weapon of PERC:  
o Deposit a thin layer of silicon nitride on the back (10 nano-meter)  
o Regular cells only deposit on the front side, but PERC deposit it on both 
sides.  
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o Use laser to remove Al2O3 and SiN4  
• Sunergy holds multiple patents  
The economics of PERC at Sunergy  
• Cost increase: ¥ 0.3 to ¥ 0.5 increase out of 10RMB mono-C cell. i.e. only 3-5% 
increase in cost.  
• In ¥/W term, PERC cell is ¥ 4.7-4.8/W, comparing to conventional cell which is 
4.4 to 4.5 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in this exhibit is done as part of 









Exhibit 5: Innovation at Advanced Solar Power (Long Yan): Ambitious R&D 
Upstart* 
Advanced Solar Power (ASP, known as Long Yan in Chinese) at Hangzhou, 
Zhejiang Province is the leading innovator and producer of CdTe solar PV in China. It 
was founded by Dr. Xuanzhi Wu, who still holds the world efficiency record for the 
CdTe solar cell he developed while working at the U.S. National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL). The key technology that differentiates ASP from its major global 
competitor First Solar is its use of the Close Space Sublimation (CSS) method to produce 
CdTe cells, which increases the speed of the chemical compound deposition. In addition 
to solar cell research, ASP also works with domestic Chinese tooling manufacturers to 
develop equipment used in commercial CdTe production.  
Despite its promising technology, ASP is still not a formidable competitor to First 
Solar. Its R&D investment is only 10% of that of First Solar1; its mass-produced solar 
cells are 2-percentage point lower in efficiency than First Solar’s predominant 
technology; ASP has only 30MW manufacturing capacity by 2014, compared to First 
Solar’s whopping 1.8GW capacity. Exhibit 5 provides an overview of ASP’s innovation 
effort.  
CdTe solar cell innovation at Advanced Solar Power:   
• Key technology: Close Space Sublimation (CSS) method prepared CdTe 
• Mass production cell efficiency: 12%, 2% lower than First Solar’s main product 
• Production capacity: 30MW  
Key figure: Chairman Dr. Xuanzhi Wu 
• 30 years of solar PV research experience, including 20 years at U.S. DOE’s 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
• CdTe efficiency world record holder R&D spending 
• Cumulatively by 2013, $30M, 10% of First Solar’s R&D spending  
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in this exhibit is done as part of 
Stanford China project led by the author.  
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Exhibit 6: Innovation at Hanergy: Innovation through mergers and acquisitions* 
Innovation structure at Hanergy 
• Global R&D Center located in Beijing, China, which manages Hanergy’s 
technology profile including 
o CIGS 
o GaAs  
o a-Si 
Majority of the actual R&D work are conducted overseas, in R&D labs at the firms they 
purchased  
• SoliBro 
o Glass-on-glass based classic CIGS modules, using Co-Evaporation method  
o 20.7% lab efficiency 
o 14% production efficiency  
• MiaSole 
o CIGS with spadering technology.  
o Spadering technology is a deposition method that uses plasma to strike solid 
metal target to release particles and deposit them onto substrates.  It is a faster 
deposition process although with a lower efficiency. 
o The end product is lighter, about 4kg/m2, and more flexible 
• Global Solar  
o CIGS prepared with co-evaporation approach and flexible substrate 
o The firm company aimsto commercialize the flexible substrate CIGS.  
• Alta Devices  
o GaAs  
o Record holder of single junction thin film solar cell  
• Apolo Solar 
o a-Si  
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Domestic Chinese R&D collaborators 
• Tianjin University: Professor Wang Chengshan 
• Nankai University: Professor Zhao Ying  
Innovation goal: bring down the cost of lightweight thin film cells.  
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in this exhibit is done as part of 
Stanford China project led by the author.  
 




10th FYP 11th FYP 12th FYP Technology 
Total 
(M$) 973 863 973 863 973 863 
a-Si 2.4  2.4 2.3 4 3.2 14.4 








CIGS  3.5   4.8  8.3 
HIT 





Silicon     4.8  4.8 
PERC      N.A. N.A. 
Total 4.8 6.7 4.8 8.1 13.7 9.7 47.8 
 
* Note: Data collected and analyzed as part of the Stanford China Project.  
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Exhibit 7. HIT World and Chinese Efficiency Records* 
All the world record efficiencies of HIT solar cell are from Sanyo in Japan. The 
company started to develop HIT since 1980s. Since its breakthrough of 20% efficient 
HIT solar cells of 1 𝑐𝑚2 in 1994, Sanyo has been steadily improving the efficiency by 
modifying the cell structure. After Sanyo became part of Panasonic Group in 2010, it 
announced the efficiency record of 24.7% in 2013 and a major increase of 25.6% in 2014 
with its HIT+ IBC technology. For mass production, Sanyo started to produce the 
commercial HIT solar modules of 17.3% efficient in 1997. In 2011, the efficiency was 
further enhanced to 19%. 
China is a latecomer to HIT research; serious research effort did not start until the 
11th FYP where MOST invested in two HIT-related 863 Programs. The research group 
led by Wenjing Wang at CAS IEE reported an efficiency of 17.27% for small-scale HIT 
cell in 2008. Its joint R&D with Chaori Solar produced a 125mm by 125mm HIT cell of 
20.25% efficient in 2013. In the same year, Zhengxin Liu’s group at CAS SIMIT 
produced a 125mm by 125mm HIT cell of 20.13% efficiency.  
 
* Data collection and initial analysis conducted as part of the Stanford China Project by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a 
member of the Stanford University China Project research team. 
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Exhibit 8. CIGS World and Chinese Efficiency Records* 
World record of CIGS as of December 2014 was 21.7% and is held by ZSW 
Centre for Solar Energy and Hydrogen Research in Stuttgart, Germany. The record-
setting cell had an area of 0.5 𝑐𝑚2 and was manufactured via a co-evaporation process. 
ZSW has long been a world record holder of CIGS since 2010. It has also agreed a joint 
partnership with Germany's Manz to move the new methods out of the laboratory and 
into the factory. Before 2010, the record is held by NREL for more than 10 years. Other 
world’s leading institutions of CIGS includes Solibro in Germany, the subsidiary of Q-
Cells that was bought by Hanergy, and Solar Frontier in Japan. For the mass production, 
Solar Frontier in Japan produced 900 MW in 2012, compared with 74 MW production 
capacity in 2010. Silibro, an affiliation of Q-Cells at the time, produced 140 MW 
compared with 70 MW capacity in 2011. 
Nankai University held the China’s record efficiency of CIGS until 2011. For 
small area (smaller or equal to 1cm2) CIGS solar cell, Nankai University improved its 
efficiency from 7.28% in 1995 to 8.83% % and 9.13% in 1999, then later to 12.1% in 
2004, and finally to 15.35% and 15.6% in 2011. However, the Chinese record in 2011 
was set not by Nankai University, but the group at CAS Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced 
Technology led by Dr. Xudong Xiao, which produced a 16.6% CIGS cell. The same 
group further increased it’s the efficiency to 19.07% in 2013. By 2013, the difference 
between the record Chinese CIGS lab efficiency and the world record was only 1 
percentage point, whereas it was more than 9 percentage points in 1995. 
 
*Data collection and initial analysis conducted by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a member of the Stanford University 
China Project research team.  
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Exhibit 9. Perovskite World and Chinese Efficiency Records* 
When the very first pervoskite solar cell efficiency was reported in 2006, its 
efficiency was only tested at 2.19%. It increased to 3.81% in 2008. However, it is only a 
matter of time before this technology caught on fire. Since the beginning of the 2010s, 
extremely rapid progress has been made as a result of is academic competition among the 
major research groups. Graetzel’s group at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
(EPFL), Snaith’s group at Oxford University, Seok’s group at Korea Research Institute of 
Chemical Technology, Park’s group at Sungkyunkwan University in Korea and Yang’s 
group at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) all produced significant 
improvement to efficiency.  
The world record efficiency was set to 6.5% in 2011 by a Park’s research group.  
Further increase of the efficiency was made in 2012. A 12% efficient pervoskite cell was 
announced in 2012 as a result of collaboration between the Swiss and Korean scientists. 
In 2013, research groups from Korea, Switzerland, and Britain all produced new 
efficiency records, and by the end of 2013, the efficiency frontier was pushed to 16.2% 
by Dr. Seok of South Korea. In 2014, the UCLA group led by Chinese-American scholar 
Yang Yang updated the efficiency record to 19.3%.  
China entered Perovskite research relatively late. The first perovsike solar cell 
efficiency was produced in Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), 
and it was tested at 4.87% efficient in 2013. Since then, a leapfrogging happed to 
pervoskite research in China when multiple research groups enter the area and created 
competition among the innovation players (Section 3.3.3.2). As a result, Chinese record 
efficiency was updated 9 times by 8 different research groups in 16 months and 
eventually stood at 15.4% in April 2014.  
 
* Data collection and initial analysis conducted as part of the Stanford China Project by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a 
member of the Stanford University China Project research team. 
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Exhibit 10. Organic PV World and Chinese Efficiency Records* 
Research on organic photovoltaic (OPV) materials and devices has flourished in 
recent years due to its potential to offer low-cost solar energy. The organic donor–
acceptor heterojunction structure produced by Eastman Kodak Company in 1986 is 
considered as the foundation for all OPV devices. It produced a nearly 1% efficient OPV 
cell. The first bulk heterojunction structure of 1% efficientwas developed by Alan Heeger 
at UCSB in 1995. The performance of OPV devices, including the efficiency and 
stability, has since been steadily improving. There are many research groups working on 
OPV around the world. UCSB, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria, Plextronics 
and Konarka Technology. and Solarmer in the U.S., and Siemens in Germany have all set 
world records. New materials and novel device architectures have been developed. In 
2011, Mitsubishi Chemical announced that their small area single layer OPV cell reached 
10.7% efficiency; it was the first time that an organic solar cell exceeds 10% lab 
efficiency. The world record efficiency improvement was stagnant since then until 2015, 
when researchers from North Carolina State University in the U.S. and Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology produced an 11.5% efficient OPV cell.  
Chinese researchers started OPV researcher not too long after the world’s leading 
institutes began to move into this technology space. Professor Li’s group at CAS Institute 
of Chemistry and Dr. Cao’s group at South China university of Technology (SCUT) 
produced the majority of the efficiency records in China. The efficiency trajectory of 
OPV cells follows closely of the world record efficiency. In 2007, the world record was 
5.5%, produced at UCSB, while the Chinese record produced by SCUT was just 0.1 
percentage point lower. During the time period between 2011 and 2015, where the world 
record remained static, new Chinese records kept being produced. Li’s group at CAS 
Institute of Chemistry announced a Chinese record of 7.59% in August 2011, and one 
month later, Cao’s group at SCUT improved the efficiency to 8.37%. The latter group has 
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since produced two higher efficiency cells; one tested at 9.20% efficient in 2012, and the 
other one tested at 9.28% efficient in 2014.  
 
* Data collection and initial analysis conducted as part of the Stanford China Project by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a 





Exhibit 11. CdTe World and Chinese Efficiency Records* 
Just like Sanyo holds the exclusive technology of HIT, First Solar takes the 
dominant position of CdTe. The company started the research of CdTe as early as 1990s. 
It launched production of commercial products in 2002. After crushed the efficiency 
mark for CdTe with a world-record 20.4% in 2014, First Solar set the new record of 
21.5% in February 2015. FirstSolar’s full fleet average conversion efficiency was 14.4 
percent and the lead line at First Solar was averaging 14.8 percent in Q4 2014. In the 
early days, First Solar collaborated with many universities and research institutions such 
as University of Toledo, Colorado School of Mines and the University of South Florida. 
However, the collaboration is suspended when the company started to develop Vapor 
Transport deposition (VTD) technology at the beginning of 2000s. Currently, First Solar 
is the exclusive owner of high efficiency CdTe technology. In comparison with 
FirstSolar’s VTD technology of high temperature, other leading research institutions such 
University of Toledo develops a 14.5%-efficient CdTe solar cell by magnetron sputtering 
at low temperature.  
Sichuan University is among the first few universities that worked on CdTe solar 
cells in China. During the 9th FYP (1995-2000), it achieved an efficiency of 13.38% in 
2003. Its 300 KW pilot production line can produce 40cm x 30cm solar modules at an 
efficiency of 8.25%. CAS Institute of Electrical Engineering succeeded in producing a 
0.02cm2 CdTe cell at 14.4% efficient in 2014. Shanghai Center for Photovoltaic, together 
with Professor Deliang Wang from China University of Science and Technology, 
managed to produce a CdTe cell of nearly 14% efficient on a 0.07cm2 glass substrate in 
2012 and 14.6% efficient of 0.25 𝑐𝑚2 using chemical bath deposition method. 
 
 
* Data collection and initial analysis conducted as part of the Stanford China Project by Zhao (Joy) Zhu, a 





Figure B.1. NSFC Investment in C-Si* 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 






Figure B.2. NSFC Investment in a-Si 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 




































































Figure B.3. NSFC’s Investment in HIT* 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 






Figure B.4. NSFC Investment in CIGS* 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 
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Figure B.5. NSFC Investment in CdTe* 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 







Figure B.6. NSFC Investment in Other Thin Film Technologies* 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 
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Figure 6a. Number of NSFC Grants to 















Figure 6b. NSFC Investment to Other 




Figure B.7. NSFC’s Investment in Organic PV* 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 




   
  
 
Figure B.8. NSFC’s Investment in Perovskite* 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 
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Figure B.9. NSFC’s Investment in DSSC* 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 







Figure B.10. NSFC’s Investment in Quantum Dots* 
 
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 
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Figure 9a Number of NSFC Grants to 
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Figure 9b. NSFC Investment in 




Figure B.11. NSFC’s Investment inCZTS*  
* Note: Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project. Analysis in the figures is done as part of 
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Fgure 11b. NSFC Investment in CZTS 
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Table B.2 Top Five Patent Holders of Category 1 solar PV technologies 
 China Foreign 




1 Trina 13 Company Sanyo 15 Company 















5 Company Sharp 7 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 15.8% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 21.7% 
Total 265 Total 240 
Poly-Si 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 
1 Nankai University 6 Company Sharp 5 Company 
2 Xiamen Univeristy 6 Academic IBM 4 Company 






4 Hunan University 6 Company BT photonic 2 Company 
5 Trina 6 Company Canon 2 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 16.6% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 27.6% 
Total 181 Total 58 
PERC 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 





5 Company LG 3 Company 
 301 
Table B.2 Continued 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 





4 Zhongshan University 4 Academic 
Robert Bosch 
GmbH 1 Company 
5 CAS(Electrica) 3 Academic 
Mosel Vitelic 
Inc. 1 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 48.0% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 73.3% 
Total 50 Total 15 
HIT 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 
1 Nankai University 7 Academic 
Applied 





5 Academic General Electric 4 Company 
3 CAS (Electric) 4 Academic Sanyo 3 Company 
4 Linuo Solar Power 4 Company 
Princeton 
University 3 Academic 
5 Trina 4 Company Solyndra 3 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents  
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 26.1% 
Total  Total 92 
CIGS 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 












7 Academic DuPont 5 Company 





4 CAS (Shanghai) 6 Academic 
Showa Shell 
Sekiyu 3 Company 
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Table B.2 Continued 










5 Company Solyndra 3 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 24.6% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 42.4% 
Total 130 Total 66 
CdTe 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 










6 Company DuPont 5 Company 







4 Academic First Solar 3 Company 
5 CAS (Shanghai) 4 Academic 
Solar System 
and Equipment 2 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 39.3% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 31.5% 
Total 122 Total 73 
a-Si 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 
1 Nankai University 16 Academic Sanyo 6 Company 





6 Academic Sony 3 Company 
4 Donghsu Group 4 Company LG 2 Company 
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Table B.2 Continued 







4 Academic Mistubishi 2 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 31.5% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 38.1% 
Total 146 Total 42 
Perovskite 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 
1 Tongji Univeristy 3 Academic Samsung 3 Company 
2 Zhejiang University 3 Academic BASF 1 Company 





1 Academic Panasonic 1 Company 
5 CAS (Shanghai) 1 Academic Panasonic 1 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 71.4% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 46.7% 
Total 14 Total 15 
MWT 







1 Company LG 1 Company 









1 Company    
4 JA Solar 1 Company    
5 Yingli 1 Company    
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 100% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 100% 





Table B.2 Continued 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 




















3 Company IBM 4 Company 
4 Hongfujin Industry 3 Company 
Nakata 
TsueYu 3 Individual 
5 Dongnan University 3 Academic Kyo Semi Co 2 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 30% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 36.1% 
Total 9 Total 72 
Multi-junction 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 






















3 A Applied Materials 2 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 28.3% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 41.9% 
Total 120 Total 43 
Note:  
Data collection facilitated by Evalueserve http://www.evalueserve.com/ 
Data collection and analysis done as part of Stanford China Project. 
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Table B.3 Top Five Patent Holders of Category 2 solar PV technologies 
 China Foreign 
















13 Academic Fujikura 7 Company 
4 Rainbow Corp. 11 Company Sony 7 Company 
5 Tsinghua University 11 Academic 
Gracel 
Display Inc. 7 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 20.3% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 38.8% 
Total 310 Total 98 
 DSSC 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Entity 
# of 
Patent Type 
1 Nankai University 6 Company Sharp 5 Company 
2 Xiamen University 6 Academic IBM 4 Company 






4 Hunan University 6 Company BT photonic 2 Company 
5 Trina 6 Company Canon 2 Company 
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 16.6% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 27.6% 
Total 181 Total 58 
 Quantum Dot 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 
1 Wuhan University 8 Academic 
Princeton 
University 7 Academic 
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Table B.3 Continued 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 
2 Fudan University 7 Academic 
Michigan 













6 Academic Nichiya 4 Company 






Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 18.1% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 50.0% 
Total 177 Total 46 
 CTZS 
Ranking Entity # of Patent Type Name 
# of 
Patent Type 









of Sci & 
Tech 





2 Academic    





2 Academic    
Top 5 entities as a % of total 
number of patents 46.4% 
Top 5 entities as a % of 
total patents 100% 
Total 28 Total 1 
Note:  
Data collection facilitated by Evalueserve http://www.evalueserve.com/ 
Data collection and analysis done as part of Stanford University China Project. 
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Table B.4 Top Five Patent Holders of Category 3 solar PV technologies 
 China Foreign 
























University 1 Academic SLIa 2 
Company 
5 JA Solar 1 Company  Fraunhofer  1 Academic 
Top 5 entities as a percentage of 
total number of patents  87.5% 
 Top 5 entities as a 
percentage of total 
number of patents 32.1% 
Note:  
Data collection facilitated by Evalueserve http://www.evalueserve.com/ 
Data collection and analysis done as part of Stanford University China Project. 
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS TO CHAPTER 4 
Exhibit 1: Delicacy Management at GCL Poly 
At GCL Poly, the global leading Chinese silicon and wafer producers, delicacy 
management is implemented at both the executive level and at the grass root level79. At 
the company headquarter, there is a working group in the management center dedicated 
to study delicacy management and its strategic implications. The company also runs an 
organizational-wide campaign to promote the concept and the practices among its 
employees. The working group from time to time conducts studies to assess factories’ 
production performance and identify areas for improvement. They focus their attention 
on optimizing three levels of operations in their factories. At the most basic level, they 
take a page from Taylor’s scientific management approach by studying the movement of 
workers and how they operate machines and pass materials from one stage to the next. 
Step two, they apply information learned from step one to design across-procedural 
practices to optimize the efficiency of the entire production line. Step three, if the most 
efficient practice cannot be accommodated by the current production line, they will 
redesign the production line or even the entire workshop in order to implement the more 
efficient operation.  
Speaking of efficiency, it is a multi-faucet concept under delicacy management. It 
requires optimization on multiple fronts, including reducing time, material waste and 
solar cell breakage rate; increasing yields; shortening transition time and down time; 
reducing onsite inventory; increasing the level of automation with reasonable human 
control; and reducing the number of sub-par products.  
The ultimate goal is to control cost and increase final product quality. This 
approach has allowed GCL Poly to achieve a new level of cost-competitiveness in their 
                                                 
79 Tour ID #3 
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latest poly-silicon production plant. When it was first built, it followed the standardized 
modular workshop design, meaning arranging the production process one module after 
another. However, the manager quickly found that the cost was higher than they 
expected. They applied the delicacy management approach to examine the production 
process and discovered that for the particular product produced in that factory, the 
modular style production line design prolongs the material transporting time between 
modules, which led to inefficiency. In response, they decided to redesign the workshop 
and the production line to streamline the production process to fit the product. The end 
result was a faster production processes requiring a smaller number of processes, which 
the company time, money, and labor.  
Besides the top-down approach, a grass root approach was also put in place 
through which about ways to improve the efficiency of individual processes as well the 
entire system proposals can be submitted to the company management center from 





Exhibit 2: History of Pragmatism in China 
Pragmatism was first introduced to China by no other than its most famous 
champion, John Dewey. Dewey traveled to China in 1919 and stayed for 2 years to teach 
and advocate pragmatism. His Chinese disciple, Hu Shi, also became an influential figure 
and carried Dewey’s torch after he returned to the U.S. Pragmatism was well accepted in 
China in the first half of the 20th century until the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949 (Tan, 2004). Under the first 30 years of the Chinese Communist Party 
rule, pragmatism was criticize for many reasons including its opposition to the dictation 
of ideology and the of instrumentalism component of it. However, it was revived after the 
implementation of the “open door” policy in 1978 and the market-base economic reform 
that came right after that. 
Famously said by former Chairman and the architect of the Chinese economic 
reform Deng Xiaoping, “Practice is the sole criterion of truth.” The whole economic 
reform that broke ties with planned economy and adopted principles of market economy 
was essentially pragmatic because if it were to follow the communist ideology, none of 
the market-based solutions would be sanctioned since they were inherently capitalistic, 
the very ideology that communism decries. Nevertheless, by embracing pragmatism, 
Deng and his successors bypassed the controversial ideological debates, and proposed a 
new framework, which was to roll up the sleeves and do things, and then let the results 
decide the legitimacy of the action, rather than leaving it to ideological criteria. From a 
TIS perspective, this new framework is inherent entrepreneurial because it took the risks 
with regard to a new approach to run a country’s economy and it experimented with it 
and eventually reduced the uncertainty of such approaches and legitimized its existence 
(entrepreneurial experimentation). In fact, the economic reform at its initial stage was 
made of many local-scale experiments. They tested concepts such as allowing temporary 
collective or private ownership of farmland, private ownership of enterprises, free-market 
based pricing system, etc, all of which would deemed as risky and controversial at least if 
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not scandalous under a rigid communism regime. But because of the pragmatic 
framework Deng promoted, the experiments were largely judged on their outcome rather 
than their ideology camp. Successful small scale local experiments were later rolled out 
to a larger area, and eventually became nation-wide practice.  
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, China scholars have long noticed that when 
it comes to policy design, modern China is surprisingly decentralized and full of 
experimental and risk-taking spirit (Bardhan, 2002; Heilmann, 2008; Jin, Qian, & 
Weingast, 2005) rather than being a tightly central-controlled economy. Experiments, or 
in a TIS sense, entrepreneurial experimentations, are at the front and centered of many 
new economic policy designs. Besides the above-mentioned experiments with property 
ownership and market-based pricing system, one recent and energy-related policy 
program is also a good example of experiment-based pragmatism. In designing its 
greenhouse gas regulation, China created 5 pilot cities and 2 pilot provinces since 2011 to 
test different carbon emission trading schemes. The cap-and-trade systems implemented 
by different cities and provinces vary from how they treat price floor, price ceiling, credit 
banking and borrowing, industry coverage, etc. The idea is to explore different policy 
design and understand their merits and drawbacks. Information collected at the municipal 
and provincial level directly informed the final design of the national cap-and-trade 
system, which was announced in September 2015.  
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Table C.1 Key Subsidy Types Addressed in US-China Solar Trade Cases 
Type Details 
Investment Subsidies/Grants 
Golden Sun Demonstration Program to 
Trina 
2009; provided one-time assistance 
over the course of its 2-yr term 
Discovered Grants to Suntech & Trina R&D Grant 
Sub-Central Government Subsidies for 
Development of “Famous Brands” & 
“China World Top Brands” Suntech 
Grant provided by Wuxi City 
contingent on export performance 
(i.e. application required disclosure 
of export ratios & compliance with 
international standards) 
Special Energy Fund to Suntech Provided in Shandong 
Fund for Outward Expansion of Industries Provided in Guangdong 
Tax Incentives 
“Two Free, Three Half” Program for 
Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIEs) to 
Luoyang Suntech & Zhenjiang Huantai 
(cross-owned affiliates of Suntech) 
Terminated in Jan 2008, but 
preferential tax rate grandfathered-in 
for many (tax-exempted in first 2 
years of profitability & assessed 50% 
of standard income tax rate for next 
3 years) 
Preferential Tax Program for High or 
New-Tech Enterprises (HNTEs) to 
Suntech & Trina 
Established Jan 2008; Recognized 
HNTEs eligible for reduced income 
tax of 15% (down from standard 
25%) 
Enterprise Income Tax Law, R&D 
Program80 to Suntech & Trina 
Tax reduction constitutes a financial 
contribution in the form of 
government revenue foregone & a 
benefit in the amount of tax savings 
Import Tariff & VAT Exemptions for Use 
of Imported Equipment to Trina, Suntech, 
Luoyang Suntech, Shanghai Suntech, 
Zhenjiang Huantai, Suzhou Kuttler 
 
VAT Rebates on FIE Purchases of 
Chinese-Made Equipment to Trina 
Deemed specific, as VAT rebates are 





                                                 
80 Solar I Countervailing Duties (CVD) Final Decision Memorandum 
(http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/2012-25564-1.pdf), page 17. “Allows enterprises tax 
deductions of research expenditures incurred in the development of new technologies, products, and 
processes. If eligible research expenditures do not “form part of the intangible assets value,” an additional 
50% deduction from taxable income may be taken on top of the actual accrual amount. Where these 
expenditures form the value of certain intangible assets, the expenditures may be amortized based on 150% 
of the intangible assets costs.” 
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Table C.1 Continued 
Type Details 
Income Tax Reductions for Export-
Oriented FIEs 
No deeded as countervailable 
because this was not an act that 
target the solar PV energy industry 
specifically. 
Income Tax Benefits for FIEs Based on 
Geographic Location 
No deeded as countervailable 
because this was not an act that 
target the solar PV energy industry 
specifically. 
Local Income Tax Exemption & 
Reduction Programs for “Productive” FIEs 
No deeded as countervailable 
because this was not an act that 
target the solar PV energy industry 
specifically. 
Tax Refunds for Reinvestment of FIE 
Profits in Export-Oriented Enterprises 
No deeded as countervailable 
because this was not an act that 
target the solar PV energy industry 
specifically. 
Preferential Lending 
Export Seller’s Credits No deeded as countervailable 
because this was not an act that 
target the solar PV energy industry 
specifically. 
Export Buyer’s Credits Suntech & Trina Ex-Im Bank loans provided at 
preferential rates for purchase of 
exported goods from China 
Input Subsidies 
Provision of Polysilicon LTAR to Suntech 
& Trina 
(Deemed specific to cell producers) 
Provision of Land for LTAR to Suntech & 
Trina 
(Constitutes a financial contribution 
from an authority in the form of 
goods/services) 
Provision of Aluminum for Less Than 
Adequate Remuneration (LTAR) 
No deeded as countervailable 
because this was not an act that 
target the solar PV energy industry 
specifically. 
Source: Solar I Countervailing Duties (CVD) Final Decision Memorandum 
(http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/2012-25564-1.pdf); Solar II CVD Final Decision 
Memorandum (http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2014-30071-1.pdf). 
Note: Information collection and table compilation were conducted as part of the Stanford China Project 



















US$1.09M (RMB 7.5M) 
provided to match central RE 
stimulus funds, for CSI to 




















R&D grants from local 
government for local PV 


















863 grant of US$4.7M (RMB 
30M) to mass-produce PERC 
cells (with expectation that PST 





















Local industrial tax reduction 




                                                 
81 Solar Daily article; May 4, 2009: 
http://www.solardaily.com/reports/Canadian_Solar_Announces_Funding_Agreement_With_City_of_Suzh
ou_999.html.  
82 LDK Q4 2012 earnings call (cited by BNEF). 
83 LDK Q1 2013 earnings call (cited by BNEF). 
84 Interviewee # 81, #82.  
85 LDK Q4 2012 earnings call (cited by BNEF). 
86 LDK Q1 2013 earnings call (cited by BNEF). 
87 Interviewee #102 
88 “Creditors Dispute Details as Suntech Finds Buyer,” BNEF (China Solar Analyst Reaction); November 
19, 2013: https://www.bnef.com/Insight/8856.  
89 Interviewee # 91 
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Government co-pay with 









US$31.4M (RMB 200M) in 
funding & bank loans provided 
at company’s inception94 











Local government chip in for 
companies’ social security and 











government Unknown  
Recruitment packages including 
an automobile, an apartment, 
and a research lab, provided for 
free or heavily subsidized by 













Unknown Pre-built standardized factory floor97 
                                                 
90 NBD article; June 22, 2012: http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2012-06-22/662422.html.  
91 DAQO Q1 2014 earnings call (cited by BNEF). 
92 Imeigu article; May 26, 2013: http://news.imeigu.com/a/1369576370859.html. 
93 Interviewee # 91 
94 Imeigu article; May 26, 2013: http://news.imeigu.com/a/1369576370859.html. 
95 Interviewee # 91 
96 Interviewee # 91 
97 Interviewee # 91 
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Public transit system for people 
who work at local industrial 
parks including employees of 
PV companies, provided for 
















International school located in 
Trina Solar Industrial Park, 
subsidized by local government 
and Trina Solar99 
Notes: Note: Information collection was conducted as part of the Stanford China Project. 
      Table initially compiled as part of the Stanford China Project by Cait Pollock, and further 




                                                 
98 Interviewee # 91 
99 Tour at Trina Solar Industrial Park, on August 28, 2014.  
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Exhibit 3. PV Deployment Program in China before 2013 
The Solar Roofs Program was created by MOF and Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) in 2009 to provide capital subsidies for BIPV 
and rooftop PV systems at ¥ 20/Watt ($ 2.9/Watt) and ¥15/Watt ($ 2.2/Watt) level, 
respectively. The subsidy levels were later downgraded to ¥ 17/Watt ($ 2.5/Watt) and ¥ 
13/Watt ($ 1.9/Watt) to reflect the declining PV module price. In order to qualify for the 
subsidies, a PV project has to have a minimum capacity of 50kW and the PV modules 
have to meet the minimum efficiency floors:  16%, 14% and 6% for monocystalline PVs, 
polysilicon PVs, and thin-films, respectively.   
The Golden Sun Demonstration Program was initially set up to subsidize the total 
investment of a solar project. It was established in 2009 and offered 50% subsidy to grid-
connected rooftop PV, BIPV, and ground-mounted systems and its associated 
transmission and grid connection costs, and 70% subsidies to off-grid solar PV projects in 
remote areas. In a revision in 2011, the program changed its subsidy mechanism from a 
fixed percentage of total project investment to ¥ 9/W ($1.3/W) subsidy for projects using 
crystalline modules and ¥ 8/W (1.2/W) for projects using thin-film modules.  The 
subsidies were further adjusted downward to ¥ 7/W ($1/W) for all PV module types in a 
2012 revision, reflecting the fast declining module price.  By the time the two programs 
ended in 2013, 3.38GW of distributed solar had been installed as a result of these two 
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Screen Printing 12 













Ingot / Block 
Production 
Equipment 






















Charge Controller 185 
Battery 170 
Converter 9 
Monitoring System 42 





















Metallization Paste 40 
Screen 24 
Ammonia 16 























Recycled Material 17 
Crucible 105 
Insulation felt 38 
Seed Crystal 2 




Junction Box 109 
Connector 100 
Frame 62 
TCO Material 0 
Sputtering Target 55 
Encapsulant 49 
Backsheet 26 

















Crystalline   531 













Third Generation 2 
Source: Table compiled using ENF database http://www.enfsolar.com/directory/equipment  
 Data collected and analyzed as part of the Stanford China Solar Project.  
 Data collected as part of the Stanford China Project by Jingfan Wang, a member of the Stanford 
China Solar Project, and analyzed by the author of this dissertation.  
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Strength of China’s supply chain that remains strong 
 
Figure D. 1. Global Top 10 PV Glass Suppliers in 2013 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey the Continuous Edition Analysis Report.  
Note: 
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
The map was created as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this dissertation, Cait Pollock 
and Jingfan Wang, all members of the Stanford China Project research team. 
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Figure D. 2. Global Top 10 PV Junction Box Suppliers in 2013 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey the Continuous Edition Analysis Report.  
Note: 
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
The map was created as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this dissertation, Cait Pollock 






Figure D. 3. Global Top 10 PV Laminate Machine Suppliers in 2013 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey the Continuous Edition Analysis Report.  
Note: 
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
The map was created as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this dissertation, Cait Pollock 
and Jingfan Wang, all members of the Stanford China Project research team.  
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Weaknesses of China’s supply chain that are improving 
 
Figure D. 4. Global Top 10 PV Back Sheet Suppliers in 2013 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey the Continuous Edition Analysis Report.  
Note: 
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
The map was created as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this dissertation, Cait Pollock 







Figure D. 5. Global Top 10 PV EVA Suppliers in 2013 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey the Continuous Edition Analysis Report.  
Note: 
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
The map was created as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this dissertation, Cait Pollock 




Figure D. 6. Global Top 10 PV Etching Machine Suppliers in 2013 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey the Continuous Edition Analysis Report.  
Note: 
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
The map was created as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this dissertation, Cait Pollock 
and Jingfan Wang, all members of the Stanford China Project research team.  
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Weaknesses of China’s supply chain that are stagnant 
 
 
Figure D. 7. Global Top 10 PV Silver Paste Suppliers in 2013 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey the Continuous Edition Analysis Report.  
Note: 
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
The map was created as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this dissertation, Cait Pollock 





Figure D. 8. Global Top 10 PV String Machine Suppliers in 2013 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey the Continuous Edition Analysis Report.  
Note: 
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
The map was created as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this dissertation, Cait Pollock 





Figure D. 9. Global Top 10 PV Flash Test Machine Suppliers in 2013 
Sources: ENF Chinese Cell and Panel Manufacturers Survey the Continuous Edition Analysis Report.  
Note: 
The subscription to the ENF database came through the Stanford China Project. 
The map was created as part of the Stanford China Project by the author of this dissertation, Cait Pollock 
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